[ G.R. No. 16118. February 16, 1961 ] 111 Phil. 100; 59 OG 5490 (August, 1963)
[ G.R. No. 16118. February 16, 1961 ]
DELFIN MERCADER, PETITIONER, VS. HON. FRANCISCO VALILA OF THE JUSTICE OF THE PEACE COURT OF BOBON, SAMAR AND AMANCIO BALITE, RESPONDENTS. D E C I S I O N
BENGZON, J.:
On April 20, 1959, Amancio Balite filed with the justice of the peace court at Bobon, Samar, a criminal complaint for libel against Delfin Mercader. After making the preliminary examination, the judge issued the corresponding warrant of arrest. The accused moved to dismiss for lack of jurisdiction and cause of action. Upon denial thereof, the accused filed in September 1959, this petition for certiorari, based mainly on the alleged want of jurisdiction of the aforesaid inferior court.
In ordinary circumstances, the petition would have, been dismissed, without prejudice to its presentation before the local court of first instance. But at that time there were pending before this Tribunal some cases involving the jurisdiction, or lack of jurisdiction, of justices of the peace over criminal libel, in the light of Republic Act 1289, approved June 15, 1955.[1] So, we gave due course to this petition. In his answer, the respondent judge explained that he had taken cognizance of the case for purposes of preliminary investigation. In fact, he stated, as the accused had failed to attend the hearing, and there was prima facie evidence, he forwarded the expediente to the court of first instance for trial on the merits.
The controversy is thus reduced to the question whether the inferior courts may, after the passage of Republic Act 1289, entertain criminal complaints for written defamation, not for trial on the merits, but for purposes of preliminary investigation. It is contended by those who would deny such authority, that Republic Act 1289 had the effect of depriving justice of the peace courts of their power even to conduct preliminary investigations in the matter of libel or written defamation. The question has been decided in the affirmative in People vs. Olarte, 108 Phil., 756; 58 Off. Gaz., (8) 1517. Through Mr. Justice Concepcion, this Court said:
“Can we justly hold that by fixing for said offense a penalty falling under the original jurisdiction of courts of first instance, the framers of section 2 of Act No. 277 had evinced the intent, either to establish an exception to the provisions of Act No. 194, authorizing every justice of the peace “to make preliminary investigation of any crime alleged to have been committed within his municipality, jurisdiction to hear and determine which is by law * * * vested in the judges of Courts of First Instance,’ or to divest justice of the peace of such authority, as regards the crime of libel?”
“It is obvious to us that such inference is unwarranted. To begin with, there is absolutely nothing in Act No. 277 to indicate the aforementioned intent. Secondly, repeals or amendments by implication arc neither presumed nor favored. On the contrary every statute should be harmonized with them. Thirdly, the jurisdiction of courts of first instance to hear and determine criminal actions within the original jurisdiction thereof is far from inconsistent with the authority of justices of the peace to make preliminary investigations in such actions. What is more, this authority has been vested to relieve courts of first instance of the duty to hear cases which are devoid of probable cause, thereby paving the way for the effective exercise of the original jurisdiction of said courts and the expeditious disposal by the same of criminal cases which are prima facie mertitorious. * * *.”
“It is apparent, from a perusal of the three (3) provisions aforementioned, that the framers of Article 360 of the Revised Penal Code intended to introduce no substantial change in the existing law, except as regards venue, and that, in all other respects, they meant to preserve and continue the status quo under sections 2 and 11 of Act No. 277. Such was also the purpose of Congress in passing House Bill No. 2695, which eventually became Republic Act No. 1280.”
The Bobon justice of the peace has thus acted within his powers, and this petition will have to be dismissed.
Petitioner here maintains that even if the justice of the peace courts have jurisdiction to conduct preliminary investigations, the venue was improperly laid in Bobon, because neither the complainant nor the defendant resided there. The statute[2] provides that where the libel is published or circulated in a province or city wherein neither the offended party nor the offender resides, the action may be brought therein; and the complaint herein questioned, alleges that the libel had been published and circulated in Bobon and other municipalities of Samar. Bobon and Samar, therefore, constituted proper venue.
Petitioner’s last contention that the complaint stated no cause of action, may not be considered now. It is unimportant in a certiorari proceeding, specially because petitioner has the remedy of discussing the issue before the court of first instance, and then if after hearing he is convicted, to appeal in due time.
Padilla, Bautista Angelo, Labrador, Concepcion, Reyes, J. B. L., Barrera, Paredes and Dizon, JJ., concur.