[ G.R. No. L-10542. July 31, 1958 ] G.R. No. L-10542
[ G.R. No. L-10542. July 31, 1958 ]
DIOCESA PAULAN, ET AL., PLAINTIFFS, ZACARIAS SARABIA, ET AL., THIRD-PARTY PLAINTIFFS-APPELLANTS, VS. ZACARIAS SARABIA, ET AL., DEFENDANTS, JUAN CADUÑGON, THIRD-PARTY DEFENDANT, MARIA M. LIM, THIRD-PARTY DEFENDANT-APPELLEE. D E C I S I O N
BAUTISTA ANGELO, J.:
On July 25, 1951, a truck owned and operated by Zacarias Sarabia and driven by Emilio Celeste fell into a creek after it collided with another truck of the Mary Lim Line. As a result of the collision, Gaudencio Basco who was one he passengers of Sarabia’s truck died. On April 19, 1955, Basco’s widow and heirs filed a complaint against Zacarias Sarabia and Emilio Celeste for compensation and damages.
On July 11, 1955, defendants filed a third-party complaint against Juan Caduñgon, driver of the Mary Lim truck, and one Quintin Lim as owner and operator of the latter truck. This complaint was, however, amended on December 20, 1955 stating therein that the owner of the truck driven by Juan Caduñgon was Maria M. Lim. On January 24, 1956, Maria M. Lim filed a motion to dismiss on the grounds (1) that there is no cause of action against her, and (2) that the action, being a quasi-delict, has already prescribed. This motion was sustained on the ground of prescription and the complaint against Maria Lim was dismissed. Hence this appeal.
There is no merit in the appeal. The action which appellants desire to press against appellee is really one based on a quasi-delict which prescribes in four years, and this period having already expired when the action was taken, it is obvious that the action has prescribed. Thus, in the third-party complaint against appellee it is alleged that the collision “was the exclusive, direct and immediate result of the felonious, negligent, careless, reckless and imprudent driving of the TPU truck Mary Lim Line No. 108 by Juan Caduñgon x x x without any regard for traffic laws, and regulations and vehicle laws as to speed, blowing of horn, right of way and other rules”, which truck is owned and operated by appellee. And Article 1146 of the new Civil Code provides that an action based “upon a quasi-delict” prescribes in four years.
It is true that “When a defendant claims to be entitled not a party to the action x x x to contribution, indemnity, subrogation or any other relief, in respect of the plaintiff’s claim, he may file, with leave of court, against such person a pleading which shall state the nature of his claim and shall be called the third-party complaint” (Rule 12, Section 1). And appellants may invoke this privilege by bringing into the case the owner of the truck which in their opinion has been the one responsible for the accident, but this can only be done if the claim is still enforceable and not when prescription has already set in. While this provision of the rule has been adopted to avoid multiplicity of actions, such however can no longer be invoked when the action is already barred as in the present case.
But it is contended that the action of appellants has not yet prescribed if the period of four years should be counted from the date the main action was filed against them by the plaintiffs, which is April 19, 1955, because their amended third-party complaint was filed against appellee only on December 20, 1955. And this is so, they contend, because the purpose of their action is only to ask reimbursement from appellee. But appellee contends that this theory is erroneous because the nature of the present action being one for damages it is but proper and reasonable that the period of four years be computed from the day the damage is caused. In this case collision took place on July 25, 1951 and so more than four years had elapsed when the amended third-party complaint was filed against appellee.
We find correct the contention of appellee. The law ordinarily provides that the period during which an action may be brought shall be computed from the time the right of action accrues (Articles 1144 & 1149, new Civil Code), but nothing is provided in this respect with regard to an action quasi-delict, for Article 1146 (new Civil Code) simply provides that the action shall be instituted within four years. There being no provision as to when shall the period of four years commence to run, the provision of Article 1150 shall apply, which reads: “The time for prescription for all kinds of actions, when there is no special provision which ordains otherwise, shall be counted from the day they may be brought.” Evidently, the day therein referred to is that the collision, for an action based on a quasidelict can be brought now independently of the criminal action and even regardless of the outcome of the latter (Article 31, new Civil Code). There can therefore be no dispute that the action of appellants against appellee should have been brought within the period of four years counted from July 25, 1951.
But even if appellee is not brought in as third-party defendant as desired by appellants, we may say that no prejudice would thereby result to appellants, because the liability of appellee could still be pleaded and proven by appellants. In fact, that is the special defense pleaded by appellants in their answer to the main complaint. They claimed that the collision was “the direct result and responsibility of the driver of TPU truck No. 108” belonging to appellee. So that if they succeed in proving such defense even in the absence of appellee, they could still be exempt from liability even if no judgment thereon could be rendered against the latter. Anyway, the action of the plaintiffs against appellee has also prescribed.
Moreover, under the law, “The responsibility of two or more persons who are liable for a. quasi-delict is solidary” (Article 2194, new Civil Code), and “A solidary debtor may, in actions filed by the creditor, avail himself of all deefenses which are derived from the nature of the obligation x x x.With respect to those which personally belong to the others, he may avail himself thereof only as regards that part of the debt for which the latter are responsible” (Article 1222, Idem.). In other words, in the event that appellants be held co-responsible with appellee for the result of the collision, they may invoke in their favor not only the defenses that pertain to their share in the act but also those pertaining to the share of appellee, including that of prescription.
The claim that the action of appellants against appellee should be deemed interrupted when the drivers of the two trucks were criminally prosecuted as a result of their negligent act, is untenable, for such interruption only accrues of the benefit of the offended party and not of appellants. This is upon the theory that the institution of a criminal carries with it the institution of the civil action unless the offended party reserves his right to institute it separately [Rule 107, Section 1 (a)]. But as regards an action based on a quasi-delict, the rule is different. As already stated, when an action is based on an obligation not arising from the act or omission complained of as a felony, such action may proceed independently of the criminal action and regardless of the result of the latter (Article 31, new Civil Code), which shows that the institution of a criminal action cannot have the effect of interrupting the institution of a civil action based on a quasi-delict.
Wherefore, the order appealed from is affirmed, with costs against appellants.
Paras, C.J., Bengzon, Padilla, Concepcion, and Endencia, JJ., concurs. Montemayor, J., see dissent. Reyes, J., concurs in the opinion of Justice Reyes, J.B.L. Reyes, J.B.L., J., see concurring opinion. Felix, J., concurs in a separate opinion.