THE PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, PLAINTIFF AND APPELLEE, VS. AMADO V. HERNANDEZ, ET AL., DEFENDANTS AND APPELLANTS. RESOLUTION

[ G.R. Nos. L-6025-26. July 18, 1956 ] 99 Phil. 515

[ G.R. Nos. L-6025-26. July 18, 1956 ]

THE PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, PLAINTIFF AND APPELLEE, VS. AMADO V. HERNANDEZ, ET AL., DEFENDANTS AND APPELLANTS. RESOLUTION

CONCEPCION, J.:

This refers to  the petition for bail filed by defendant-appellant Amado Hernandez on June 26, 1954, and renewed on December 22, 1955.   A similar petition, filed on December 28, 1953, had been denied by a resolution of this court dated  February 2,  1954.  Although not  stated in said resolution, the same was due mainly to these circumstances: The prosecution maintains that Hernandez is charged with, and has been convicted  of, rebellion completed with murders,  arsons and robberies,  for which the capital punishment,  it is claimed, may be imposed, although the lower court  sentenced him merely to life  imprisonment.   Upon the other hand, the defense contends, among other  things, that rebellion can  not be complexed  with murder, arson, or robbery.   Inasmuch  as the issue  thus  raised had not been previously settled  squarely, and this  court was then unable, as yet,  to  reach a  definite conclusion thereon,  it was deemed best not  to disturb,  for the time being, the course of action taken  by the lower court,  which  denied bail to the movant.  After  mature deliberation,  our considered opinion on said issue is as follows:

The first two paragraphs of the amended information in this case read:

“The undersigned accuses  (1) Amado V. Hernandez alias Victor alias Soliman  alias Amado  alias AVH alias Victor Soliman, (2) Guillermo Capadocia alias Huan Bantiling alias Cap alias G. Capadocia,  (3) Mariano P. Balgos alias Bakal alias Tony Collantes alias Bonifacio,  (4)  Alfredo Saulo alias Elias alias Fred  alias A.B.S. alias A.B., (5)  Andres Baisa, Jr. alias Ben alias  Andy (6) Genaro de la Cruz alias Gonzalo alias Gorio alias Arong, (7)  Aquilino Bunsol alias Anong, (8) Adriano Samson alias Danoy, (9) Juan J. Cruz alias Johnny 2, alias Jessie Wilson alias William,  (10)  Jacobo  Espino, (11)  Amado Racanday,  (12) Fermin Rodillas,  and  (13)  Julian Lumanog alias Manue, of the crime of  rebellion with multiple murder, arsons and robberies committed as follows:

“That on or about March 15, 1945, and for some  time before the said date and  continuously thereafter until the present  time, in the City  of Manila,  Philippines,  and  the place which  they  had chosen  as the  nerve center  of all their rebellious activities in the different parts of the  Philippines, the said.accused,  conspiring, confederating, and cooperating with each other, as  well as with the thirty-one  (31) defendants  charged in criminal  cases Nos. 14071, 14082, 14270, 14315, and 14344 of the Court of First Instance of Manila (decided May 11, 1951) and also with others whose whereabouts and identities are still unknown, the said  accused and their co-conspirators, being then officers and/or members of, or otherwise associated with the Congress of  Labor Organizations  (CLO) formerly known as the Committee on Labor Organization  (CLO), an active agency, organ, and instrumentality of the Communist Party  of the Philippines  (P.K.P.),  with central offices in Manila and chapters and affiliated or associated labor  unions and other ‘mass organizations’ in  different places in  the Philippines, and as  such agency,  organ, and instrumentality, fully cooperates in, and synchronizes itjs activities with the  rebellious activities  of the ‘Hukbong Magpalayang Bayan, (H.M.B.) and other organs, agencies, and instrumentalities of the Communist Party  of the Philippines (P.K.P.) to thereby  assure, facilitate,  and  effect  the  complete and  permanent success  of the armed rebellion against the Republic of the Philippines, as the herein defendants and their co-conspirators have in  fact synchronised the activities of the CLO  with the  rebellious activities of the HMB and other agencies,  organs and instrumentalities of the Communist Party of the Philippines and have otherwise master-minded or promoted the cooperative efforts between the CLO and HMB and other agencies, organs, and instrumentalities of the P.K.P. in the prosecution of the rebellion against the Republic of the Philippines, and being then also high ranking officers and/or members of, or otherwise affiliated with, the Communist Party of the  Philippines  (P.K.P.), which is now actively engaged  in an armed rebellion against the Government of the Philippines through acts therefor committed and planned to  be further  committed in Manila and other places in the Philippines, and of which party the ‘Hukbong Mapagpalaya ng Bayan’  (HMB), otherwise or formerly known as the ‘Hukbalahaps’ (Huks), is the armed force, did then and there willfully, unlawfully  and feloniously help, support, promote, maintain, cause, direct and/or command the ‘Hukbong Mapagpalaya ng Bayan’ (HMB) or the ‘Hukbalahaps’  (Huks) to rise publicly and  take arms against the Republic of the Philippines, or otherwise participate in such  armed public uprising, for the purpose of removing  the territory of the  Philippines from the allegiance to the government and laws thereof as in fact the said ‘Hukbong Mapagpalaya ng Bayan’ or ‘Hukbalahaps’ have risen publicly and taken arms  to attain the said  purpose by then and there making armed raids,  sorties and  ambushes, attacks  against  police, constabulary and army detachments as well  as innocent civilians, and  as a  necessary  means  to commit  the  crime of  rebellion, in connection therewith and in furtherance thereof, have then and there committed acts of murder, pillage, looting, plunder, arson, and planned destruction of private and public property to create and spread chaos, disorder, terror, and fear so as to facilitate the accomplishment of the aforesaid purpose, as follows, to wit:”

Then follows a description of  the murders,  arsons and robberies allegedly perperated by the accused “as a necessary means to commit the crime  of  rebellion, in connection therewith and in furtherance thereof.”

Article 48 of  the Revised Penal  Code  provides that:

“When a single act constitutes two or more  grave or less grave felonies, or when an  offense is a necessary means  for committing the other,  the penalty for the  most  serious crime shall be  imposed, the same  to be applied in  its maximum  period.”

