[ G. R. No. L-11051. June 30, 1958 ] 104 Phil. 87
[ G. R. No. L-11051. June 30, 1958 ]
VICTORIANO MANZANO, PETITIONER AND APPELLEE, VS. HON. ARSENIO H. LACSON, AS MAYOR OF THE CITY OF MANILA AND ALEJO AQUINO, AS CITY ENGINEER OF THE CITY OF MANILA, RESPONDENTS AND APPELLANTS. D E C I S I O N
REYES, J.B.L., J.:
Sometime in August, 1948, the former Rural Progress Administration acquired a big parcel of land known as Tuason Estate No. 2 situated in Sampaloc, Manila, for resale to occupants thereof. Subsequently, the possession and administration thereof were transferred to “Ang Buhay, Inc.,” a non-stock corporation, which undertook the survey and subdivision thereof into home lots. The corresponding survey plan of the subdivision, to wit: Psd-24819, was duly approved by the Bureau of Lands after it had been submitted to, and approved as to layout by, the Adviser to the President on Planning (par. V of the petition and Exhibit 1). By virtue of the provisions of Executive Order No. 376, dated November 28, 1950, the Rural Progress Administration was abolished and all its properties, assets, rights, etc. were transferred to, and its obligation assumed by the Landed Estates Division of the Bureau of Lands. Petitioner and appellee, who purchased lot 3, Block 3, of the said subdivision on installment basis, filed on May 13, 1953 an application with respondent and appellant City Engineer for a temporary building permit to construct a strong material house thereon (paragraph 2, Partial Stipulation of Facts). The lot in question does not abut on any street, public or private, but only on a proposed street shown on the plan (Exhibit 1). Petitioner and appellee’s application, however, bears the conformity of the chief of the Landed Estates Division of the Bureau of Lands who placed thereon a note reading: “The street along this lot will be constructed as soon as funds for the purpose is made available.” (Exhibit 2.) Previous to the application of petitioner and appellee, the city authorities had issued several temporary building permits for the construction of houses on other lots of the subdivision abutting only on proposed roads with assurance of the Director of Lands that the proposed roads would be constructed as soon as funds were available. Up to the present, said roads has not been constructed as promised, (paragraphs 3 and 6, Partial Stipulation of Facts). Respondent and appellant City Engineer forwarded petitioner and appellee’s application to respondent and appellant City Mayor, stating among others, that “in view of the herein compromise of the Chief, Landed Estates Division, in behalf of the Bureau of Lands, to the effect that the streets, curves, gutters, drainage, etc. in this subdivision will be constructed as soon as funds for the purpose is available * * *, this office would interpose no objection to the granting of a temporary building permit in favor of Mr. Manzano.” And under date of October 31, 1955 respondent and appellant City Engineer accordingly notified petitioner and appellee stating, among others, the following: “With reference to your application for building permit for the construction of a strong material building on lot 3, Block 3, Ang Buhay Suddivision, Sampaloc, I regret to inform you that his Honor, the Mayor, has disapproved the same in view of the provisions of paragraph (d), Section 8, of Executive Order No. 98, series of 1946 * * *.” Consequently, petitioner and appellee filed this petition for mandamus. In answer to the petition, it was also alleged as additional affirmative defense that section 103 of the Revised Ordinances of the City of Manila requires as a prerequisite to the issuance of a building permit “that the building shall abut or face upon a public street or alley or on a private street or alley which has been officially approved.” The lower court ruled that both, the ground for the disapproval of petitioner and appellee’s application for building permit based upon the provisions of paragraph (d), section 8 of Executive Order No. 98, series of 1946, and the additional special defense set up in behalf of respondents and appellants based on section 103 of Ordinance 1600, otherwise known as the Revised Ordinances of the City of Manila, are not well taken and commanded respondents and appellants forthwith to issue the building permit applied for by the petitioner and appellee. From the decision the respondent has appealed, assigning the following errors:
“The lower court erred in holding that respondents and appellants’ ground for the disapproval of petitioner and appellee’s application for building permit based on the provisions of paragraph (d), Section 8 of Executive Order No. 98, series of 1946, is not well taken. The lower court erred in holding that the additional defense set up in behalf of respondents and appellants based on the provisions of Section 103 of Ordinance No. 1600, known as the Revised Ordinance of the City of Manila is likewise not well taken. The lower court erred in commanding respondents and appellants forthwith to issue the building permit applied for by petitioner and appellee.”
