[ G.R. No. L-7271. August 30, 1957 ] 101 Phil. 1071
[ G.R. No. L-7271. August 30, 1957 ]
PHILIPPINE NATIONAL BANK, PLAINTIFF AND APPELLANT, VS. JOSE C. ZULUETA, DEFENDANT AND APPELLEE.
BENGZON, J.:
In the Manila court of first instance, the Philippine National Bank sued the defendant upon a letter of credit and a draft for the amount of $14,449.15. Although willing to pay the equivalent in pesos of the draft, plus bank charges, the defendant objected to the 17% excise tax imposed by Republic Act No. 601 which the Bank tried to collect. Both documents, he contended, had been issued and had matured before the approval of said Act, therefore the excise tax should not “be charged. After trial, the court rendered judgment exempting defendant from the 17% excise tax; but ordered him to deliver to plaintiff the sum of P37,622.11 plus daily interest of P3.9938 on P29,154.55 beginning from January 9, 1953. The plaintiff appealed, insisting on the right to collect 17% excise or exchange tax. This is the only issue between the parties now. For a statement of the facts we may quote from plaintiff’s brief. “On October 26, 1948, Defendant-Appellee applied for a commercial letter of credit with Plaintiff-Appellant, Philippine National Bank (Manila) and was granted L/C No. 36171 (Exhibit “B”) on November 6, 1948, in favor of Otis Elevator Co., 260 Eleventh Avenue, New York City, U.S.A., for $14,449.15 for the purchase of an electric passenger elevator; on May 17, 1949, and under the said letter of credit (Exhibit “B”), Otis Elevator Co. drew a 90 day sight draft for $14,449.15 (Exhibit “A”) which draft was duly presented to and accepted by Defendant-Appellee on July 6, 1949. Said acceptance matured on October 4, 1949. Upon Defendant-Appellee’s signing a 90 day trust receipt (Exhibit “C”) on June 3, 1949, Plaintiff-Appellant released to Defendant-Appellee the covering documents of the shipment. In the meantime, debit advice (Exhibit “G”) was received from Plaintiff-Appellant’s New York Agency to the effect that it advanced or paid the draft (Exhibit “A”) to Otis Elevator Co. on May 17, 1.949, and charged Plaintiff-Appellant the sum of $14,467.21 representing the face value of the draft (Exhibit “A”) plus $18.06 as 1/8 of 1% commission. After the maturity date (October 4, 1949) Plaintiff-Appellant presented the draft to Defendant-Appellee for payment but the latter failed, neglected and refused to pay. During its special session in January, 1951, Congress passed House Bill No. 1513, now Republic Act No. 601, approved on March 28, 1951, imposing a 17% special excise tax (otherwise known as foreign exchange tax) on the value in Philippine peso of foreign exchange sold by the Central Bank of the Philippines or its authorized agents. Plaintiff-appellant, as any other commercial bank in the Philippines, is an authorized agent of the Central Bank of the Philippines. On October 17, 1952, and January 18, 1958, Plaintiff- Appellant sent bills or statements of collection (Exhibits “D” and “D-l”) to Defendant-Appellee but the latter failed and refused to effect payment thereof. In those statements, the sum of P4,955.74 was included representing the 17% special excise tax on the peso value of the draft for US $14,449.15 (Exhibit “A”), * * *.” Defendant’s application for a letter of credit partly read as follows:
“Please arrange by cable for the establishment of an Irrevocable Letter of Credit on New York in favor of Otis Elevator Co., 260 Eleventh Avenue, New York City for account of Hon. Jose C. Zulueta for the sum of fourteen thousand four hundred FORTY- NINE AND 15/100 ($14,449.15) DOLLARS against drawn at NINETY DAYS accompanied by shipping documents covering of ONE COMPLETE ELECTRIC PASSENGER ELEVATOR * * * Drafts must be drawn and presented or negotiated not later than May 31, 1949. IN CONSIDERATION THEREOF, I/we promise and agree to pay you at maturity in Philippine Currency, the equivalent of the above amount or such portion thereof as may be drawn or paid upon the faith o£ said credit, together with your usual charges, and I/we authorize you and your respective correspondents to pay or to accept drafts under this credit, * * *”
And the draft issued thereunder (Exhibit A) was negotiable and addressed to herein defendant as the drawee. From plaintiff’s statement of its position it is not clear whether recovery is demanded upon the letter of credit, or upon the draft Exhibit A. Plaintiff may, undoubtedly, proceed on either cause of action. (See Art. 571 Code of Commerce; Sec. 51 Negotiable Instruments Law.) Had the plaintiff elected to recover on said letter of credit, then it would meet with the doctrines in Araneta vs. Philippine National Bank, 95 Phil., 160, 50 Off. Gaz., (11) 5350), According to the majority opinion in that case, plaintiff should receive the equivalent in pesos, on May 17, 1949, of what the New York Agency paid to Otis Elevator, i.e. $14,467.21. (plus bank fees of course.) According to the minority opinion, the equivalent in pesos of the same amount of dollars on October 4, 1949. No. 17% tax on both dates. In converting dollars into pesos, no 17% exchange tax would be imposable, since it was created only in March 1951. The plaintiff knows the case, for it was a party to it; and anticipating, in this appeal, the obvious conclusions, it insists not so much on the letter of credit, as on the bill of exchange Exhibit A[1]. As stated before, such draft was drawn by Otis Elevator Co. in New York. It was addressed to defendant as drawee, who is due course accepted it. There is no’ question that upon accepting it, defendant became a party primarily liable[2]; and the holder (Philippine National