It is obvious, from the language of this article, that the same presupposes  the  commission of  two  (2) or more crimes, and, hence,  does  not  apply  when the culprit is guilty of only one  crime.

Article  134 of said  code  reads:

“The crime of rebellion  or  insurrection  is  committed by rising publicly and taking arms  against the Government for the purpose of removing from the  allegiance to said Government  or its laws, the territory of the Philippine Islands or any part thereof, of any body of land, naval or other armed forces, or  of  depriving the Chief Executive  or the Legislature, wholly or partially, of any  of  their powers or  prerogatives.”

Pursuant  to Article  135 of the same code “any person, merely participating or executing the commands of  others in a rebellion shall suffer the penalty of prision mayor in its minimum period.”

The penalty is increased to prision  mayor and a fine not to exceed P20,000 for “any person who promotes, maintains or heads  a rebellion or insurrection or who, while holding any public office or employment, takes part therein”:

“engaging in  war against the forces  of the  government”,  “destroying  property”,  or  “committing   serious  violence”,   “exacting contributions or”  “diverting public funds from the lawful purpose for which  they have been  appropriated”.

Whether performed singly or collectively, these five (5) classes of acts constitute only one offense, and no  more, and are, altogether, subject to only one penalty—prision mayor and a fine not to  exceed P20,000.  Thus for instance, a public officer who assists the rebels by turning over to them, for use in  financing the uprising, the public  funds entrusted to his custody, could neither be prosecuted for malversation  of  such  funds, apart  from  rebellion,  nor accused and convicted  of the complex  crime of rebellion with malversation  of  public funds.  The  reason is that such malversation  is inherent in the  crime of rebellion committed by him.  In fact, he would not be guilty of rebellion  had  he not so misappropriated  said funds.  In the imposition, upon said public officer, of the penalty for rebellion it would even be improper to consider the aggravating circumstance of advantage taken by the offender of  his public  position,  this being an essential element of the crime he had  perpetrated.  Now,  then, if the  office held by said offender and the nature of the funds malversed by  him cannot aggravate the penalty for his offense, it is clear that neither may it worsen the very crime committed by  the culprit by  giving  rise, either  to  an independent crime, or to  a complex crime.   Needless  to say, a mere participant in the rebellion, who is not a  public officer, should not  be placed at a  more disadvantageous position than the promoters, maintainers or  leaders of the movement,  or the public  officers who join the  same, insofar as  the application  of Article 48  is  concerned.

One of the means by which rebellion may be committed, in  the words  of  said Article 135, is by “engaging in war against the forces of  the  government” and “committing serious violence” in the prosecution of  said “war”.  These expressions imply everything that war connotes, namely; resort to arms, requisition of property and services, collection of taxes and contributions, restraint of liberty, damage to property, physical injuries and loss of life, and the hunger, illness  and unhappiness that war  leaves in  its wake—except that, very often, it is worse than war in the international sense, for it involves internal struggle, a fight between brothers, with a bitterness and passion or ruthlessness seldom found in a contest between strangers.  Being within the purview of “engaging in war” and “committing serious violence’”, said resort to arms, with the  resulting impairment or destruction of life and property, constitutes not  two or  more  offense, but only one crime—that  of rebellion plain and simple.  Thus, for instance,  it has been held that “the  crime of treason may be committed  ‘by executing either a single or similar intentional overt acts, different or similar but distinct, and for that reason, it may be considered one single continuous offense.  (Guinto vs. Veluz, 77  Phil., 801,  44 Off. Gaz., 909.)”   (Peoples. Pacheco, 93 Phil., 521.)

Inasmuch as the acts specified in said Article  135 constitute, we repeat, one single crime, it follows  necessarily that said acts offer no  occasion  for the application  of Article  48,  which  requires therefor the commission of, at least,  two crimes.  Hence, this  court  has never in  the past, convicted  any person of the “complex crime of rebellion with murder”.  What is more, it appears that in every one  of the cases of rebellion published in the Philippine Reports, the defendants were convicted of simple rebellion, although they had killed several persons, sometimes peace officers (U. S. vs. Lagnason, 3 Phil.,  472; U. S. vs. Baldello, 3 Phil,  509, U. S. vs. Ayala, 6  Phil.,  151;  League vs.  People, 73 Phil., 155).

Fallowing a parallel line are our decisions in the more recent cases of treason, resulting from collaboration with the Japanese during the war in the Pacific.   In fact, said cases went  further  than the  aforementioned  cases  of rebellion,  in that the theory  of the prosecution to  the effect that the accused in  said treason  cases were guilty of the complex crime of treason with murder and  other crimes was  expressly and  repeatedly  rejected  therein. Thus, commenting on the  decision of the  People’s Court finding the accused  in People  vs.  Prieto  (80 Phil., 138, 45  Off. Gaz.,  3329)   “guilty of   * * *   the  crime of treason complexed by murder and  physical injuries”  and sentencing him  to  death,  and on  the  contention of the Solicitor General that Prieto had committed  the “complex crime  of  treason  with  homicide”, this cburt,  speaking through Mr. Justice  Tuason, said:

“The execution of  some of  the  guerrilla suspects  mentioned in these  counts and the infliction of physical injuries on others are not offenses separate from  treason.  Under  the  Philippine treason law and under the United States constitution denning treason, after  which the former was  patterned, there must concur both adherence to  the enemy and giving him aid and comfort.  One without the other does not make treason.

“In the nature of tilings, the giving of aid and comfort can only be accomplished by some  kind  of action. Its very nature partakes, of a  deed  or physical activity as opposed  to a  mental  operation. (Cramer vs. U.S., ante.)  This deed or physical activity may be, and  often  is,  in itself  a  criminal  offense under  another  penal statute or  provision.  Even  so,  when the deed is  charged as an element of  treason it becomes  identified with  the latter crime and can not be the subject of a separate punishment, or used in combination with treason to increase the penalty as  Article 48 of the Revised Penal Code provides.  Just as one can not be punished for possessing opium in a prosecution for smoking the identical drug, and a robber cannot be held guilty of coercion or trespass to a dwelling  in a prosecution for robbery,  because possession of opium and force and trespass are inherent in smoking and  in  robbery  respectively, so may not a  defendant be made liable for murder as a separate crime or in conjunction with another offense where, as  in this case, it is averred as a  constitutive  ingredient  of   treason.  * * *  Where murder or  physical injuries  are  charged as overt  acts of treason* * * they can  not  be  regarded  separately  under  their  general denomination.”   (Italics   supplied.)

