[ G. R. No. L-9159. May 31, 1957 ] 101 Phil. 705
[ G. R. No. L-9159. May 31, 1957 ]
FELIPE QUIRINO, PETITIONER AND APPELLANT, VS. PHILIPPINE NATIONAL BANK, ET AL., RESPONDENTS AND APPELLEES. D E C I S I O N
MONTEMAYOR, J.:
On January 14, 1955, the Philippine National Bank filed a complaint in the Justice of the Peace Court of Vigan, Ilocos Sur, against several defendants, among them appellant Felipe Quirino who was duly served with summons but failed to appear and answer the complaint on the date, place and time set in said summons. On motion of plaintiff bank, appellant Quirino was declared in default on February 15, 1955, and on February 18, 1955, the plaintiff was allowed to introduce its evidence. On the same day, judgment was rendered in its favor and against the appellant. On February 25, 1955. appellant Quirino, learning of the judgment rendered against him, filed a “petition to lift order of default” with the Court of First Instance of Ilocos Sur. The hank tiled a motion to dismiss the petition on the ground that it stated no cause of action. Acting upon said petition to dismiss, the Court, presided by Judge Francisco Geronimo, found the petition to be “not sufficient in form and substance, for the relief provided for in Rule 88 of the Rules of Court can only be availed of when the judgment from which the relief is sought has already become final.” The lower court stated that the correct procedure followed for petitioner Quirino “should have been to file a motion in the Justice of the Peace Court of Vigan, asking for the setting aside of the Judgment by default and for a new trial in accordance with section 16, Rule 4, of the Rules of Court, and that should, said petition be denied, then petitioner will’ appeal to the Court of First Instance.” Consequently, the petition for relief was dismissed, without pronouncement as to costs. Defendant-petitioner is now appealing that order of dismissal direct to us. We are in complete accord with the trial court and counsel for the appellee bank in the position taken by them. When the appellant filed his petition for relief before the Court of First Instance, the judgment against him by the Justice of the Peace had not yet become final and executory. Consequently, relief under Rule 38 of the Rules of Court was not in order for the reason that said relief is available only after a decision or a judgment from which relief is sought'4s final and executory. Such is our ruling in the case of Veluz vs. Justice of the Peace Court of Sariaya, 42 Phil. 557, wherein we said:
“* * * * Certainly there is no occasion for putting the aggrieved person to the trouble of presenting” the petition permitted by said sections, to the Court of First Instance during that time when the trial court, upon its authority, may correct any error, mistake, or injustice which he has committed. Said sections are only applicable after the judgment has become final and after the time has elapsed for perfecting an appeal. A judge has an inherent right, while his judgment is still in bis control, to correct error, mistakes, or injustices. After the judgment has become final, he loses his right to change or modify it in the slightest decree, except for the purpose of correcting" clerical errors." (Italics supplied.)
Before seeking relief from a decision rendered by a court, it should be given an opportunity to correct any mistake or injustice committed whenever possible, and this naturally is possible where said judgment has not yet become final. The law contemplates that relief may be sought and may be granted by the Court of First Instance where said relief is no longer available in the inferior court, because it has lost jurisdiction over the case by reason of the decision having become final. There is no reason for the law requiring the aggrieved party to go to the Court of First Instance for relief and dragging to the same court the winning party, causing unnecessary expense and loss of time to both when the same relief, could be sought and granted in the Justice of the Peace Court, the court of origin. Defendant-appellant contends that the only relief available to him in the Justice of the Peace Court is that provided in
Section 14, Rule 4, which reads as follows-, “Sec. 14. Vacating dismissal and defaults.—Within two hours after the entry of a dismissal or default, as provided in the last two preceding sections, the court may set made such entry and allow the party against whom such dismissal or default had been entered to have a trial upon the merits of the cause, if such party appears and makes it manifest to the court that his failure to appear at the time and place designated in the summons was, by reason of fraud, accident, or mistake.”;
and that after the expiration of said two hours, all. doors of relief are closed to him. But as the trial court and counsel for the appellee correctly maintain, even after the expiration of two hours after the rendition of the default judgment, within the period for appeal when the judgment has not yet become final, the aggrieved party may, under section 16 of the same Rule 4 of the Rules of Court, still ask for new trial.Section 16 provides:
“Sec. 16. New trial.—Within the time provided for perfecting an appeal from a judgment rendered by an inferior court and before an appeal is so perfected, the court may grant a new trial to correct an error or injustice it may have committed.”
The case of Abadilla vs. Municipal Court of Manila, G. R. No. 48262, Lawyers’ Journal, August 31, 1937, p. 744, is in point. In said case, the plaintiff filed a complaint in the Municipal Court of Manila and defendant was summoned to appear on August 10, 1984 and answer’ the complaint. Defendant failed to appear on that date either personally or by counsel, and judgment of default against him was rendered. On August 81, 1984, defend- ant petitioned the reopening of the case and two days later, the Municipal Court set aside its decision and set the case for hearing. A motion for reconsideration was presented by the plaintiff but it was denied. When the case reached this Tribunal, we ruled that:
The Municipal Court “not having lost all control to change, alter or modify a judgment within its discretion, its previous decision might be set aside and a new trial or re-hearing granted. That is an inherent power of the courts as to decisions before they become final * * *.”
In view of the foregoing, the appealed order of dismissal is hereby affirmed, with costs. Paras, C. J., Bengzon, Padilla, Bautista Angelo, Labrador, Concepcion, Jlndencia, and Felix, JJ., concur.