[ G.R. No. L-8455. February 27, 1956 ] 98 Phil. 466
[ G.R. No. L-8455. February 27, 1956 ]
GAUDENCIO MANIGBAS, ET AL., PETITIONERS AND APPELLEES, VS. JUDGE CALIXTO P. LUNA, ETC., ET AL., RESPONDENTS. JUDGE CALIXTO P. LUNA, RESPONDENT AND APPELLANT. D E C I S I O N
BAUTISTA ANGELO, J.:
.On July 13, 1954, Gaudencio Manigbas and eleven others were charged with murder before the Justice of the Peace Court of Rosario, Batangas by Captain Epigenio Navarro, commanding officer of a constabulary detachment stationed in Alangilang, Batangas, Batangas. The complaint was later amended by including one Miguel Almario. Three days after the, filing of the original complaint, counsel for the accused moved that they be granted bail for their provisional liberty and, on July 19, 1954, the court issued an order wherein, after reconsidering its previous order denying bail to all, allowed to some the right to bail and denied to others. Both defense and prosecution filed a motion for reconsideration, the former asking that all the accused be granted bail while the latter pleading that all of them be denied because the justice of the peace court has no jurisdiction to grant bail in eases involving, capital offenses. On July 21, 1954, the court entered an order setting aside its order of July 19, 1954.and restoring, its original order denying bail to all the accused for the reason that “in a long series of decisions promulgated by our Supreme Court in connection with the granting of bail to a person charged with a capital offense which were carefully examined by this court, there is not a single case wherein the Justice of the Peace Court entertained a petition for bail for a person charged with a capital offense and thereafter hear the evidence to determine whether the same is strong or not so as to warrant the giving of bail.” Upon receipt of a copy of the aforesaid order, counsel for the defense filed with the Court of First Instance of Batangas, sitting in Lipa City, a petition for mandamus seeking in effect to compel the justice of the peace court of Rosario to receive evidence to determine if the same warrants the granting of bail to the accused. After the provincial commander and the justice of the peace put in their answers, the court on August 24, 1954 granted .the petition holding that respondent justice of the peace court has authority to grant bail even if the charge involves a capital offense and ordering said court to act on the application for bail. Hence this appeal. Before proceeding to discuss the merits of the presents controversy, there is need to dwell on a point of procedure which came up during the deliberation of this case. This has reference to the fact that, according to the record, the accused who have interposed this petition for mandamus are still at large for so far no order has been issued for their arrest. The record discloses that immediately upon the filing, of the charge against them they applied for bail and their motion was immediately acted upon by the justice of the peace. And the denial of the bail eventually led to the filing of the present petition for mandamus. We hold that this petition is premature for its purpose is to compel the performance of a duty whjeh does not exist there being no correlative right the use Sir enjoyment of it has been denied which may be the subject of mandamus (section 67, Rule 3) ; and this is so because the right to bail only accrues when a person is arrested. or deprived of his liberty. The purpose of bail is to secure one’s release and it would be incongruous to grant bail to one who is. free. Thus; “bail is the security required and given for the release of a person who is in the custody of the law” (Rule 110, section 1), and evidently the accused do not come within its purview. We could therefore dismiss this petition on this score alone were it not for the importance of the issue now before us which requires proper elucidation for the guidance of all justices of the peace who may be found in similar predicament. The issue to be determined is whether a justice of the peace can, in a case involving a capital offense, act on an application for bail and receive evidence to determine if the evidence of guilt is strong or otherwise grant bail if the evidence so warrants. Under our Constitution, all accused persons before conviction are entitled to bail except those charged with capital offenses when evidence of guilt is strong (Article III, section 1, paragraph 16). Under our rules, in non-capital offenses, after judgment by a justice of the peace and before conviction by the court of first instance, an accused is entitled to bail as a matter of right (Rule 110, section 3);. but, “after conviction by the Court of First Instance, defendant may, upon application, be bailed at the discretion of the court.” (Rule 110, section 4.) And implementing the provision of our Constitution, the rule also provides that “No person in custody for the commission of a capital offense shall be admitted to bail if the evidence of his guilt is strong” (Rule 110, section 6). The burden of showing that the evidence of guilt is strong is on the prosecution (Rule 110, section 7). While as a general rule it may be stated that an application for