[ G. R. No. L-8876. October 31, 1957 ] 102 Phil. 292
[ G. R. No. L-8876. October 31, 1957 ]
ALLIED FREE WORKERS’ UNION, ET AL., PETITIONERS, VS. HONORABLE JUDGE SEGUNDO APOSTOL, ET AL., RESPONDENTS. D E C I S I O N
BAUTISTA ANGELO, J.:
On August 11, 1952, the Compania Maritima, lligan Branch, hereinafter referred to as the company, entered into an “arrastre and stevedoring contract” with the Allied Free Workers’ Union, hereinafter referred to as the union, whereby the services of the union to “do and perform all the work of stevedoring and arrastre services of all its vessels or boats in lligan City”, were engaged. The term of the contract was for a period of one month from August 12, 1952, which may be renewed by agreement of the parties, at the same time giving the company the right to revoke the contract “if and when the Allied Free Workers’ Union fails to render good service.” Upon the expiration of the term on September 12, 1952, the contract was not renewed by formal agreement, but the union and its members continued to perform the services agreed upon until August 24, 1954 when the company served a notice in writing upon the union terminating the contract from August 31, 1954. On the same date, the company entered into a similar contract with the lligan Stevedoring Association giving to the latter the arrastre and stevedoring service. Meanwhile, on July 23, 1954, the union sent a letter to the company requesting- that it be recognized as the exclusive bargaining unit to load and unload all the cargo of its vessels calling at the port of lligan City as it had exclusively performed for the last two years (Annex A), and when said demand was not attended to within the reglementary 10-day period, the union filed on August 6, 1954 with the Court of Industrial Relations a petition praying for the certification of the union as the sole and exclusive collective bargaining unit of the company at Iligan City in connection with the stevedoring and arrastre work of all the cargo of the vessels belonging to said company (CIR Case No. 175—MC). Instead of answering the demand of the union, the company gave notice to it terminating the arrastre and stevedoring contract they had previously executed effective August 31, 1954, which met a vigorous protest on the part of the union, and on August 26, 1954, the union filed charges of unfair labor practice against the company with the Court of Industrial Relations praying that the same be investigated and, if proven, the company be criminally dealt wdth in accordance with law. And feeling aggrieved and discriminated against because of the unjust lockout slapped upon the union by the company, the members of the union, together with other employees who were sympathetic with their cause, engaged in picketing the street and wharf where the vessels of the company used to dock at the port of Iligan City thereby preventing the loading and unloading of the cargo carried on board said vessels to the prejudice of the, company, the shippers and consignees of the cargo. On September 8, 1954, the company commenced the present case in the Court of First Instance of Lanao (Civil Case No. 5377) seeking to enjoin the union and its members from interfering with the loading and unloading of the cargo on board the vessels of said company that are docked or may dock at the port of Iligan City and to recover the damages the company may have suffered incident thereto aggregating the total amount of P120,000. The company also prayed for the rescission of the arrastre and stevedoring contract entered into between the parties on August 11, 1952. As an incident of the action, the company also asked that a writ of preliminary injunction be issued pending the termination of the case. On September 9, 1954, the court, without any previous hearing, granted ex parte the petition for the issuance of a preliminary writ of injunction upon the filing of a bond by the company in the amount of P20,000. Having been served with a copy of this order on the same date, September 9, 1954, the union immediately filed an urgent motion to dissolve the injunction basing its plea on the fact that, there being already a labor dispute pending between the parties before the Court of Industrial Relations, the trial court had no jurisdiction to act on the case and much less an issue the writ of preliminary injunction, the same coming under the exclusive jurisdiction of the industrial court under Republic Act No. 875. But the court, instead of dissolving the injunction, merely allowed the union to file a counter-bond in the amount of P40,000 if and when it desires to lift the injunction. On September 10, 1954, the company in turn moved to allow the original writ to stand unless the union put up a counterbond in the amount of P100,000 considering the amount of damages asked for in the complaint. And on September 13, 1954, the union filed a formal motion to dismiss reiterating the same ground it had advanced in its former motion that the trial court has no jurisdiction to act on the case. On December 15, 1954, the court issued an order denying the motion to dismiss but maintaining its ruling that the union may put up a counterbond of P40,000 if it so desires. In due time, the union filed the present petition for prohibition seeking to set aside the last order above adverted to and prohibiting respondent judge from proceeding with Civil Case No. 577 on the ground of lack of jurisdiction. The main issue raised by the union is whether the trial court has jurisdiction to take cognizance of Civil Case No. 577 and, incidentally, to issue the preliminary injunction in question. The question of whether or not a court of first instance can take cognizance of a case which involves a labor dispute or can issue a writ of injunction as an incident thereto has been recently decided by this Court in the Case of Philippine Association of Free Labor Unions (PAFLU), et al. vs. Hon. Bienvenido Tan, et al., 99 Phil, 854, 52 Off. Gaz., No. 13, 5836, wherein, speaking of the jurisdiction of the industrial court after the passage of Republic Act No. 875, this Court said:
“But this broad jurisdiction was somewhat curtailed upon the approval of Republic Act 875, the purpose being to limit it to certain specific eases, leaving’ the refit to the regular courts. Thus, as the law now stands, that power is confined to the following cases. (1) when the labor dispute affects an industry which is indispensable to the national interest and Is so certified by the President to the industrial court (section 10, Republic Act 875); (2) when the controversy refers to minimum wage under the Minimum Wage Law (Republic Act 602) ; (3) when it involves hours of employment under the Eight-Hour Labor Law (Commonwealth Act 444) ; and (4) when it involves an unfair labor practice [Section 5,(a), Republic Act 875]. In all other eases, even If they grow out of a labor dispute, the Court of Industrial Relations docs not have Jurisdiction, the intendment of the law being “to prevent undue restriction of free enterprise for capital and labor and to encourage the truly democratic method of regulating the relations between the employer and employee by means of an agreement freely entered into in collective bargaining’ (section 7, Republic 875). In other words, the policy of the law is to advance the settlement of disputes between the employers and the employees through collective bargaining, recognizing ’that real industrial peace cannot be achieved by compulsion of law’ [See section l(c), in relation to section 20, Idem.].”
It therefore appears that with the exception of the four cases above specified, the Court of Industrial Relations has no jurisdiction even if the case involves a labor dispute. And as the issue in the instant case does not fall under, nor refer to, any of the specified cases, it follows that the lower court has jurisdiction to entertain the same even if there is actually a case pending between the same parties in the industrial court involving a request by the union to be recognized as the sole collective bargaining unit of the company with regard to its stevedoring and arrastre services, for the instant case merely refers to the recovery of damages occasioned by the picketing undertaken by the members of the union and the rescission of the arrastre and stevedoring’ contract previously entered into between the parties. The next issue that arises is: Can the lower court grant injunction in connection with the picketing of the premises of respondent company by the members of the petitioning union ? In the affirmative, is the injunction issued by it in accordance with law? The first question should be answered in the affirmative, considering our finding that the trial court has jurisdiction to take cognizance of the case, but we hold nevertheless that the injunction issued by it is void because the procedure laid down by section 9 (d) of Republic Act 875 was not followed in its issuance. The instant case, being an outgrowth of a labor dispute arising from the picketing of the premises of respondent company by the members of petitioning union, the trial court cannot grant the injunction merely ex parte under section 6, Rule 60 of the Rules of Court, but must follow what is provided for in Republic Act No. 875. Thus, in the same case of Philippine Association of Free Labor Unions (PAFLU), et al. vs. Hon. Bienvenido Tan, et al., supra, we said:
“We believe however that in order that an injunction may be properly issued the. procedure laid down in section 9 (d) of Republic Act S7i5 should be followed and cannot be granted ex parte as allowed by Rule 60, section 6, of the Rules of Court. The reason is that the case, involving as it does a labor dispute, comes under said section 9 (d) of the law. That procedure requires that there should be a hearing- at -which the parties should be given an opportunity to present witnesses in support of the complaint and of the opposition, if any, with opportunity for evoss-examination, and that the other conditions required hy said section as prerequisites for the granting of relief must be established and stated in the order of the court. Unless this procedure is followed, the proceedings would be invalid and of no effect. The court would then be acting in excess of its jurisdiction. (Lauf vs. E. G. Shinner Co., Inc., supra).”
Moreover, under Section 9 (d) of Republic Act No. 875, an injunction ex parte can be issued only “upon testimony under oath, sufficient, if sustained, to justify the court in issuing a temporary injunction upon hearing after notice.” In other words, even if the court can grant an injunction ex parte, there is still need of a hearing wherein the sworn testimony of the applicant should be received, although the writ “shall be effective for no longer than five days and shall be void at the expiration of said five days.” The injunction in question, having been issued ex parte, without notice and without hearing, the same is void and without effect (Apolonia Reyes, et al. vs. Hon. Bienvenido Tan, et al., 99 Phil., 880; 52 Off. Gaz., [14] 6187). Wherefore, petition is denied, but the writ of injunction issued by the court is hereby set aside. The preliminary injunction issued by this Court is also set aside. No costs. Padilla, Montemayor, Reyes, A., Labrador, Endencia and Felix, JJ., concur. Bengzon, J., concurs in the result.