[ G.R. No. L-9569. September 30, 1957 ] 102 Phil. 61
[ G.R. No. L-9569. September 30, 1957 ]
RAMON CARO, PETITIONER, VS. LUCAS RILLORAZA AND WORKMEN’S COMPENSATION COMMISSION, RESPONDENTS. D E C I S I O N
CONCEPCION, J.:
Petitioner Ramon Caro seeks a review, by writ of certiorari, of a decision of the Workmen’s Compensation Commission, which affirmed that of a referee thereof, sentencing said petitioner to pay the sum of P723.34 to respondent Lucas Rilloraza, by way of compensation for an injury suffered by the latter, in addition to the fees of said Commission. While constructing the window railing of a building located at No. 1049 R. Hidalgo Street, Manila, and belonging to Mrs. Carmen Prieto de Caro, but managed by her husband, petitioner Ramon Caro, as administrator of their conjugal partnership, and President and General Manager of Ramcar Inc., on August 4, 1953, at about 4:00 p.m., Lucas Rilloraza, a carpenter by occupation, fell to the ground and broke his leg, as the wooden platform on when he and another carpenter were working collapsed According to Dr. Fidel Guilateo, of the Workmen’s Compensation Commission, said injury produced temporary total disability for a period of six (6) months, and permanent partial disability of five (5% per cent of said leg. The only question for determination in this case is whether Hilloraza was petitioner’s employee, within the review of the Workmen’s Compensation Act. Petitioner maintains the negative view, upon the ground that Rilloraza was hired by one Daniel de la Cruz, who, allegedly, is an independent contractor. This pretense was rejected, however, by the Workmen’s Compensation Commislon, which held that De la Cruz was, at least, “merely an intermediary” and that petitioner is the “real employer” of Billoraza. In this connection/ the decision of the referee, which was affirmed by the Workmen’s Compensation Commissioner, says;
“As may be seen from the above resume’ of facts, preponderance of evidence tends to point that defend- ant Ramon Caro is the employer in the,sense contemplated by the Act. But even assuming that Daniel de la Cruz, alleged contractor, engaged by respondent really had such work undertaken for the latter, yet the former’s participation as such contractor is considered as merely an intermediary between Ramon Caro and the laborers working under him. (Italics ours.)
Petitioner Caro assails this finding, stating:
“In support of his contention that Daniel de la Crua was an independent contractor, petitioner presented Exhibits ‘A’, ‘B’, ‘C’ and ‘D’, whlen were the contracts signed by Daniel de la Cruz for the repair jobs on the various portions of the building, specifying the nature of the work to be done and the contract prices, and in all said contacts,, Daniel de la Cruz had invariably assumed all responsibility for whatever accident that may happen to his laborers engaged In these jobs.”
Said exhibits[1] do not justify the conclusion draws therefrom by herein petitioner. Exhibits B, C and D are dated respectively, December 9 and 16, 1953, and May 21, 1953 long after the accident that disabled respondent Rilloraza, who, therefore, had nothing to do with the subject-matter of said contracts. Exhibit A refers to the work of changing the “soleras” or floor joists, whereas, at the time of the occurrence, Rilloraza was constructing a " window railing”, which is not covered by said contract. At any rate, the provision in Exhibit A (as well as in Exhibits B, C and D) relieving petitioner from liability for any accident that may happen to the laborers placed in the job by De la Cruz, can not, and does not, affect such obligations as petitioner may have under the Workmen’s Compensation Act. To begin with, De la Cruz spoke only for himself in the exhibits aforementioned. He did not represent Rilloraza, and had no authority to represent him therein. Secondly, section 7 of said Act provides:
“Any contract, regulation or device of any sort intended to exempt the employer from all or part of the liability created by this Act shall be null and void.” (Italics ours.)