Accordingly, we convicted the accused  of  simple  treason and  sentenced him to life imprisonment.

In People vs. Labra, 81  Phil.,  377, 46  Off.  Gaz., Supp. No. 1, p. 159, we used the following  language:

“The lower court found  appellant  guilty not  only  of treason, but of  murder,  for the killing of  Tomas  Abella, and,  following the provisions of Article 48 of the  Revised Penal Code  sentenced him to death,  the maximum  penalty  provided by article  114. “The lower court erred in finding appellant guilty  of  the murder of Tomas Abella.  The arrest and killing of Tomas Abella for being a guerilla, is alleged  in  count 3 of the information, as one of  the  elements of the crime  of treason for which  appellant  is prosecuted.  Such  element  constitute  a  part  of  the  legal  basis upon  which appellant stands  convicted of the crime  of treason. The killing of Tomas Abella cannot be considered as legal ground for convicting  appellant of  any  crime other than  treason.  The essential elements  of  a given crime  cannot be  disintegrated  in different parts,  each  one  stand  as  a separate  ground to  convict the accused  of  a different  crime or  criminal offense.  The elements constituting a given  crime are integral and inseparable parts of a whole.  In the contemplation of the law, they  cannot be  used for double or multiple purposes.  They can  only be used for the sole  purpose  of showing  the  commission  of  the  crime  of which  they  form  part.  The  factual  complexity  of  the  crime  of treason does not  endow it with  the  functional  ability  of worm multiplication or amoeba reproduction.   Otherwise, the accused will have  to face as many prosecutions and convictions  as  there are elements in the  crime of treason, in open violation of the constitutional  prohibition  against double jeopardy.”   (Italics supplied.)

The same  conclusion  was  reached  in  People  vs. Ali botod  82 Phil.,  164, 46 Off. Gaz., 1005, despite the  direct participation of the defendant therein in the maltreatment and killing of several persons.

In  People vs. Vilo 82 Phil., 524, 46 Off.  Gaz., 2517, we held:

“The People’s Court, however, erred in classifying the crime  as treason with murder.  The killing  of  Amado Satorre   and one Segundo is charged  as an  element of  treason,  and  it   therefore becomes identified with the latter  crime, and  cannot  be the subject of a separate punishment or used in combination with treason to  increase  the penalty as Article  48 of the Revised Penal Code provides,”  (People vs. Prieto, L-399, 45 Off. Gaz. 3329.   See, also People vs. Labra, L-386,  46  Off. Gaz.,  [Supp. to  No.  1], 159.)” (Italics supplied.)

To the same effect was our decision in People vs. Roble 83  Phil., 1, 46  Off. Gaz., 4207.   We  stated therein:

“The  court held that the facts alleged in the information  is a complex crime of  treason with murders, with  the result  that the penalty  provided  for  the most serious offense  was to be imposed on its maximum degree.  Viewing the case from  the standpoint of modifying circumstances, the court believed  that the  same result obtained.  It  opined  that the killings were  murders  qualified by treachery  and  aggravated  by  the  circumstances  of  evident  premeditation, superior strength, cruelty, and an armed band.

“We  think this  is  error.  The tortures  and murders set  forth in the information are merged in and formed part of the treason. They  were in this case the overt acts which, besides traitorous intention supplied a vital ingredient in the crime.”  (Italics supplied.)

The  accused  in People vs. Delgado 83 Phil., 9,  46  Off. Gaz.,  4213,  had been  convicted by  the  People’s Court of  “the  crime  of  treason  complexed with the crime of murder” and sentenced to the  extreme  penalty.  In  our decision, penned by Mr. Justice Montemayor, we expressed ourselves as  follows:

The  appellant  herein  was  and  is a  Filipino citizen.  His adherence to the  Japanese  forces of occupation  and giving them aid and comfort by acting as  their spy,  undercover man, investigator, and even  killer when necessary to cow  and compel the inhabitants to  surrender  their firearms  and  disclose  information about the guerrillas has been fully established.  His  manner of  investigation and maltreatment of  some of his  victims like  Tereso  Sanchez and Patricio Suico,  was so cruel, brutal and  inhuman that it is almost unbelievable that  a  Filipino can commit and practice such  atrocities especially on his own countrymen.  But, evidently, war, confusion and opportunism  can and do  produce  characters and  monster unknown during  peace  and normal  times.

“The  People’s Court found the appellant guilty of  treason  complexed  with  murder.  The  Solicitor  General,  however, maintains that the  offense  committed is simpletreason, citing  the  doctrine laid down by this court  in the case  of  People vs. Prieto,  (L—399, 45  Off. Gaz.,  3329)  but accompanied by the aggravating circumstance under Article 14,  paragraph 21,  of  the  Revised Penal Code, and not  compensated  by  any mitigating  circumstance,  and  he recommends the imposition  of the penalty of death.  We agree with the Solicitor General  that  on the basis  of the ruling of this  court in the case of People vs. Prieto, supra, the appellant may be  convicted only of treason, and that the killing and infliction of physical injuries committed  by  him may  not be  separated  from the crime of treason but  should  be regarded as acts performed in the commission of treason, although, as  stated in said  case, the brutality with which the  killing  or physical injuries were carried out  may be taken  as an  aggravating circumstance.”  (Italics supplied.)

and reduced the  penalty  from death  to  life  imprisonment and a  fine of  P20,000.

Identical were the  pertinent  features  of the  case  of People vs. Adlawan,  83 Phil., 194,  46  Off.  Gaz.,  4299, in which,  through Mr. Justice Reyes  (A),  we declared:

“* * * we find  merit in the contention that appellant should have not been convicted of the so-called ‘Complex crime  of treason with murder, robbery, and rape.’  The killings, robbery, and raping mentioned  in  the  information  are  therein  alleged  not  as  specific offenses but as mere elements  of (the  crime  of  treason  for  which the accused is  being prosecuted.  Being merged in  and identified with the general  charged, they  can not be used in combination vrith the  treason  to increase the penalty under Article  US of the Revised Penal Ctfde.  (People vs. Prieto,  L-339, January 29,  1948, 45 Off. Gaz., 3829.)  Appellant shoufld, therefore, be held guilty  of  treason only.”   (Italics supplied.)

