[ G.R. No. L-10952. May 30, 1958 ] 103 Phil. 980
[ G.R. No. L-10952. May 30, 1958 ]
THE PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, PLAINTIFF AND APPELLANT,. VS. BENIGNO LINGAD Y VITO, DEFENDANT AND APPELLEE. D E C I S I O N
BAUTISTA ANGELO, J.:
On October 30, 1954, Benigno Lingad y Vito was charged before the Municipal Court of Manila with the crime of slight physical injuries thru reckless imprudence where, after trial, he was found guilty and sentenced to pay a fine of P50, with subsidiary imprisonment in case of insolvency, and to pay the costs.
On appeal to the court of first instance, the accused filed a motion to quash, which the court granted and dismissed the case, holding that the crime of slight physical injuries when committed thru reckless inprudence is not punishable “by law. The Government appealed to this Court. The pertinent portion of the information reads:
“That on or about the 28th day of October, 1954, in the city of Manila, Philippines, the said accused being then the driver and person in charge of Pick-up with plate No. T-518 (Cavite-‘54), did then and there drive, manage and operate the same along Arroceros Street, in said city, in a careless, reckless, negligent and imprudent manner, by then and there making the same run at a speed greater than was reasonable and proper and by not taking the necessary precautions to avoid accident to persons or damage to property, considering the condition of traffic in said place at the time, causing by such carelessness, recklessness, imprudence and lack of precaution the said Pick-up with plate No. T-518 (Cavite-‘54), so driven, managed and operated by him to strike and bump against car No. PI-2578 (Manila) which was then at a stopped position and driven by Det. Mariano Joaquin, and as a result of the violent impact Mayor Arsenio Lacson, a passenger of the said car with plate No. PI-2573 sustained physical injuries, which have required and will require medical attendance for a period of more than 1 but less than 10 days and have prevented and will prevent the said Mayor Arsenio Lacson from engaging in his customary labor for the same period of time.” (p. 4, record)
In sustaining the motion to quash, the trial court relied on the decision of the Court of Appeals in People vs. Macario Ande y Marino, 51 Off. Gaz., p. 5222, wherein it held that “The law does not declare as a crime and does not provide any penalty for the execution of an act - more serious as it is - committed thru reckless imprudence which, if intentional (only) amounts to a light felony.” And this decision is predicated on a portion of Article 365 of the Revised Penal Code which provides that “A fine not exceeding 200 pesos and censure shall be imposed upon any person who, by simple imprudence or negligence, shall cause some wrong which, if done maliciously, would have constituted a light felony.”
We have no quarrel with the above citation. The same is in accordance with law. But the question is: Do the acts alleged in the information not fit into the framework of said decision, or do they not come under the above quoted portion of Article 365 of the Revised Penal Code?
The answer is obviously in the affirmative if we carefully examine the averments of the information. While the information gives the designation of the crime as “slight physical injuries through reckless imprudence”, the body thereof does not specify the kind of negligence or imprudence that qualifies the crime charged, for it merely alleges that it was committed “in a careless, reckless, negligent and imprudent manner * * * causing by such carelessness, recklessness, Imprudence and lack of precaution”, the collision which resulted in the injury. Under such vague allegation of the imprudence act, one may infer that the act may have been committed either through reckless or simple negligence, depending upon the nature of the evidence that may be presented by the prosecution. And even if what was intended was to qualify the crime with reckless imprudence, still it cannot be said that the same is not punishable by law for it may still be shown during the trial that the accused committed the act only through simple negligence upon the theory that what is more or graver includes the less or lighter, in the same manner as a serious physical injury includes a slight injury, or robbery includes the crime of theft. The question, therefore, in the last analysis may boil down to a matter of evidence. In other words, the elements of the two kinds of negligence are practically the same, the only difference lies in the degree, and this can be substantiated by proper evidence.
We are, therefore, of the opinion that the trial court erred in sustaining the motion to quash .and in dismissing the case.
Wherefore, we hereby set aside the order appealed from and direct that the case be remanded to the trial court for hearing on the merits. No costs.
Bengzon, Montemayor, Reyes, A., Concepcion and Endencia, JJ., concur.