Pursuant thereto, even if Exhibit A had been signed by Rilloraza, himself, it could not affect his rights, if any, to compensation from petitioner herein. Thirdly, as held in Andoyo vs. Manila Railroad Co., G.R. No. 34722 (March 28, 1932):
“In regard to the first assignment of error, the defendant company pretends to show through Venaneio Nasol’s own testimony that he was an independent contractor who undertook to construct a railway line between Maropadlusan and Mantalisay, but as far as the record shows, Nasol did, not testify that the defendant company had no control over hid as to tha manner or methods he employed pursuing his work. On the contrary, he stated that hj| was not bonded, and that he only depended upon the Manila Railroad Company for money to be paid to his laborers. As stated “by counsel for the plaintiffs, the word ‘independent contractor’ means ‘one who exercises independent employment and contracts to do a piece of work according to his own methods and without being subject to control of his employer except as to result of the work.’ Furthermore, *if tha employer claims that the workmen is an Independent contractor, for whose acts he is not responsible, the burden is on him to show his Independence. (Ruel vs. Ligerwood, Rural Tel. Go. supra; underscoring ours.)
“Tested by these definitions and by the fact that the defendant has presented practically no evidence to determine whether Venancio Nasol was in reality an independent contractor or not, we are inclined to think that he is nothing but an intermediary between the defendant and certain laborers. It is indeed difficult to find that Nasol is an independent contractor or a person who possesses no capital or money of his own to pay his obligations to them, who files no bond to answer for any fulfillment of his contract with his employer and specially subject to the control and supervision of- his, employer. falls short of the requisites or conditions necessary for the common and independent contractor.” (Underscoring ours.)
Petitioner herein did not prove, or even try to prove, that De la Cruz had agreed to do a piece of work “according to his own methods * * * without being subject to the control of his employer.” On the contrary, the reference, in Exhibit A, to the general nature of the work to be undertaken, without any plans or specifications to be followed, indicates that the floor joists mentioned in said contract were to be changed under the direction and concontrol of Mr. Caro or his representative, and in the manner or by the method designated, by either. In other words, Daniel de la Cruz was not an independent contractor, within the purview of the Workmen’s Compensation Act. In. fact, the notice of injury filed by Rilloraza on September 28, 1953 referred to De la Cruz as a “capataz”. In other words, even if Rilloraza had been engaged by De la Cruz, and there is no affirmative evidence thereon, the former was induced to believe that the latter acted merely as foreman of Caro, who, in turn,was Rilloraza8s employee. Moreover, pursuant to the Workmen’s Compensation Acts:
“When an employee suffers personal injury from any accident arising out of and in the course of his employment, or contracts tuberculosis or other illness directly caused by such employment, or either aggravated by or the result of the nature of such employment, his employer shall pay compensation in the sums and to the person hereinafter specified, * * *.” (Section 2.)
The “employer” and the “employee” referred to in. this provision are defined in section 39 of said Act, as follows:
“(a) ‘Employer includes every person or association of persons, incorporated or not. public or private, and the legal representative of the deceased employer. It includes the owner or lessee of a factory or establishment or place of work or any other person who is virtually the owner or manager of “the business carried on in the establishment or place of work but who, for the reason that there is an independent contractor in the same, or for any other reason, is not the direct employer of laborers employed there. “(b) ‘Laborer* is usfd as a synonym of ‘Employee’ and means every person who has en- tered the employment of, or works under a service * * * for an employer. It does not include a person whose employment is and is not for the purposes of the occupation or business of the employer. Any reference to a laborer injured shall, in case he diess, include a reference to the person depend depenent on him, as defined in this Act, if the context so requires, or, if the employer is a minor or incapacitated, to his guardian or nearest of kin.” (Ilatalics ours.)
