[ G.R. No. L-10610. May 26, 1958 ] 103 Phil. 773
[ G.R. No. L-10610. May 26, 1958 ]
THE PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, PLAINTIFF AND APPELLANT, VS. ERNESTO SILVELA, DEFENDANT AND APPELLEE. D E C I S I O N
BENGZON, J.:
Ernesto A. Silvela was arrested in Iloilo upon a sworn complaint of Rosalia Bermejo Palauar, which had been preliminarily investigated by the City Fiscal thereof. Said complaint alleged that the accused,
“* * * signed, sent and addressed two unsealed letters to the undersigned containing a certain false, malicious and defamatory libel tending to injure and impeach the honesty, virtue, honor, reputation and integrity of the undersigned, by then and there willfully, maliciously and criminally branding, calling and imputing to the undersigned among others as “Pompom, Naga Business, Naga Prostitute, Prostitute, * * * which appear in two letters sent and addressed by the accused to the undersigned on September 21, 1955 and September 25, 1955 which defamatory and libelous letters are hereunder quoted verbatim as follows:
“MY DEAR MISS ROSALIA PALAUAR:
Allow me to take the cudgel in responding your well-written and threatening letter because I am an integral member of the family of the man you alleged to have smeared your profession and your degree of Master of Arts, major in English. * * * How proud you are to announce to everybody that you have said degree and yet how ignorant you are even of the simple term “libel”, Libel, for your information, is a written or printed defamation or slander. What a paradox! You don’t know the very word, libel, and yet you have the nerve to frighten my brother-in-law of its consequences-of the great fine and the long imprisonment! You should have had consulted a lawyer before writing that ignominious letter of yours; he could have had informed you that the most appropriate case you can bring to court if there is any truth to your allegation is “oral defamation.” * * . I intended to return to my job this Sunday but I am postponing said trip in order to hear for myself the case I encourage you to bring to court at your earliest convenience. However, before bringing it to court, may I advise you to change the word naga-business to naga prostitute; otherwise you will become a laughing stock in court. You know, the most appropriate English term for “pom-pom” is prostitute. ‘ * *.” “DEAR MISS ROSALIA B. PALAUAR:
I am afraid, Madam, your mind is exceedingly polluted with your guilt or you simply cannot understand English sentences. I was only advising you to change the word, “naga business” to “naga-prostitute” since the equivalent English word for “pompom” is prostitute but in your last letter, according to you, I called you “pompom” or “naga-business.” How irrelevant you are.
You further told me to rectify the term, prostitute. Well, I am really sorry. I cannot acquiesce to your kind request. I have been trained in my profession to be exact to the smallest fraction; hence, I always call a spade, a spade, and a shovel, a shovel. Besides, I cannot pick a more refined term for your implied idea of a “pompom.” At any rate, I mean every word I say and I’m conscious of its consequences.”
Before his arraignment, Silvela moved to quash, contending that the facts charged did not constitute an offense. Over the fiscal’s opposition, the judge dismissed the case explaining that “upon reading carefully the two letters quoted in the complaint, it does not appear that defamatory words have been directed against the complainant.”
We read the letters differently. As admitted by the defendant, he first answered a letter of complainant to his brother-in-law wherein she had apparently threatened to sue the latter for having called her “naga-business’ or “pompom.” Now, in this first letter, defendant practically says, “my brother-in-law should have called you ‘prostitute’ the most appropriate English term.”
The second letter responded to complainant’s reply to the first. In this reply, complainant requested defendant to rectify the term “prostitute” which he had applied to her. Yet defendant answered:
“I cannot acquiesce to your kind request. I have been trained in my profession to be exact to the smallest fraction; I always call a spade a spade, and a shovel, a shovel * * * I mean every word I say and I’m conscious of its consequences.” (Italics Ours.)
It is clear in our opinion that defendant as much as said, “If I called you ‘prostitute’ I decline to retract. I say what I mean, and I mean what I say.” Defendant refused to withdraw the dagger: instead, he plunged it deeper, to the hilt. Of course, it is unnecessary to add that calling a young lady pursuing graduate courses a “prostitute” is libelous.