Bank) may sue him, even if there had been no presentation for payment on the day of maturity. (Sec. 70 Negotiable Instruments Law.) Admittedly, defendant’s responsibility is for $14,449.15 due in Manila on October 4, 1949 (plus bank fees). He is under obligation to deliver such amount in pesos as were the equivalent of $14,449.15. At what rate of exchange? The rate prevailing on the day of issuance, day of acceptance, day of maturity, the day suit is filed, or that prevailing on the day judgment is rendered requiring him to pay? Herein lies the center of the controversy. Appellant will win this appeal only if the rate on the last two days above mentioned is held to be the legal rate. The document is negotiable and is governed by the Negotiable Instruments Law. But this statute does not contain any express provision on the question. We know the draft is a foreign bill of exchange, because, drawn in New York, it is payable here. (Sec. 129 Negotiable Instruments Law.) We also know that although the amount payable is expressed in dollars-not current money here—it is still negotiable, for it may be discharged with pesos of equivalent amount[3]. The problem arises when we try to determine the “equivalent amount”, because the rate of exchange fluctuates from day to day. There are decisions in America to the effect that, “the rate of exchange in effect at the time the bill should have been paid” controls. (11 C.J.S. p. 264.) Such decisions agree with the provisions of the Bills of Exchange Act of England [4] and could be taken as enunciating the correct principle, inasmuch as our Negotiable Instruments Law, practically copied the American Uniform Negotiable Instruments Law which in turn was based largely on the Bills of Exchange Act of England of 1882. In fact we praetically followed this rule in Westminster Bank vs. K. Nassoor, 58 Phil. 855. There is one decision applying the rate of exchange at the time judgment is entered. (11 C. J. S. p. 264.)[5] This decision however seems not to have taken into. account the Bills of Exchange Act above-mentioned. And we have rejected its view in the Westminster case, supra. Furthermore it related to a bill expressly made payable in a foreign currency-which is not the case here. And the theory would probably produce undesirable effects upon commercial documents, for it would make the amount uncertain, the parties to the bill not being able to foresee the day judgment would be rendered [6]. But, the appellant argues, the defendant had promised to pay $14,419.15 in dollars; therefore he must be ordered to pay the sum in dollars at current rates plus 17%. The argument rests on a wrong premise. Defendant had not promised to pay in dollars. He agreed to pay the equivalent of 14,419.15 dollars, in Philippine currency [7]. But if we admit that defendant had agreed to pay in dollars, then we have to apply Republic Act No. 529 and say that his obligation ‘‘shall be discharged in Philippine currency measured at the prevailing rates of exchange at the time the obligation was incurred.” Now then, Zulueta’s obligation having been incurred[8] before the creation of the 17% tax, it may not be validly burdened with such tax, because the law imposing it could not be deemed to have impaired obligations already existing at the time of its approval. The plaintiff’s theory seems to be that in remitting dollars to its New York Agency, after it collects from defendant, it has to pay for the said excise tax.[9] The trial judge expressed the belief that such amount had been remitted before the enactment of Republic Act 601, because considering the practice of banks of replenishing their agencies abroad with necessary funds, he deemed it improbable that the Manila Office of the Bank—in two years— had not reimbursed its New York Agency for the amount advanced on account of the draft Exhibit A. This belief most probably accorded with reality; because as early as May 17, 1949 (Exhibit G) the New York Agency had “charged” the amount of this draft against the account of the Manila office there,—which means the Agency had reimbursed itself the amount of the draft out of the funds of the Manila Office then in its possession (in New York) or coming to its possession afterwards. And it is unbelievable that in two years the Manila office never had in New York sufficient funds to effect the reimbursement. In fact, the statement of account rendered by plaintiff to defendant on October 17, 1952, (Exhibit D) enumerated these charges:
“To your acceptance amounting to ……………………….
$14,449.15
Plus: Remitter’s Commission ……………………
18.06
Converted at 3/4 % ……………………………….
$14.567.21
P29,151.43
5% int. 5/17/49-10/19/52-1251 da. ………..
4,995.68
P34,147.11
10% comm. on $14,449.15 ………………………
2,911.51
Documentary stamps ……………………………..
8.70
Air Mail ……………………………………………….
2.00
17% Excise Tax on P29,151.43 ……………….
4,955.74
Other charges …………………………..
3.00”
From the above it may be deduced that the amount of the draft had been remitted or paid to the New York Agency in May 1949, for the reason that Zulueta is charged with remitter’s commission" and 5% interest on the amount of the draft (and such commission) beginning from May 17, 1949. This necessarily implies that in accordance with Exhibit G, the New York Agency had been reimbursed of the draft’s amount (or such amount was remitted) on May 17, 1949.[10] Now, in May 1949 no 17% exchange tax was payable upon such remittance; and the Manila office did not pay it. Therefore Zulueta should not pay it too. In view of the foregoing the judgment will be affirmed, with costs against appellant. So ordered. Paras, C. J., Padilla, Montemayor, and Bautista, Angelo, JJ., concur.