In other words, the owner or lessee of a factory or place of work or the owner or manager of the business therein carried on, may be bound to pay the compensation provided in section 2, above quoted, despite the intervention of an “independent contractor.” Thus, in De los Santos vs. Javier (58 Phil., 82), it was held*
“* * * If we refer again to the definition of employer, we shall see that it comprises the owner or lessee of a factory or establisment or place of work or any others person who is virtually the owner or manager of the business carried on in the establishment or place of work but who, for the reason that there is an independent contractor in the same, or for any other reason, is not the direct employer of laborers employed there. We take this to mean that although the owner of the factory, is not the direct employer of the laborers employ and therein because there is an independent contractor in the factory, the owner of the factory is nevertheless to be considered for the purposes of the Workmen’s Compensation fact as, the employer of the laborers working under the Independent contractor but that is true only with respect to laborers doing work which is in the usual course of the owner’s business.” (Italics ours.)
This was reiterated in Philippine Manufacturing Co. vs. Garonirao, (96 Phil, 276). The reason is that
“* * * If the owner of a factory were not liable for the injuries sustained by the employees of an independent contractor engaged in the usual business of the owner, the owner of the factory by subterfuge subterfuge of an independent contractor could relieve himself of all liability and completely defeat the purposes of the law. * * *.” (The Law Governing Labor Disputes in the Philippines, by Vicente J. Francisco (2nd Ed.), p. 813; Italicsg ours.)
This is, exactly, what would happen if contracts like Exhibit A sufficed to place the aforementioned owner or manager s beyond the pale of the Workmen’s Compensation Act. Indeed, Daniel de la Cruz does not appear to have any office or business establishment, or even a license to engage in business as building contractor. He would seem to be merely a free lancing carpenter (not uncommon in Manila), with some ex- perience in carpentry work, who goes around looking for minor repair or construction jobs, for he has - like the intermediary in the Andoyo case “no capital or money to pay his laborers or to comply with his obligations to them.” Neither did he file a bond to answer, either for the fulfillment of his contract with petitioner herein, or for the satisfaction of such liability as may arise by reason of any injury arising out of and in the ordinary course of thee employment of the laborers engaged pursuant to Exhibit A. In the light of these facts, we fail to see how De la Cruz could possibly be regarded an “independent” contractor. Indeed, there is nothing to indicate that he could pay the compensation prescribed in Republic Act 772. Upon the other hand, the reference made therein, and in the decisions on this subject, to “independent” contractors, shows clearly that such status was not meant to be given to every contractor and that the party relying upon said status must establish to the satisfaction of the Court the conditions essential therefor. The mere introduction of Exhibit A,2 without even the testimony of De la Cruz,3 and without any affirmative evidence to the effect that it was he, acting in his own name and behalf, who engaged the services of Rilloraza, is far from sufficient to prove that De la Cruz was an independent contractor, pursuant to the accepted standards thereon. Under these conditions, a decision in favor of petitioner herein would, in effect, set at naught and completely nullify tha provisions of the Workmen’s Compensation Act, inasmuch as the door would thereby be left wide open for the effective circumvention and evasion of the responsibility therein created by the expedient of engaging the services of an indigent and irresponsible intermediary willing to relieve the employer from his liability under said Act. It is well settled that the same “should be interpreted so as to accomplish, not defeat, the purpose for which it was enacted by the Legislature,“4 that it “is a social legislation designed to give relief to the workman who has been a victim of an accident in the pursuit of his employment,“5 and that it should be construed “fairly, reasonably or liberally in favor of and for the benefit of employees and their dependents and all doubts as to right of compensation resolved to their favor and all presumptions indulged in their favor"6 In fact, the Workmen’s Compensation Act7 specifically provides that “in any proceeding for the enforcement of the claim for compensation” under the provisions thereof, “it shall be presumed in the absence of substantial evidence to the contrary - 1. That the claim comes within the provisions of this Act;” Again, subdivisions (a) and (b) of section 39 of the Workmen’s Compensation Act are explicit on the conditions essential to be exempt from responsibility under section 2 of said Act, namely: (1) the employment must be “purely casual” and, in addition thereto, (2) said employment must “not be for the purposes of the occupation or business of the employer.”