In People vs. Suralta,  85 Phil., 714, 47 Off. Gaz.,  4595, the language  used was:

“* * * But the People’s Court erred  in finding the  appellant guilty of the complex crime of treason with murder, because murder was an ingredient of the crime of treason, as  we  have  heretofore held in  several cases.  (Italics  supplied.)

This was reiterated  in People vs. Navea, 87  Phil., 1, 47 Off. Gaz., Supp. No. 12, p.  252:

“The  Solicitor  General  recommends  that  the  appellant  be sentenced  for the complex crime of treason with  murder.   We have already ruled, however,  that where,  as  in the  present case,  the killing  is  charged as an element of treason, it  ‘becomes  identified with the  latter  crime  and cannot be the subject of a separate punishment, or  used in  combination with  treason  to increase  the penalty  as  Article  48  of  the  Revised  Penal Code  provides” (Italics supplied.)

The question at bar was, also, taken up in the case of Crisologo vs. People and Yillalobos  (94 Phil., 477), decided on February 26,1954.  The facts and the rule therein laid down are set  forth  in our unanimous decision in  said case,  from which we quote:

“The petitioner Juan  D.  Crisologo, a captain in the USAPFE during the  last world war and at the time of the filing of  the present petition a lieutenant  colonel in the  Armed Forces of  the Philippines, was  on March 12, 1946,  accused  of  treason under Article 114 of the Revised  Penal Code  in an information  filed in the People’s Court.  But before the accused could be brought under the jurisdiction of the court, he was on January 13, 1947,  indicted for violations of Commonwealth Act No. 408, otherwise known as the Articles of War, before a military  court created by authority of the Army  Chief  of Staff,  the  indictment  containing  three charges, two  of which, the first and third,  were those of treason consisting in  giving information and aid to the enemy leading to the capture of USAFFE officers and men and other persons  with anti-Japanese reputation and in urging members of the USAFFE to surrender  and cooperate with the  enemy,  while the second  was that of having certain  civilians  killed in time of war.   Found innocent  of the  first and third charges but  guilty of the second, he was on May, 8, 1947, sentenced by the military court to life imprisonment.

“With  the  approval  on June 17, 1948, of  Republic Act  No. 811 abolishing  the  People’s  Court, the  criminal  case  in that  court against the petitioner was, pursuant to the provisions of  said  Act, transferred to the  Court  of  First  Instance  of  Zamboanga  and there the  charges  of  treason were amplified.  Arraigned in  that court upon the amended information, petitioner  presented a motion to quash,  challenging  the  jurisdiction  of  the court  and  pleading double jeopardy  because of his previous  sentence  in  the  military court. But the court  denied  the  motion  and, after petitioner had pleaded  not  guilty, proceeded  to  trial,  whereupon,  the present petition  for  certiorari and  prohibition was  filed in  this  court  to have the trial  judge  desist from proceeding with the trial and dismiss the case.

“It is, however, claimed that the offense charged in the military court different from that charged in the  civil  court and that  even granting that the  offense was identical the  military court had no jurisdiction to take cognizance of the same because the People’s Court had previously  acquired jurisdiction over the case  with the result that the conviction in the court martial was void. In support of the first point, it is urged that the amended  information filed in the Court of First Instance  of  Zamboanga contains overt acts distinct from those charged in  the military court.   But we note that while certain overt acts specified in the amended information  in the Zamboanga court were not specified in the indictment in the court martial,  they all are embraced in the general  charge of  treason, which is  a continuous offense and one who commits ft is not criminally liable for as many crimes as there are overt acts, because all evert act ‘he has done or might have done for  that purpose constitute but a  single  offense.  (Guinto vs.  Veluz, 44  Off. Gaz., ,909; People  vs. Pacheco,  L-4750, promulgated July 31, 1953.)  In other words, since the offense charged in the amended information in the Court of First Instance  of Zamboanga is treason, the  fact that the said  information contains an enumeration of additional overt  acts not specifically mentioned in the indictment  before  the military court is immaterial since the new alleged overt  acts do not  in themselves constitute a new and  distinct  offense from  that of  treason,  and this court has repeatedly held that a person cannot be found guilty of treason and  at the same  time also  guilty of  overt acts specified in the information for treason even if those  overt acts considered separately t are  punishable  by  law,  for  the simple  reason that those  overt  acts are  not  separate offenses distinct from  that of treason  but constitute  ingredients thereof.**  (Italics suuplied.)

Thus, insofar as treason is concerned, the opinion of this court, on the  question whether  said. crime  may be  complexed   with  murder, when the former   was  committed through the latter,  and it is so alleged in  the information, had positively and clearly crystalized itself in the negative as early as January 29, 1948.

We have not overlooked the decision in  People vs. Labra (L-1240, decided on May 12, 1949), the dispositive part of which partly reads:

“Wherefore, the verdict  of  guilty  must be  affirmed.  Articles 48, 114  and 248 of the Revised Penal Code  are applicable to the offense of treason with murder.  However for lack of sufficient votes to impose the extreme penalty, the appellant will  be  sentenced to life imprisonment.  * *  *.”

Although it mentions Articles 48 and 248 of the Revised Penal Code and “the offense of treason with murder,” it should be noted that vie  affirmed therein the action of the People’s Court, which, according to the opening statement of our decision, convicted Labra of “treason aggravated with murder”.  Besides, the applicability of said articles was not discussed in said decision.  It is obvious, from a mere perusal thereof, that this court had no intention of passing upon such  question.  Otherwise, it would  have explained  why it did not follow the rule laid down in the previous cases of Prieto, Labra (August 10,  1948), Alibotod,  Vilo,  Roble,   Delgado and Adlawan  (supra),  in which  the issue was  explicitly examined and decided in the negative.   Our  continued  adherence to this view in the subsequent cases of  Suralta,  Navea,  Pacheco  and Crisologo, without even a passing reference to the second Labra  case, shows that  we did not consider the same as reflecting  the opinion of the court on  said  question.   At any rate,  insofar as  it  suggests otherwise,  the position taken in the second  Labra case must be deemed reversed by our decisions in said  cases  of Suralta,  Navea, Pacheco and Crisologo.