bail may be acted upon by the court which has cognizance of the1 case regardless of whether it involves a capital offense ,or not, (Peralta vs. Ramos, 71 Phil., 271) and as a general proposition we may concede that justices of the peace before whom a case is initiated by the filing of the corresponding complaint or information have also authority to entertain petitions for bail in cases involving non-capital offenses as to which the accused are entitled to bail as a matter of right, however, doubt’ is entertained as to whether said justices of the peace can likewise entertain bail while the cases are under their control if they involve capital offenses like the one under consideration. This doubt has arisen because the law and the rules on the matter are not explicit enough and our jurisprudence has not so far laid down a, clear-cut ruling clarifying this point in this jurisdiction. In the United States “it may be stated as a general rule that all judicial officers having the power to hear and determine cases have the power to take bail.” It is regarded as “a necessary incident to the right to hear and determine the cause” (6 Am. Jur., p. 67). And with particular reference to justices of the peace, the general rule is that “where, under the statutes, justices of the peace have power as examining magistrates, with power of commitment, they may in their discretion admit to bail”; except, where their power to “take bail” is limited by the Constitution, or by statute, in which case “they must act within the express or implied limitations thereby laid down” (6 C. J., 973-974). But the prevailing rule is that “inferior officers vested only with the power to commit cannot, without express legislative enactment, take bail in capital offenses, for the determination of the sufficiency of the evidence in such cases, in order to entitle the accused to bail, is a -matter of the greatest importance both to the accused and to the state and is the appropriate province of the court entrusted with the trial of such cases” (6 Am. Jur., p. 67). Considering the general rule that justices of the peace have the power as examining magistrates to commit and in their discretion admit to bail an accused person unless such power is limited by the Constitution or by statute, can we say that in this jurisdiction our justices of the peace have also the power to admit to bail a person accused of a capital offense? Our answer must of necessity be in the affirmative not only because there is no such limitation in our Constitution but because the Judiciary Reorganization Act of 1948 seems to expressly confer this power upon them. We refer to sections 87 and 91 of said Act relative to the power of justices of the peace to conduct preliminary investigations and the incidental powers they may exercise in relation thereto. The first section provides that the justices of the peace may conduct preliminary investigations “for any offense alleged to have been committed within their respective municipalities * * * without regard to the limits of punishment, and may release, or commit and bind over any person charged with such offense to secure his appearance’ before the proper court.” And section 91 provides that the same justices of the peace may “require of any person arrested a bond for good behavior or to keep the peace, or for the further appearance of such person before a court of competent jurisdiction.” The only limitation to this power is that the bond must be approved by that court. These provisions are broad enough to confer upon justices of the peace the authority to grant bail to persons accused even of capital offenses for such is the only meaning that we can give to the phrase “bind over any person charged with such offense to secure his appearance before the proper court.” This is the meaning of bail as defined in section 1 of Rule 110. Some apprehension has been expressed by some members of the Court over the fact that if such power is given to justices of the peace in capital cases the power may be abused or improperly exercised considering the fact that some of them are not lawyers or are politicians like the mayors who may act under the law when the incumbent justices are temporarily absent (section B, Rule 108). While the possibility of abuse cannot be denied such cannot argue against the existence of the power and if there is need for a remedy such devolves upon Congress. But before such curative measure is adopted, our duty is to apply the law as we see it regardless of its implications. And in the event that an abuse is committed, the situation is not without a remedy. The government can immediately take steps to obtain appropriate relief and, we are sure, the proper court will not deny prompt action when necessary to promote the interests of justice. We are therefore of the opinion that respondent justice of the peace can act on the application for bail taking into account the evidence that may be presented by the prosecution. In this respect the order appealed from is correct. Considering tl at the petition for mandamus is premature, the same should be dismissed with costs against petitioners. Parás, C. J., Padilla, Reyes, A., Jugo, Concepcion, Reyes, J. B. L. and Endencia, JJ., concur.