“* * * when the lav makes the owner of the factory the employer of the laborers employed therein notwithstanding the intervention of an independent contractor it refers to laborers engaged in, carrying on the usual business of the factory, and not to the laborers of an independent contractor doing work separate and distinct from the usual business of, the, owner of the factory.” (The Law Governing Labor Disputes in the Philippines, by Vicente J.Francisco [2nd Ed.] p. 812: italics ours.) “Employment is ‘casual’ when it is irregular, unpredictable, sporadic and-brief in nature. Under most statutes, even if casual, it is not exempt unless it is also pat side the usual business, of the employer. Under this test, most maintenance and repair activities, as well as even remodelling and incidental construction, have been held to be within the usual course of a business.” (Larson’s Workmen’s Compensation Law, Vol. 1, p. 759; italics ours.)
Accordingly, in Mansal vs. P.P. Gocheco Lumber Co., 96 Phil., 941 (April 30, 1955), we held that a laborer, who had been injured while stacking lumber in a lumber yard belonging to the defendant compaay, was entitled to compensation from the latter, although he had been employed by a contractor who undertook to do the stacking of lumber in said yard at a given rate. In the case we said:
“The case at bar is similar or parallel to that, of stevedores unloading cargo from a ship. The fact that the stevedores work under the control of a contractor who pays them, and that they may seek other work under different carriers, and their work covers a very short period of time as to each carrier, does not exempt the carrier who had employed them in the unleading of the cargo from paying compensation for death or injuries received by them because the unloading of the cargo is an ordinary part of a carrier’s duty,. To this effect is our decision in the case of Flores vs. Cia. Maritima, 57 Phil.. 905, thus:
‘There is not the least shadow of doubt that the deceased was a laborer in the legal sense. He had “been recruited by order of the captain of the ship and he was engaged in the work of unloading the ship’s cargo at the time of the accident. There can be no dispute that this kind of work is included in the business in which the appellee is engaged. That the deceased had been recruited or engaged by a, contractor is of no moment because the latter,for purposes of the lay was an agent or representative of the ship’s captain who, in turn, represents the appellee.’” (Italics ours.)
Likewise, in the case of Achijiro Idoma (23 Hawaii, 291), the facts and conclusion reached, as abstracted in the aforementioned work on the Philippine Labor Laws, were:
“A sugar company let a contract to H. to build a road-bed on its plantation to be used in its business, furnished H. with camps, tools, and appliances, the work to be to tho satisfaction of the company’s engineers; the claimant, a workman employed by H. who alone had the right to discharge him, was injured while working on the road-bed and filed with the Industrial Accident Board his claim for compensation against the company and H.; the question of liability of the company was reserved to the Hawaii court. It was held that the company was liable, it being an employer of the claimant within the language and intent of the act.” (Italics ours.)
In the present case, the building in which Rilloraza worked was found to be “intended or used for rental (business) purposes,” Petitioner, in turn, had control of such building, as manager of Ramcar, Inc., and administrator, not only of his paraphernal properties, but, also, of those of his wife, Carmen Prieto, “which properties have been incorporated with those of Prieto Hermanos.“8 Obviously, the repair of said building is part of the usual business of the administration of the aforesaid properties, so that the same may be suitable for the gainful purpose above referred to. Consequently, even if Billorasa, who did the repair work thereof, were a casual laborer, engaged directly by De la Cruz, acting as an independent contractor, which he is not, the former would still be an employee of petitioner herein, within the purview of the Workmen’s Compensation Act, and, henee, would be entitled to demand compensation from him. During our deliberations on this case, the question arose which is not raised by petitioner whether the word “business” appearing in the definition of the term “employer”, is limited to “commercial” enterprises only, as distinguished [ from undertakings of a “civil” nature. In this connection, Laison, in his work on “The Law of Workmen’s Compensation,” says:
“* * * The crucial word here is ‘business’, and the courts, ever since the original leading ease of Marsh v. Groner, have followed the example of that ease in giving the word its ordinary and popular meaning:
‘There are few words more current in our speech than the word ‘business’; few that included a greater variety of subjects, and yet none which, in popular speech, has greater or more marked singleness in denotement. When one’s business is the subject of common speech, no one can be in doubt as to the reference. It would be a very exceptional person we do not know how to otherwise describe him who would not understand that the reference is to the habitual or regular occupation that the party was engaged in with a view to winning a livelihood or some gain.” (Vol. I, pp. 738-739; italics ours.)