It is true  that  treason and rebellion are  distinct and different from each  other.   This does not  detract, however, from the rule  that the ingredients of a crime form part and parcel thereof, and, hence, are absorbed  by the same and cannot be punished either separately therefrom or by  the application  of Article 48 of  the Revised  Penal Code.   Besides there is more reason to apply said  rule in the crime  of  rebellion than in that of treason, for the law punishing  rebellion   (Article 135, Revised  Penal  Code) specifically mentions tne act  of engaging in war and committing serious violence  among its essential elements— thus clearly indicating that  everything done in the prosecution of said war,  as a  means necessary therefor, is embraced  therein—unlike the  provision on  treason  (Article 114,  Revised  Penal  Code)  which is less  explicit thereon.

It is urged that, if the crime of assault upon a person in authority  or an  agent of a person in authority may be committed with  physical injuries  (U. S. vs. Montiel, 9 Phil.,  162), homicide  (People vs. Lojo,  52 Phil.,  390) and  murder  (U. S.  vs.  Ginosolongo,  23 Phil., 171; U.  S. vs. Baluyot, 40  Phil.,  385), and rape may  be perpetrated with physical injuries (U. S. vs. Andaya,  34 Phil., 690), then rebellion may,  similarly, be complexed with murder, arson, or robbery.  The  conclusion Does  not follow, for engaging in  war, serious  violence, physical  injuries and destruction of life and property are inherent in rebellion, but  not  in assault upon persons in authority or agents  of persons  in authority  or  in  rape.   The word “rebellion” evokes, not merely a challenge  to  the constituted authorities, but, also, civil  war, on  a bigger or lesser scale, with all the evils  that go  with  it,  whereas, neither rape nor assault  upon  persons  in authority connotes necessarily, or even  generally, either physical  injuries, or murder.[1]

In support of the theory that a rebel who kills  in furtherance of  the insurrection   is  guilty of  the complex crime of rebellion  with murder,  our attention has been called to Article 244 of the old Penal Code of the  Philippines, reading:

“Los delitos  particulares  cometidos en una rebeli6n o sedicion, o con  motivo de  ellas,   seran castigados  respectivamente  segun  las disposiciones de este Codigo.

“Cuando no  puedan  descubrirse sns autores seran penados comb tales los  jefes  principales de la rebelion o sedicion.”

and to  the following observations of  Cuelto Calon  (Derecho Penal, Vol. II, p.  110), in  relation  thereto:

“Se  establece aqui  que  el  en una  rebelion  o sedicion,  o  con motivo de ellas, comete otros  delitos (v.g., roba, mata olesiona), sera responsable de estos ademas de los delitos de rebelion o sedicion.  La dificultad consiste en estos casos en separar los accidentes de la rebelion  o sedicion de  los delitos  independientes  de  estas, y como las  leyes no contienen en este punto precepto alguno aplicable,  su solucion ha  quedado encomendada a los tribunales.  La jurisprudencia que estos han sentado considera  como accidentes de la rebelion o sedicion—cuya criminalidad queda embedida en la de estos  delitos, y,  por  tanto, no son punibles especialmente—los hechos de escasa gravedad  (v.g., atentados, desacatos, lesiones menos graves); por el contrario,  las infracciones graves,  como  el  asesinato o las lesiones graves, se consideran como  delitos  independientes  de la rebelion o de la sedicion.”

It should be noted, however, that said Article 244 of the old Penal  Code  of the Philippines has not  been included in our Revised Penal Code.  If the applicability of Article 48  to rebellion was determined by the existence of said Article 244, then the elimination of the latter would be indicative  of the contrary.

Besides, the crime of  rebellion, referred to  by  Cuello Calon, was that punished in the Spanish Penal Code,  Article  243  of which  provides:

“Son  reos de rebelion  los  que  se  alzaren  publicamente y ev abierta  hostilidad contra el Gobierno para cualquiera de los objetos siguientes:

“Destronar  al Rey, deponer al Regente o Regencia del Reino, o privarles de su libertad personal n obligarles a ejecutar on  acto contrario a su voluntad.  “Impedir la celebracion de las elecciones para  Diputados a Cortes o Senadores en todo el Reino, o la  reunion legitima de las  “Disolver las Cortes o impedir la deliberacion de alguno de los Cuerpos Colegisladores o  arrancarles alguna resolucion.  “Ejecutar cuallquiera de los delitos previstos en el artfculo 165.  “Sustraer  el Reino o parte de el o algun  cuerpo de tropa de tierra  o de mar, o cualquiera otra clase de fuerza armada, de la obediencia  del  Supremo Gobierno.  “Usar y ejercer por si o despojar a los Ministros de la Corona de sus facultades constitucionales, o impedirles b coartarles su libre ejercicio.   (Articulo  167, Codigo Penal de  1850.—Veanse las demas concordancias del articulo 181.)”

