[ G. R. No. L-10981. April 25, 1958 ] 103 Phil. 453
[ G. R. No. L-10981. April 25, 1958 ]
ANACLETO LUISON, PROTESTANT AND APPELLANT, VS. FIDEL A. D. GARCIA, PROTESTEE AND APPELLEE. D E C I S I O N
BAUTISTA ANGELO, J.:
In the general elections held on November 8, 1955, Anacleto M. Luison and Fidel A. D. Garcia were the only candidates for mayor of Tubay, Agusan. The certificate of candidacy of Luison was filed by the Nacionalista Party of the locality duly signed by the chairman and secretary respectively, while the certificate of candidacy of Garcia was filed by the local branch of the Liberal Party but it was merely signed by one who was a candidate for vice-mayor. For this reason, the executive secretary of the Nationalists Party impugned the sufficiency of the certificate of candidacy filed in behalf of Garcia, whereupon the Commission on Elections, after making its own investigation, issued Resolution No. 23 declaring Garcia ineligible to run for the Office. Consequently, the Commission on Elections, after making its own investigation, issued Resolution No. 23 declaring Garcia ineligible to run for the Office. Consequently, the Commission on Elections who immediately implemented it by striking out the name of Garcia from the list of registered candidates. Said secretary also relayed the instruction of the Commission on Elections to the board of inspectors of every precinct and the board of canvassers so that they may be guided accordingly and the votes cast for him may not be counted and instead be considered as stray votes. At this juncture, Garcia filed an action for prohibition with the Court of First Instance of Agusan against the municipal secretary of Tubay praying that an order be issued restraining the latter from invalidating his certificate of candidacy as well as the votes that may be cast for him, which was however dismissed on the ground that said court had no jurisdiction to review the ruling of the Commission on Elections on the matter. No appeal was taken from this order which became final. Meantime, Garcia filed a motion for reconsideration of Resolution No. 23 of the Commission on Elections but the same was denied and no appeal was likewise taken from the ruling of the Commission. Notwithstanding the adverse ruling of the Commission on Elections, as well as the dismissal of the petition for prohibition sued out by Garcia, the latter continued with his candidacy and the question of his ineligibility became an issue in the campaign. And when the time came for the counting and appreciation of the ballots, the board of inspectors, in spite of the adverse ruling of the Commission on Elections, counted all the votes cast for Garcia as valid and credited him with them in the election returns with the result that he garnered 869 votes as against 675 of his opponent Luison. Consequently, the municipal board of canvassers proclaimed Garcia as the mayor elect of Tubay, Agusan. Believing that Garcia is ineligible to hold office, Luison filed a petition of quo warranto in the proper court of first instance for the purpose of disputing his ineligibility and securing his consequent ouster from office, but the petition was dismissed for lack of merit on a motion filed by respondent. Luison appealed from the ruling and the case was docketed in the Supreme Court as G. R. No. L-10916. Luison took one step further. He also filed a protest in the same court on the same ground that Garcia was ineligible because his certificate of candidacy was declared null and void by the Commission on Elections. After the reception of the evidence, the court found for protestee holding that the certificate of candidacy filed by the latter was in substantial compliance with the law and that the Commission on Elections erred in declaring him legally insufficient. It therefore dismissed the protest with costs against protestant. Hence the present appeal. The question whether the certificate of candidacy of the protestee is legally sufficient is now moot it appearing that tha resolution of the Commission on Elections declaring that said certificate was not prepared in accordance with law has become final for having the protestee failed to appeal from said resolution as required by law. In this connection, it should be noted that while this appeal was pending consideration in this court, the quo warranto case was passed upon wherein this Court held that said resolution is now res judicata and is binding upon the protestee (See decision in G. R. No. L-10916, promulgated on May 20, 1957). It cannot therefore be now disputed that protestee is ineligible to hold the office for which he was proclaimed. The issue now to be determined is whether, the protestee being ineligible and protestant having obtained the next highest number of votes, the latter can be declared entitled to hold the office to be vacated by the former. Our answer is in the negative. As this Court has held, “The general rule is that the fact that a plurality or a majority of the votes are east for an ineligible candidate at a popular election does not entitle the candidate receiving the next highest number of votes to be declared elected. In such case the electors have failed to make a choice and the election is a nullity” (Llamoso vs. Ferrer, et al., 84 Phil., 490). In a subsequent case, this Court also said that where the winning candidate has been declared ineligible, the person who obtained second place in the election cannot be declared elected since our law not only does not contain an express provision authorizing such declaration but apparently seems to prohibit it (Villar vs. Paraiso, 96 Phil., 658: See also Nuval vs Guray, 52 Phil., 654 and Topacio vs. Paredes, 23 Phil., 238). Moreover, a protest to disqualify a protestee on the ground of ineligibility is different from that a protest based on frauds and irregularities where it may be shown that protestant was the one really elected for having obtained a plurality of the legal votes. In the first case, while the protestee may be ousted the protestant will not be seated; in the second case, the protestant may assume office after protestee is unseated. The first case is brought to court by a petition of quo warranto, while the second by instituting an election protest. Thus, the Supreme Court, in denning these two remedies, said:
“All election disputes may be divided into two distinct classes: (1) those which pertain to the casting and counting of the ballots; and (2) those which pertain to the eligibility of the candidates. If there be eases incapable of being so classified, they have not been suggested. “* * * If the nature of the evidence upon which the eligibility (qualifications) of a person to hold office must be decided is considered, it will be seen that such evidence has nothing to do with the manner of casting snd counting the votes. To what purpose would be the examination of registry lists and ballots by officers appointed and paid for that purpose in determining the eligibility of a successful candidate for office? The eligibility of a person to be elected to a provincial or municipal office depends upon his qualifications as a voter, his residence, his allegiance to the United States, his age, the absence of disqualifications inflicted by the courts by way of punishment, etc. That is, these qualifications and disqualifications do not depend upon the conduct of election inspectors, the illegal trafficking in votes, the method of casting and counting the ballots, or the election returns. The evidence required to establish such qualifications or disqualifications would not aid in any way in determining the questions relating to the manner of casting and counting the ballots. E converso, would the examination of ballots aid in arriving at a decision as to his eligibility. There is nothing’ in this section to indicate that the court shall receive or consider evidence as to the personal character or circumstances of candidates. “Again, the effect of a decision that a candidate is not entitled to the office because of fraud or irregularities in the election is quite different from that produced by declaring a person ineligible to hold such an office. In the former case the court, after an examination of the ballots may find that some other person than the candidate declared to have received a plurality by the board of canvassers actually received the greater number of votes, in which case the court issues its mandamus to the board of canvassers to correct the returns accordingly; or it may find that the manner of holding the election and the returns are so tainted with fraud or illegality that it cannot be determined who received a plurality of the legally cast ballots. In the latter case, no question as to the correctness of the returns or the manner of casting and counting the ballots is before the deciding power, and generally the only result can be that the election fails entirely. In the former, we have a contest in the strict sense of the word, because opposing parties are striving for supremacy. If it be found that the successful candidate (according to the board of canvassers) obtained a plurality in a legal manner, and another candidate was the legal victor, the former must retire in favor of the latter. In the other case, there is not, strictly speaking, a contest, as the wreath of victory cannot be transferred from an ineligible candidate to any other candidate when the sole question is the eligibility of the one receiving a plurality of the legally cast ballots. In the one case the question is as to who received a plurality of the legally cast ballots; in the other, the question is confined to the personal character and circumstances of a single individual.” (Topacio vs. Paredes, supra.)
Considering the fundamental difference existing between the nature of a petition for quo warranto and that of an election protest, it may be said that a candidate who files a protest against one who has been proclaimed as having received the highest number of votes basing his protest cannot disguise his action so as to make his protest a justification to be seated in office. In other words, he cannot convert an action for quo warranto into an election protest. This is because these two cases are fundamentally different in nature and in purpose. In quo warranto, “there is not, strictly speaking, a contest, and the wreath of victory cannot be transferred from an ineligible candidate to any other candidate”, while in a protest, “the question is as to who received a plurality of the legally cast ballots” (Topacio vs. Paredes, supra). The present action, therefore, partakes of the nature of quo warranto and as such has no reason to exist. This question is already involved in the other case (G. R. No. L-10916). The case of Monsale vs. Nico* (46 Off. Gaz., Supp. No. 11, 211) invoked by protestant is not in point. In that case the candidate who was declared ineligible was not proclaimed because the votes cast for him were declared nullified and the one proclaimed is the candidate who received the next highest number of votes. The trial court found that the protestant was not ineligible because it considered his certificate of candidacy legally sufficient, and when the case was brought to the Supreme Court on appeal the latter merely reversed the ruling of the trial court. In that case there was no direct pronouncement that the one who received the next highest number of votes may by declared seated. This case cannot be invoked as precedent. Wherefore, the decision appealed from is reversed. The Court declares that neither protestee nor protestant has been validly elected and so none is entitled to the position of mayor of Tubay, Agusan. No pronouncement as to costs. Paras, C. J., Bengzon, Labrador and Endencia, JJ., concur. Reyes A., J., concurs in the result. Reyes, J. B. L., J. concurs with both the opinions of Justices Bautista and Concepcion.