His Honor apparently viewed the imputations in the letter as purely impersonal, not applying to the complainant herself. As we have already stated, the offensive imputations obviously referred to the addressee of the letter, who was therein called a prostitute.
Nevertheless, it may be added that the obnoxious writing need not mention the libeled party by name (Causin vs. Jakosalem, 5 Phil., 155) the prosecution being permitted to prove by evidence that a vague or general imputation of dishonorable conduct referred to the complainant or complainants. In one of the most famous libel cases, an editorial about “Birds of Prey,” criticising “man, who besides being eagles, having the characteristics of the vulture, the owl and the vampire, etc. etc.,” was held to be libelous notwithstanding its having failed to identify the aggrieved parties; because proof aliunde showed that it referred to them. (Worcester vs. Ocampo, 22 Phil., 42.)
In this instance, the fiscal asserted that he could and would prove at the trial, that the offensive words referred to the complainant, as the complaint averred.
What evidence could the Fiscal adduce to prove the connecting link? Probably the complainant’s letters to defendant and to his brother-in-law, the terms of which as we surmised, will undoubtedly reveal the connection—if still needed—between the insulting words and the person to whom they alluded.
Furthermore, the motion to quash must be deemed to have admitted the allegations of the complaint, one of which states that defendant wilfully, maliciously called the complainant, or imputed to her, the words “pompom,” “naga-business,” “naga-prostitute,” and “prostitute.”
During our deliberations, the question of “publication” cropped up. Although it was not raised by the defendant, it was a proper subject of inquiry, since publication constitutes one of the essential elements of the crime of libel.’ We were quoted Lopez vs. Delgado, 8 Phil., 26, wherein the malicious defamation having been inclosed in a sealed envelope and sent by special messenger to the plaintiff by the defendant, it was held that no libel had been committed, since the letter was not published; but we noticed that whereas there the envelope was “sealed,” here it was “unsealed.”
And later we found U.S. vs. Griño, 36 Phil., 738, wherein the accused signed and sent to the offended party a letter (not shown to be sealed) charging the latter with having illicit relations with her (accused’s) husband. She was held guilty of having “published” the libelous writing.
Now, if sending a letter “not shown to be sealed” is publication, sending of an “unsealed letter” as in this case, should a fortiori be held to be publication. The Griño case accords with American jurisprudence:
“As a general rule, in the absence of a statute to the contrary, a communication of the defamatory matter to the person defamed is a sufficient publication to constitute a criminal offense.” (53 Corpus Juris Secundum, Libel and Slander, sec. 284.)
“While publication within the rules relating to civil liability implies communication of the libel or slander complained of to a person other than the victim, its meaning; is considerably broader in criminal prosecutions; the authorities appear to agree that in such cases, impartation of the defamation, to anyone at all-even to the person defamed-constitutes such a publication as will support an indictment, specially when done with an intent ’to provoke a breach of the peace. Thus, it has several times been held that publication may be effected within the meaning of the law by enclosing libelous matter in. sealed envelope and mailing or delivering it to the person therein denounced.” (33 American Jurisprudence, pp. 293-294.) Italics Ours.
This is not to declare the Lopez case modified or superseded by the Griño decision. The former involved a civil litigation for damages, as to which the prevailing view seems to be: “If the defamatory matter is not seen or heard by anyone except the defamer and the defamed, damages to character reputation can not result since a man’s reputation is the estimate in which others hold him, and not what he himself thinks.” (Many cases cited in annotation at p. 239 of 24 American Law Reports Annotated.)
Wherefore, having found the letters to contain libelous matter which in the eyes of the law had been published, we must reverse, and hereby reverse, the appealed decision. The record will be remanded to the court below for further proceedings. With costs against appellee.
Montemayor, Bautista Angelo, Labrador, Concepdon, Reyes, J.B.L. and Endencia, JJ., concur.