Thus, the Spanish Penal Code did not specifically declare that rebellion includes the act of engaging in war against the forces of the Government and of using serious violence for the purposes stated in Article 134  of the Revised Penal Code.   In view of this  express statutory inclusion  of the acts of war and  serious violence among the  ingredients of rebellion in  the Philippines, it is  clear that  the distinction made  by  Cueilo Calon between  grave and less grave offenses committed in the course of an insurrection cannot  be  accepted in  this jurisdiction.  Again, if  both classes  of offenses are  part and parcel of a rebellion, or means necessary therefor,  neither law nor logic justifies the exclusion of the one and the inclusion of the other.  In fact, Cueilo Calon  admits that “the difficulty lies in separating the  accidents of rebellion or sedition from the offenses independent therefrom.”  Ergo, offenses that are not  independent therefrom, but. constituting  an integral part thereof—committed, precisely, to carry out the uprising to its successful conclusion—are beyond the purview of Article 244.   Indeed, the above quoted statement of Cueilo Calon—to the effect that grave felonies committed in the course  of  an insurrection are  independent  therefrom— was based upon a decision of the Supreme Court of Spain of February 5, 1872, which we find reported in the Codigo Penal  de  Filipinas, by  Jose Perez Rubio,  as follows:

“El Tribunal Supremo de Justicia  en sentencia  de  5 de  Febrero de 1872, tiene decWado:   Que segun los articulos 184 del Codigo Penal de 1830, y 259 del reformado (1870), los delitos particulars cometidos en una rebelion o sedici6n o con motivo de ellas se castigan respectivamente segun las disposiciones de los mismos Codigos;  y con arreglo al decreto de amnistia de 9 de Agosto de 1876 estan solo comprendidos en aquella gracia las personas sentenciadas, procesadas 6 aujetas a responsabilidad por delitos  politicoa de cualquiera especie cometidos desde el 29 de Septiembre  de 1868; Que el asesinato del Gobernador Civil de Burgos no fui resultado de movimiento alguno politico,  sino de  un  mero  tumulto  que imprimio el fanatismo, y cuya tunica aparente tendencia era impedir jue aquel funcionario inventariase ciertos objetos artisticos, que se  decian existentes  en la Catedral: Que esto  lo demuestran las salvajes voces de muerte proferidas por los asesinos contra la persona del Gobernador;  sin que al ejecutar en el mismo recinto del  templo los horrorosos hechos que aparecen en la causa, alzasen bandera politica  alguna ni dieran otrb grito que el, en aquel momento  sacrilego e” impio, de  ‘Viva la religion:’ Que la  apreciar la Sala sentenciadora los hechos referentes al Gobernador Civil de delito de asesinato, penarlo con arreglo al Codigo y declarar  inaplicable  el  citado Decreto de  Amnistia, no ha cometido el error de derecho senalado en los casos 1.°  ZJ del articulo 4.° de la ley sobre establecimiento de la casacion criminal, ni infringido los articulos 250 y 259 del  Codigo Penal de 1870.”   (Page 239; Italics  supplied.)   (See, also, “El  Codigo  Penal”, by Hidalgo Garcia,  Vol.  I, p. 623.)’

It  is apparent  that said  case is  not in point.  There was no issue therein on whether murder may be completed with rebellion or sedition.  The  question for determination was whether ttye killers  of the  victim were guilty  of the common crime  of murder, or should have been convicted only  of rebellion or sedition.  The court adopted the first alternative, not because of  the  gravity of the  acts performed by the  accused, but  because they  had no political motivation.   Moreover, the footnote to said quotation from Cuello  Calon  reads:

“Los  atentados desacatos y lesiones a  la autoridad u  otros delitos contra el orden publico cometidos en la sedicidn o con  motivo  de ella, no son delitos distintos de la sedicion, 3 octubre 1903,  19 noviembre 1906;  la  resistencia  o acometimiento a  la fuerza publica por los  sediciosos es accidente de la rebelion, 23 mayo 1890.

“El asesinato de un gobernador cometido en el curso de un tumulto debe penarse como tin delito comun  de  asesinato,  5 febrero 1872. Sin  embargo, la jurisprudencia,  tratandose  de  ciertos delitos,  es vacilante; asi,  v. g., el acometimiento al teniente  de alcalde se  ha declarado en un fallo independiente de la perturbacion tumultuaria promovida para impedir al  alcalde  el cumplimiento de sus providencias, 16 marzo  1885, mientras que un hecho analogo se ha considerado en  otra sentencia ya citada como  accidente de la rebelion, 8 Octubre 1903.   El  acometimiento  de  los sediciosos  a la  fuerza publica  es accidente de la  sedicion y no  uno de los  delitos particulares  a que se refiere este articulo, 23  de mayo 1890.  Entre estos delitos  a  que  alude el precepto  se hallan  las lesiones que  puedan causar  los sediciosos, 19 noviembre 1906.”  (Footnote 21, II Cuelo Calon,  Derecho Penal,  pp. 110-111.)   (Italics supplied.)

Thus  in  a decision, dated  May 2, 1934, the  Supreme Court  of  Spain held:

“Considerando que la nota deferencial  entre Ids delitos de rebelion y sedicion,  de una  parte,  y el  de  atentado, esta constituida  por la circunstancia de alzamiento publico que caracteriza a los primeros, las cuales, por su  indole  generica, absorben a los de atentado  y deltas infraeciones que  durante su comiston y  con su motivo se cometan, y afirmandose como hecho  en la sentencia recurrida que el procesado Mariano Esteban Martinez  realizo,  en  union de  otros, el atendado que se le imputa  sin alzarse  publicamente, cae por su base el recurso fundado en supuesto distinto.”   (Jurisprudencia Criminal, Tomo  130,  p.  551.) (Italics  supplied.)

To the same effect are,  likewise, the following:

“La provocacion y el ataque  a la Guardia Civil por paisanos alzados tumultuariamente para impedir al Delegado  de un Gobernador civil el cumplimiento de sus providencias, no pueden estimarse constitutivos de un delito  distinto del de  sedicion, ni ser, por’tanto, perseguidos y penados  separadamente.

“La resistencia o el acometimiento de los sublevados a la fuerza publica  constituye, en su caso, una circunstancia o accidente  de la sedicion y no es delito de los  que el Codigo  Penal en este  articulo (formerly Article  244, now Article 227) supone que pueden  cometerse en ella o con su  motivo, los cuales denomina delitos particulares, y manda que se penen conforme a las disposiciones del propio Codigo. (S. 23-5-890; G. 23-6-890; t.  44; pagina  671)” (II Doctrina  Penal del Tribunal  Supremo, p.  2411.)   (Italics supplied.)