This view is borne out by the fact that the term “employee”, as used in our Workman’s Compensation let, “does not include a person whose employment is purely casual and is not for the purposes of the occupation, or business of the employer.” In other words, within the purview of the terms “employer” and “employee”, as defined and used in said Act, “business” is synonymous with “occupation”, or the means by which a party habitually or regularly earns a “livelihood or some gain.”
“* * *The owner of a building who rented it for income purposes, and maintained the building in repair for that purpose, was liable to an employee of a contractor repairing the building as maintenance of the building was considered as part of the owner’s business.” (Davis vs. Indus. Com. 297 111, 29, 130 N.E. 3335; italics ours.)
“* * * where the home owner rents out the second floor, he is engaged in a business for a pecuniary profit and hence liable for injuries sustained by claimant who fell from a scaffold which had been set up to rebuild a chimney on the house.” (Reibold vs. Doll, 283 App. Div. 750, 128 N.Y.S.-2d h5 [1954]; italics ours.)
“* * * it has been held that the work of taking up carpets or mattings, and of cleaning walls, transons, and curtains is a necessary part of the business of keeping the rooms and hallways of a lodging house in a state of cleanliness and good order, so that an employee, in jured while engaged in that work, is in the usual course of the trade, business profession, or occupation of the employer who conducted the lodging house.” (23 R.C.L., Sec. 62, p. 7695 underscoring ours.)
In fact, petitioner herein impliedly admitted9 and the writer of the dissenting opinion explicitly conceded, during our deliberations, that the liability of said petitioner would be incontestable had he directly engaged the services of respondent Rilloraza. Said liability could not possibly exist had those services, which were seemingly casual, not been given “for the purposes of the occupation or business of the employer .“10 The case of the Philippine Manufacturing Co. vs. Geronlmo (L-6968),11 relied upon in the dissent, is not in point, for the following reasons, namely:
The work of painting a water tank,12 during which the injury involved therein was sustained, had been undertaken by one Garcia, who “used to engage in painting contracts,“13 under conditions giving Garcia the status of an “independent” contractor"14 which De la Cruz does not have in the present case. The Philippine Manufacturing Co. was engaged in the business of the manufacture of soap, vegetable lard, cooking oil and margarine, not of painting any water tank15. But, when one’s business is to let houses for income purposes, the repair, maintenance and painting thereof with a view to attracting or keeping tenants and of inducing them to pay a good or increased rental is, most certainly, part of said business.
Thus, for instance, in De los Santos vs. Javier (supra) the defendant, who intended to buy and sell hogs and to establish a plant for curing ham, entered into a contract with one Esquillo for the construction by the latter of a corral for hogs and an office for the persons in charge of the corral. While working on said construction, in which Javier had no direct intervention, De los Santos, a laborer engaged by Esquillo, accidentally sustained injuries which caused his death. This Court held that Javier was not bound to pay compensation therefor, the laborer not been his employee, inasmuch as the business which Javier “was going to establish was that of buying and selling hogs and caring ham.” He “was not a building contractor, and it was not part of his business to construct buildings.” We added, however, that " if the defendant had made a contract with Esquillo to take the hogs from the corral to the slaughter houses, and the deceased as one of the employees of Esquillo had been fatally injured while engaged in that work, the defendant would have been liable to the heirs of the deceased, although Esquillo was an independent contractor and the deceased his employee.“16 WHEREFORE, the decision appealed from is hereby affirmed, with costs against the petitioner, It is so ordered. Paras, C.J., Bengzon, Reyes, J.B.L., and Endencia, JJ., concur.