As we see it, the only issue is whether or not the appellee Manzano (petitioner below) has complied with the requisites of paragraph (d), section 8 of Executive Order No. 98, series of 1946 (42 Off. Gaz., 425), and section 103 of the Revised Ordinances of the City of Manila. Said legal provisions read as follows:
“(d) From and after the time when any such subdivision regulations are in effect no building permit shall be issued for or no building shall be erected on any lot within the land area affected by such subdivision regulations unless the street giving access to the lot upon which said building is proposed to be placed (1) shall have been accepted or opened as, or shall have otherwise received the legal status of, a public street prior to that time or (2) corresponds in its location and lines with a street shown on a subdivision plan approved by the said Administrative Agency or (3) corresponds with a street duly located or accepted by the legislative body having jurisdiction over the area affected by such division regulations. Any building erected or to be erected in violation of this section shall be deemed an unlawful structure and an ejection, removal or injunction proceeding may be brought by the said Administrative Agency to enjoin such erection or cause it to be vacated or removed.” (Sec. 8, Executive Order No. 98, series 1946) “Sec. 103. Issuance.—When the application, plans, and specifications conform to the requirements of this title and of title thirteen hereof, the city engineer shall issue a permit for the erection of the building and shall approve in writing such plans and specifications, one copy of which shall be returned to the owner or his agent and one copy shall be retained by the city engineer: Provided, That the building shall abut or face upon a public street or alley or on a private street or alley which has been officially approved; And provided, further, That any private street or alley opened in an interior lot for the purposes of this section, once officially approved, shall be open to the general public, and with its approved width preserved shall be maintained and kept in good repair by the grantee of the permit, his heirs, executors, and assigns, and shall never be closed by any person so long as there is a building or other structure abutting or facing upon such private street or alley.” (Sec. 103, Revised Ordinances)
Regarding the first provision (Exec. Order No. 98), the court below sustained appellee Manzano’s argument that the approval of the plan Exhibit 1 by Mr. Louis Croft, Presidential Adviser on Planning, sufficed to place his case within subdivision (2) of paragraph (d) of section 8, since “the street giving access to the lot upon which said building is proposed to be placed—(2) corresponds in its location and lines with a street shown on a subdivision plan approved by the said administrative agency.” We believe the claim to be untenable. The “administrative agency” referred to can be no other than that referred to in the preceding paragraph (b) of section 8 of the same Executive Order, reading:
“(b) From and after the time when any such subdivision regulations are in effect, then no plat or subdivision shall be filed for record or recorded, no buildings shall be erected, no land sold, leased or contracted to be sold or leased, and no permit issued until such plat or subdivision shall have been approved by the Administrative Agency designated by the Commission to administer the same and such approval endorsed in writing on the plate or subdivision.” (42 Off. Gaz., 431) (Emphasis supplied)
It has not been proved that Mr. Croft was “the Administrative Agency” designated by the (Urban Planning) Commission to administer its subdivision regulations; and as it is not asserted that the petitioner’s case falls within any of the other cases envisaged in section 8 of the Executive Order No. 98, respondent Manzano has not legally complied with its conditions so as to entitle him to the issuance of the building permit. More important is the objection raised by appellant City Mayor, based on section 103 of the Manila Revised Ordinances. The trial court again upheld the respondent Manzano on this point, saying—
“On the other hand, it is admitted that the proposed building abuts or faces upon a street, as this term is commonly understood to mean an area set apart and designated as public way from side to side and from end to end, which the general public has the right to use as such, although said street, which has been officially approved as to lay out is not yet constructed.” (Appellant’s Brief, p. 18)
But, as argued for appellant City Mayor, section 103 could only apply to streets and alleys duly constructed, and it is not enough that an area be set aside for them. It will be noticed that the last proviso requires that any such private alley “be maintained and kept in good repair by the grantee”, a requirement that would have no reason to exist if the alley were merely an open transitable area, without paving, drains or gutters; the obvious purpose of the requirements being to ensure the safety and health of the residents within the area. If the Mayor is competed to grant a building permit in the present case, he may not thereafter refuse it to other applicants similarly situated. Houses would then multiply in the area, without any drainage or sanitary facilities, and constitute a source of infection that would menace the rest of the city dwellers. As the appellant puts it: “If houses in a subdivision like the one in question, with only proposed streets, proposed drains, and proposed gutters, are allowed to be constructed, dirty stagnant water would easily accumulate therein and the place would soon become filthy, obnoxious and dangerous to public health.” This consideration is decisive. It is well known that slum districts are the bane of modern cities, and we are not disposed to sanction any action that would, in the long run, add to the sores that already plague the City of Manila, and increase the danger to the health of its inhabitants. The petitioner and appellee stresses the fact that the respondent Mayor has issued temporary permits to build in the same subdivision. That is not sufficient ground to compel him to issue another. The Mayor could have been willing to issue the previous permits relying upon the promise that the streets would be constructed by the Government as subdivision owner, until the continual delay in their construction posed the probability of a slum area coming into existence if such permits were continued. The lower court’ itself noted in its decision that—
“experience teaches us that promises of well-intentional officials who are ready and willing to perform the same cannot be compelled due to circumstances beyond their control, such as unavailability of funds.”
Surely in view of such experience the Mayor can not be blamed for refusing to trust any further mere promises of street construction by the Bureau of Lands authorities, and insisting instead upon actual performance of such promises before issuing further permits. At any rate, the previous illegal issuance of permits would not in any way justify compelling the Mayor to embark in further illegality. We understand of course that the strict application of sec. 103 of the Ordinances imposes hardship upon the appellee, and limits to some extent his proprietary rights over the lot in question. It has always been understood, however, that every piece of property and every property right is held subject to reasonable state regulation, to the end that its use shall not be injurious to the health and welfare of the community. The appellee must have so understood when, in his contract of purchase, he agreed to abide by any rules and regulations “regarding the opening of widening of streets, sanitation and so forth.” Not having established an undoubted and clear legal right, petitioner Manzano has failed to make a case for the issuance of a writ of mandamus. Wherefore, the order appealed from is reversed and the petition ordered dismissed, with costs against petitioner. So ordered. Bengzon, Montemayor, Reyes, A., Bautista Angelo, Concepcion, and Endencia, JJ., concur.