G.R. No. L-11748

THE PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, PLAINTIFF-APPELANT, VS. LIBORIO SEGOVIA, DEFENDANT-APPELLEE. D E C I S I O N

[ G.R. No. L-11748. May 28, 1958 ] G.R. No. L-11748

[ G.R. No. L-11748. May 28, 1958 ]

THE PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, PLAINTIFF-APPELANT, VS. LIBORIO SEGOVIA, DEFENDANT-APPELLEE. D E C I S I O N

BAUTISTA ANGELO, J.:

On February 2, 1953, an information for malicious mischief was filed against the accused by the city attorney of Legaspi, Albay, before the Municipal Court of Legaspi. He pleaded not guilty. After the prosecution has presented its evidence, he moved to quash the information on the ground that the prosecution failed to prove all the elements of the crime charged, but the motion was denied, thereafter, the accused presented his evidence, after which the court rendered a decision finding him guilty of the crime of malicious mischief as defined in Article 327 of the Revised Penal Code and sentenced him to suffer ten (10) days of arresto menor or pay a fine of P75.00, to indemnify the offended party in same amount, with subsidiary imprisonment in case of insolvency, and to pay the costs.

From this decision, he appealed to the court of first instance where again he was charged with the same offense. On November 10, 1956, he reiterated his motion to quash the information on the same ground that it does not allege the necessary elements to constitute the crime of malicious mischief. This time the court sustained the motion and dismissed case. The court cancelled the “bond for his provisional release. The Government appealed.

The fundamental rule in considering a motion to the ground that the averments of the information sufficient to constitute the offense charged is whether the facts alleged, if hypothetically admitted, would meet the essential elements of the offense as defined in the law. te above ground imports a hypothetical admission of the alleged in the information “but challenges their sufficiency for failure to meet the essential requisites of the as specified by substantive law."[1] However, it was held that “Prima facie, the ‘facts charged’ are those described in the complaint, but they may be amplified or qualified others appearing to be additional circumstances, upon admissions made by the people’s representative, which admissions could anyway be submitted by him as amendments to same information. x x x Of course, it may be added that upon similar motions the court and the fiscal are not required to go beyond the averments of the information, nor is the latter to be inveigled into a premature and risky revelation of his evidence” (People v. Navarro, 75 Phil., 516, 518-519). Does the herein information meet this test?

The information filed in the lower court reads :

“That on or about January 13, 1953, in the District of Daraga, City of Legaspi, Philippines, and within the jurisdiction of this Honorable Court, the above-named accused moved by resentment and anger and with intent to damage another’s property did then and there wilfully, unlawfully and feloniously shoot to death a female white pig spotted brown owned by Julian Stabella which act of the accused caused damage and prejudice to said Julian Marbella in the amount of P75.00 Philippino Currency.” (Information, p. 31, Record; Underlining supplied)

Analyzing the information we find that, as alleged, the accused wilfully damaged the property of one Marbella when he shot to death a pig owned by the latter with the felonious intent of causing an injury because of resentment and anger. In other words, the accused caused damage to the property of another, with the intent to cause injury, due to an evil motive, and these are precisely the elements instituting the crime of malicious mischief (Article 327, Revised Penal Code; see Padilla, Revised Penal Code, Annotated, Vol. II, p. 645, 1955 ed.)

Commenting on the acts committed by the accused as charged in the information and as admitted by the solicitor General, this official said: “Certainly the deliberate act the accused Segovia in shooting to death the female white pig owned by Julian Marbella was obviously due to malicious intent on his part. As it has been established before the Municipal Court the accused shot not only once but four times this female white pig with his shotgun, Caliber .22 when he saw it among the plants. There was certainly the element of vengeance and anger with malicious intent of avenging whatever damage the pig might have done to his plants. The proper thing which the accused should have done when he saw the pig among his plants, was to drive it away, and after assessing the value of whatever damages the pig might have caused to his plants, he should have filed a civil action for damages against the owner, in accordance with the provisions of the Civil Code. But in this case he took the law in his own hands x x x.” We agree with this comment. It is obvious that the trial court erred in sustaining the motion to quash.

The plea is advanced that the Government can no longer appeal from the decision of dismissal without placing the accused in double jeopardy considering that he was already convicted by the Municipal Court of Legaspi. This claim ignores the fact that he appealed from the judgment of conviction and hence it was vacated. The rule is that when an appeal has been perfected, the judgment of the justice of the peace or municipal court is vacated and the case is tried de novo in the court of first instance as if it were originally instituted therein (section 8, Rule 119). No new information need be filed in the latter court in order that it may acquire jurisdiction to try the case (Crisostomo v. Director of Prisons, 41 Phil., 368; People v. Cu Hiok, 62 Phil., 501). If the case, on appeal by the accused, is as originally instituted, and the motion was filed before arraignment or plea, it is obvious that the dismissal of the case was no bar to appeal because it does not place the accused in jeopardy under Section 9, Rule 113, of the Rules of Court, The claim is therefore without merit.

Wherefore, the order appealed from is hereby set aside, the case is reiuanded to the lower court for hearing on No costs.

Paras, C.J., Bengzon, Montemayor, Reyes, A., Labrador, Concepcion, Reyes, J.B.L., Endencia, and Felix, JJ., concur.