“La Audiencia condeno  como autores de atentado a  dos  de los amotinados que agredieron al alcalde, e interpuesto recurso de casacion contra la sentencia,  el Tribunal Supremo  to casa y anula,  teniendo en cuenta lo dispuesto  en el articulo  250  (numero 3.°)  del Codigo  Penal;

‘Considerando que el acto llevado a cabo por  el grupo constituye una verdadera sedicion, sin que sea  licito el dividir este hecho y calificarlo de atentado respecto a las personas que agredieron a dicho alcalde,  porque el acometimiento fue un accidente de  la sedicion, de la  cual’  eran  todos  responsables,  ya   se  efectuara  por  los agrupados  en conjunto   o por  uno  solo,  por  ser  comun  el objeto que se proponian y no individual; y al calificar  y  penar este hecho  la  Audencia de Gerona,  de atentado *  * *, ha incurrido en  error de derecho  e infringido  los articulos 250  y siguientes del Codigo Penal, por no haberlos aplicado, y el 263, numero 2.°,  en relacion  con  el 264,  numeros  1.° y 3.°,  por su  aplicacion * * *” (Sent. 3 octubre  1903.—Gac. 12 Diciembre)  (Enciclopedia Juridica Espafiola, Tomo xxviii, p. 250).

These cases are in accord with the text of  said Article 244, which  refers, not to all  offenses  committed  in the course of a rebellion or on the occasion thereof, but only to “delitos particulares” or common crimes.   Now, what are “delitos particulares” as the  phrase is used in said article 244?   We quote from Viada:

“Las disposicidn defi primer parrafo de este artfculo no puede  ser mas justa;  con arreglo a ella, los delitos  particulares o comunes cometidos en  una rebelidn  or sedici6n no deberanv reputarse corao accidentes  inherentes a  estas, sino como delitos especiales, a dicha rebelidn y  sedicion ajenos, los que deberan ser respectivamente castigados con las penas que en este Codigo se las  senalan,  Pero, que delitos deberan considerarse como comunes,  y cuales  como constitutivos de la propia rebelion  o sedicion?   En  cuanto  a la rebelion, no  ofrece  esta cuestion dificultad alguna, pues todo hecho  que no este comprendido en tmo y  otro  de los  objetos  especificados en los seis numeros del articulo 243 sera extrano a la rebeli6n, y si se ballare definido en algun otro articulo del Codigo, con arreglo a este debera ser castigado como delito  particular.  Pero tratandose de la sedicion, comprendiendose como objetos de la misma, en los numeros 3.°, 4.° y 5.° del articulo 250, hechos que constituyen otros tantos ataques a  las personas o a la propiedad, cuales se consideran como accidentes  inherentes a la propria  sedici6n,  y cuales deberan  reputarse como delitos particulares  o comunes?  En cuanto a los casos de  los numeros 4.°  y 5. , estimanos  que el objeto politico y social que se requiera  para la realizaci&n  de  los actos en aqueUos eomprendidos es el que  debe servirnos de norma y guia para distinguir lo inherente a la sedicidn de lo que es ajeno o extrano a ella.  Cuando no  exista  ese  objeto politico y social, el acto de odio o  venganza, ejercido contra los particulares o cualquiera  clase del Estado, y el atentado contra  las  propiedades  de los  ciudadanos  o corporaciones mentados en  el numero 5.”  del articulo  250,  no seran constitutivos del  delito de sedicidn, sino  que deberan  ser apreciados y castigados como  delitos  comunes, segun las disposiciones  respectivas  de  este Cddigo—y por lo que toca  a los  actos de odio o venganza ejercidos en  la persona o bienes de alguna Autoridad o sus agentes, estimamos que deberan reputarse como delitos comunes todos  aquellos hechos innecesarios [2] para la consecucion del fin particular que se propusieran los  sediciosos;—y como  esenciales, constitutivos de la  propia sedici6n todoa aquellos actos de odio o venganza que sean  medio racionalmente necesario para el logro  del  objeto especial a que se encaminaran los  esfuerzos de los  sublevados.   Asi, en el caso de  la Cuesti6n  1 expuesta en  el comentario  del  articulo  258, es evidente  que el fin que se propusieron los sediciosos fue no pagar el  impuesto a cuya cobranza iba a proceder el comisionado; pero para lograr este objeto, como  lo lograron, fue preciso  hacer salir del pueblo al ejecutor, y a este efecto, lo amenazaron,  lo persiguieron  y llegaron hasta lesionarle.  Esas amenazas y lesiones no pudieron apreciarse, ni las aprecio tampoco la Sala sentenciadora, como delito comiin, sino  como acddente inherente a la misma sedition, por cuanto fueron un medio racionalmente necesario para la consecudin del fin deierminado que se propusieron los culpables.

“Pero  cuando  tal  necesidad  desaparece, cuando se  Were por herir, cuando se mata por matar,  el hecho ya, no pttede  ser  considerado  como un accidente propio de la  sediaion,  sino como un delito especial,  al que debe aplicarse  la  pena al  mismo correspondiente.”   (HI  Viada,  pp. 311-312.)  (Italics supplied.)

Cuello Calon is even more illuminating.  He says:

“La doctrina cientifica considera los delitos llamados politicos como infracdones  de un caracter especial distintas de los denominados delitos comunes. De esta apreciacion ha nacido  la division de los delitos, desde el punto  de vista de su naturaleza intrinseca, en delitos politicos y delitos comunes  o de derecho comun.

“Se reputan delitos comunes aquellos que  lesionan bienes juridicos individuales  (v. gr., los delitos  contra la vida,  contra la honestidad, contra la  propiedad, etc.).

“La nocion del delito pcflltico no parece tan clara.  Desde  luego revisten  este caracter los que  atentan contra  el orden politico del Estado, contra su orden  externo  (independencia de la  nacion, integridad del  territorio,  etc.), o contra el interno (delitos contra el Jefe del Estado, contra la  forma de  Gobierno, etc.).  Pero tambien pueden eer considerados como politicos  todos los delitos,  cualesquiera que sean incluso  los de derecho com/An,  cuando fueron cometidos por moviles politicos.  Deben,  por tanto,, estimarse como  infracciones de  esta clase, no solo las que  objetivamente tengan tal caracter por el interes politico que lesionan,  sino tambien las que, apreciadas subjetivamente, maninestan una motivactdn de caracter politico.

“Asl  podria formulares  esta definici6n:  es  delito politico  el cometido  contra el  orden politico del Estado, asi como todo  delito de cualquiera otra clase deierminado  por moviles politicos.”  (Cuello Calon, Derecho Penal, Tomo I,  pp. 247-249.)

