[ G.R. No. L-12894. September 30, 1960 ] 109 Phil. 522
[ G.R. No. L-12894. September 30, 1960 ]
[WITH RESOLUTION OF JANUARY 28, 1961] LILIA JUANA BARLES, MARIA ESTRELLA BARLES AND REMEDIOS BAELES, PLAINTIFFS AND APPELLANTS, VS. DON ALFONSO PONCE ENRILE, DEFENDANT AND APPELLEE. D E C I S I O N
GUTIERREZ DAVID, J.:
On September 1,1955, Lilia Juana Barles, Maria Estrella Barles and Remedios Barles, all of legal age, filed with the Court of First Instance of Manila a “peticion para el reconocimiento de filiacion paternal con dano moral” alleging in substance, among other things, that they are illegitimate issues of the defendant Alfonso Ponce Enrile and Genoveva Barles, their natural mother, with whom said defendant cohabited at the time they were conceived and born.
Instead of answering, the defendant filed a motion to dismiss the complaint on the grounds that it did not state a cause of action and that even if it did, the same had already prescribed. Action on the motion, however, was deferred until after the trial, the court being of the. opinion that the grounds alleged therein did not appear indubitable. Thereafter, the defendant filed his answer. While the case was being heard, the Juvenile and Domestic Relations Court was organized under Republic Act No. 1401 and pursuant thereto the case was transferred to said court where the trial was continued.
On June 1, 1957, the Juvenile and Domestic Relations Court, without going into the merits of the case, rendered a decision dismissing the complaint, holding that while the complaint on the basis of the evidence submitted may be considered as stating a valid and sufficient cause of action, still plaintiffs’ action had already prescribed. Reconsideration of this decision having been denied, plaintiffs. appealed directly to this Court.
We find the appeal to be meritorious.
The lower court in the decision complained of ruled that plaintiffs’ cause of action accrued from birth, and on the theory that the action, pursuant to sec. 44 of the Code of Civil Procedure, could only be brought within 10 years after the cause of action accrued, since no period therefor had been fixed by law, it held that plaintiffs’ complaint is already barred by, prescription, the same not having been filed within two years after attaining the age of majority as required by sec. 45 of the aforementioned Code of Civil Procedure. The law, in our opinion, has been misapplied. Plaintiffs, who are admittedly illegitimate (spurious) children, seek mainly to establish in their complaint their filiation or paternity with the defendant, aware as they must be that in the absence of a competent voluntary recognition on the part of the defendant, their alleged father, they cannot be entitled to successional rights unless their filiation is judicially decreed. Their action is authorized under Article 2S9 of the new Civil Code which permits the investigation of the paternity of illegitimate (spurious) children under the circumstances specified in Articles 283 and 284 of the same Code. The Code nowhere specifies the period within which the action to investigate spurious paternity should be brought., It will be observed, however, that such action is similar to the action for compulsory recognition of natural children which, under Article 285 of the new Civil Code, may be brought only during the lifetime of the presumed parents, except (1) where the parent has died during the minority of the child, in which case the later may file the action within four years from the attainment of his majority, or (2) when a hitherto unknown document of recognition is discovered after the parent’s death, in which case the action must be commenced within four years from such discovery. Both are actions whereby the child may prove that the defendant is in fact the father or mother of the the plaintiff, notwithstanding the refusal of the parent to admit the generative link. The grounds upon which either action must be premised are the same, i. e., those specified in Articles 283 and 284 of the new Civil Code. And as a matter of fact, both spurious and natural children are the offspring of illicit relations and for this reason it is but just that the investigation of parental relation should take place during the lifetime of the putative parent; for only the parent is in a position to reveal the true facts surrounding the claimant’s conception. Logically, therefore, the same time limitation, in the absence of an express legal provision to the contrary, should apply to both actions. Plaintiffs’ action in the present case having been filed during the lifetime of the presumed parent, it follows that the lower court erred in dismissing it upon the ground of prescription.
It is true that plaintiffs were born before the effectivity of the new Civil Code and for this reason, it may be argued, their action for declaration or investigation of paternity should be governed by the laws then existing. Under the old Civil Code, however, except where the paternity appears in a final judgment rendered in a criminal or civil action, nor is shown by some indubitable document in which the filiation is expressly acknowledged, no complaint, the purpose of which may be to investigate, either directly or indirectly, the paternity of illegitimate children who do not have the legal status of natural children, could be admitted. (Art. 141 in connection with Art. 140.) It will thus be seen that the old Civil Code, unlike the new, allowed only a limited investigation of paternity of illegitimate children who are not natural. Indeed, considering the allegations of the complaint and the nature of the evidence already presented in the case at bar, we think plaintiffs’ action could not have been admitted under the old Civil Code. There can hardly be any doubt, however, that it is now authorized by the new Civil Code, which took effect only in August, 1950. In this connection, the lower court erred in holding that plaintiffs’ cause of action accrued from birth. The time for prescription for all kinds of action, when there is no special provision which ordains otherwise, shall be counted from the day they may be brought. (Art. 1969, old Civil Code; Art. 1150 of the new.) Stated differently, alright of action accrues only from the moment the right to commence an action comes into existence and prescription commences to run from that time.
Upon the other hand, Articles 283, 284 and 289 of the new Civil Code, concerning proof of illegitimate filiation under which the present action has been brought, are expressly given retroactive effect under paragraph 3, Article 2263 of the same Code.
Wherefore, the appealed decision is hereby reversed and the case remanded to the lower court for further proceedings. So ordered without costs.
Paras, C. J., Bengzon, Bautista Angelo, Labrador, Concepcion, Barrera, Paredes, and Dizon, JJ., concur.
Reyes, J. B. L. J., concurs in the result.