[ G.R. No. L-6858. May 31, 1956 ] 99 Phil. 346
[ G.R. No. L-6858. May 31, 1956 ]
FERNANDO IGNACIO AND SIMEON DE LA CRUZ, PETITIONERS AND, APPELLANTS VS. THE HONORABLE NORBERTO ELA, MAYOR OF STA. CRUZ, ZAMBALES, RESPONDENT AND APPELLEE. D E C I S I O N
BAUTISTA ANGELO, J.:
Petitioners, in their behalf and for the benefit of other Jehovah’s Witnesses in the province of Zambales, brought this action to compel respondent to grant them a permit to hold a public meeting at the public plaza of Sta. Cruz, Zambales, together with the kiosk, on such date and time as may be applied for by them.
Respondent, in his answer stated that he had not refused the request of petitioners to hold a religious meeting at the public plaza as in fact he gave them permission to use the northwestern part of the plaza on July 27, 1952, but they declined to avail of it. He prayed that the action be dismissed.
The questions of fact raised in the pleadings being not controverted, and petitioners having submitted a motion for judgment on. the pleading?, which was concurred in by respondent, the court rendered a decision dismissing the case without pronouncement as to costs. Plaintiffs appealed from this decision.
It appears that petitioners are members of the Watch Tower Bible and Tract Society, commonly known as Jehovah’s Witnesses, whose tenets and principles are derogatory to those professed by the Catholic organization. In its publication “face the pacts”, that society branded the latter as a religious organization which is “a part of the monstrosity now appearing in and claiming the right to rule the earth.” Desiring to hold a meeting in furtherance of its objectives, petitioners asked respondent to give them permission to use the public plaza together with the kiosk, but, instead of granting the permission, respondent allowed them to hold their meeting on the northwestern part corner of the plaza. He adopted as a policy not to allow the use of the kiosk for any meeting by any religious denomination as it is his belief that said kiosk should only be used “for legal purposes.” And when their request for reconsideration was denied, petitioners instituted the present action for mandamus. It is now contended by petitioners that the action taken by respondent is unconstitutional being an abridgment of the freedom of speech, assembly, and worship guaranteed by our Constitution.
The issue raised involves a little digression on the extent to which the right to peacefully assemble guaranteed by the Constitution may be invoked. Fortunately, this issue has already been passed upon by this Court in Primicias vs. Fugoso, 45 Official Gazette, 3280, wherein this Court said:
“The right to freedom of speech, and to peacefully assemble and petition the government for redress of grievances, are fundamental personal rights of the people recognized and guaranteed by the constitutions of democratic countries. But it is a settled principle growing out of the nature of well-ordered civil societies that the exercise of those rights is not absolute for it may be so regulated that it shall not be injurious to the equal enjoyment of others having equal rights, nor injurious to the rights of the community or society. The power to regulate the exercise of such and other constitutional rights is termed the sovereign ‘police power’, which is the power to prescribe regulations, to promote the health, morals, peace, education, good order or safety, and general welfare of the people. This sovereign police power is exercised by the government through its legislative branch by the enactment of laws regulating those and other constitutional and civil rights, and it may be delegated to political subdivisions, such as towns, municipalities and cities by authorizing their legislative bodies called municipal and city councils to enact ordinances for the purpose.”
It therefore appears that the right to freedom of speech and to peacefully assemble, though guaranteed by our Constitution, is not absolute, for it may be regulated in order that it may not be “injurious to the equal, enjoyment of others having equal rights, nor injurious to the rights of the community or society”, and this power may be exercised under the “police power” of the state, which is the power to prescribe regulations to promote the health, morals, peace, education, good order or safety, and general welfare of the people. It is true that there is no law nor ordinance which expressly confers upon respondents the power to regulate the use of the public plaza, together.with its kiosk, for the purposes for which it was established, but such power may be exercised under his broad powers as chief executive in connection with his specific duty “to issue orders relating to the police or to public safety” within the municipality (section 2194, paragraph c, Revised Administrative Code). And it may even be said that the above regulation has been adopted as an implementation of the constitutional provision which prohibits any public property to be used, directly or indirectly, by any religious denomination (paragraph 3, section 23, Article VI of the Constitution).
The power exercised by respondent cannot be considered as capricious or arbitrary considering the peculiar circumstances of this case. It appears that the public plaza, particularly the kiosk, is located at a short distance from the Roman Catholic Church. The proximity of said church to the kiosk has caused some concern on the part of the authorities that to avoid disturbance of peace and order, or the happening of untoward incidents, they deemed it necessary to prohibit the use of that kiosk by any religious denomination as a place of meeting of its members. This was the policy adopted by respondent for sometime previous to the request made by petitioners. Respondent never denied such request but merely tried to enforce his policy by assigning them the northwestern part of the public plaza. It cannot therefore be said that petitioners were denied their constitutional right to assemble for, as was said, such right is subject to regulation to maintain public order and public safety. This is especially so considering that the tenets of petitioners congregation are derogatory to those of the Roman Catholic Church, a factor which respondent must have considered in denying their request.
It is true that the foregoing conclusion is predicated on facts which do not appear in the pleadings nor are supported by any evidence because none was presented for the reason that the case was submitted on a motion for judgment on the pleadings, but those facts like the situation of the “kiosko” and the occurrence of religious controversies which disturbed the peace and order in the municipality of Sta. Cruz are matters which may be deemed to come within the judicial knowledge of the court as in fact they were so considered by the trial judge in his decision. This is what he said on this point: “The presiding judge, through information, personal experience and through the papers, has known of unfortunate events which caused the disturbance of peace and order in the community. If the petitioners should be allowed to use the ‘kiosko’ which is within the hearing distance of the catholic church, this may give rise to disturbance of other religious ceremonies performed in the church.” (Italics supplied.) This action of the judge may be justified under section 5, Rule 123, of the Rules of Court, which is elaborated by this Court in the following wise:
There are facts, indeed of which courts should take judicial cognizance. These facts refer to a variety of subjects—legislative, political, historical, geographical, commercial scientific, and artificial—in addition, to a wide range of matters, arising in the ordinary course of nature or the general current of human events. The matter of judicial notice is ever expanding and will surely keep pace with the advance! of the sciences and the arts. But, a matter to be judicially cognizable must be well-established or authoritatively settled, or of common or general knowledge. Obviously, courts should take notice of whatever is or should be generally known because judges should not be more ignorant than the rest of mankind.’ (The Municipal Board of the City of Manila, et al. vs. Segundo Agustin, 65 Phil., 144.) (Italics supplied.)
The contention that the northwestern part of the plaza, cannot be considered as part of said plaza but of the road in the northwestern portion beyond the concrete fence is untenable, for it appears that that portion is part of the plaza and has a space capable of accommodating hundreds of people. In fact, during the past celebrations of the traditional town fiesta of the municipality, said portion has been utilized by the authorities as a place for staging dramas, zarzuelas, and cinematograph shows. Verily, the pretense of petitioners cannot be attributed to the unsuitability of that portion as a meeting place but rather to their obstinate desire to use the kiosk knowing it to be contrary to the policy of the municipality.[1]
The decision appealed from is affirmed, with costs
against petitioners.
Bengzon, Padilla, Montemayor, Jugo, Labrador, and Endencia, JJ., concur.