In short, political crimes are those directly aimed against the political order, as well as such  common  crimes as may be committed to achieve a political purpose.  The decisive factor is the intent or motive.  If a crime usually regarded as common, like homicide, is perpetrated for the purpose of removing from the allegiance “to the Government the territory of the Philippines Islands  or  any part thereof.” then said offense becomes stripped of its “common”  complexion, inasmuch as, being part and parcel of the crime of rebellion, the former acquires the political character of the latter.

Conformably  with the foregoing, the  case  of murder against the defendant  in U.  S. vs. Lardizabal  (1 Phil., 729)—an insurgent  who killed a prisoner  of war because he was too weak to march with the retreating rebel forces, and could not be left behind  without endangering the safety of the latter—was dismissed  upon the ground that the execution of said prisoner of war formed part of, and was included in, the  crime of sedition, which, in turn, was covered  by an  amnesty, to the  benefits  of which  said defendant was entitled.

True, in U. S. vs.  Alfont  (1 Phil., 115), the commander of an unorganized group of insurgents was, pursuant to Article  244 of our old  Penal Code,  convicted of homicide for having shot and killed  a woman who was driving a vehicle.  But the complex crime of rebellion with homicide was not considered in that case.  Apart from this, the accused failed to established the relation between her death and the insurrection. What is more, it  was neither proved nor alleged that he had  been prompted by political reasons. In other words, his offense was independent from the rebellion.  The latter was merely the occasion for the commission of the former.

It is noteworthy  that  the aforementioned decisions of this court and the  Supreme Court  of Spain in  cases of treason, rebellion and sedition, are  in line with  the trend in other countries, as well as in the field of international relations.  Referring to the question  as to what offenses are political  in nature, it was  said in  In re  Ezeta  (62  Fed. Rep.,  972) :

“What constitutes an offense  of a political character has not yet been determined by judicial authority.  Sir James Stephens,  in his work, History of the  Criminal Law of  England  (Volume 2, p. 71), thinks  that it should be ‘interpreted to mean that fugitive criminals are not to be  surrendered  for extradition crimes if those crimes were incidental to and formed a part of political  disturbances.’  Mr. John Stuart  Mill, in  the house of commons,  in  1866, while discussing an amendment to the act of ’extradition, on which  the  treaty between  England  and France  was founded, gave  this  definition: Any offense committed in the course of or furthering of civil war, insurrection,  or political  commotion,’  Hansard’s Debates Vol. 184, p. 2115.  In the Castioni Case,  supra, decided in 1891, the question was discussed by the  most eminent counsel at the English bar, and considered by distinguished judges, without a definition being framed that would draw  a fixed and  certain line  between  a municipal or common crime and one of political character. ‘I do not think,’ said Denman, J., ‘it is necessary or  desirable  that we should  attempt to put into  language, in the shape of an. exhaustive definition, exactly the whole state of things, or every state of things, which might bring a particular  case within the description of an offense of a political character.’  In that case, Castioni  was  charged with the  murder of  one Rossi, by shooting  him with a  revolver, in the  town of Bellinzona, in the canton of Ticino, in Switzerland.  The deceased, Rossi,  was a member of the state council of the canton of Ticino. Castioni was a citizen of the same canton.  For  some time previous to the  murder; much  dissatisfaction had been felt and expressed by a large number of inhabitants of Ticino  at the  mode in which the political  party then in power were conducting  the  government of the canton.   A request was presented to the government for  a  revision  of the constitution of the canton and, the  government having declined to take a popular vote on  that  question, a  number  of the citizens of Bellinzona, among whom was Castioni, seized the arsenal of the  town,  from which they took rifles  and ammunition, disarmed the gendarmes,  arrested  and bound  or handcuffed  several  persons connected with the government, and forced them to march in front of  the armed crowd to the  municipal palace.  Admission to the  palace was demanded in the name of the people, and was  refused by Rossi  and another member  of the government,  who  were in the palace. The crowd then broke open the outer gate of the palace, and rushed  in,  pushing before  them   the government  officials whom  they had arrested and bound.  Castioni, who was armed with a  revolver,  was  among  the first to enter.  A second door, which was locked, was broken open, and at this time, or immediately after, Rossi, who was in the passage,  was shot through the body  with  a revolver, and died very soon  afterwards.  Some other  shots were fired,  but no one else was injured.  Castioni fled to England,  His extradition was requested by the federal council of Switzerland.  He was arrested and taken before a police magistrate, as provided by the statute,  who  held  him for extradition.  Application  was  made by the accused  to the high court  of  justice of England  for  a writ of habeas corpus.  He was  represented by  Sir Charles  Russell, now lord chief justice.  The  attorney  general, Sir Richard Webster, appeared for the crown, and the solicitor  general, Sir Edward Clarke,  and Robert Woodfal, for the federal council of Switzerland. This array  of distinguished counsel, and the high character of the court, commends the case as one of  the highest authority.  It appeared from an admission by one of the parties engaged in the disturbances ’that  the  death of Rossi was a  misfortune,  and not necessary for the  rising/  The opinions of the judges as to the political character  of the crime  charged against Castioni,  upon the facts stated, is exceedingly interesting, but I need only refer to’ the following passages.   Judge Denman says:

“The question really is whether, upon the facts, it is  clear that the man was acting as one of a number of persons engaged in acts  of violence of  a political character with a political object, and as part of the political movement and rising in which he was taking part.’ “Judge Hawkins, in commenting upon the  character of political offenses, said:

‘I cannot  help thinking that  everybody  knows  there are, many acts  of a  political  character  done  vrithout  reason,  done  against all reason;  but  at the same time one  cannot  look too  hardly, and weigh in golden scales the acts of men hot in their political excitement.  We  know that in heat,  and in heated blood,  men  often do things which are against and contrary  to reason; but none  the ’less an act  of this description may be done for the purpose of furthering and in  furtherance  of a political rising, even  though it  is an act which may  be deplored  and  lamented,  as  even cruel and against all reason,  by those  who can calmly  reflect upon it after  the battle is over.’

“Sir  James Stephens, whose definition as  an author has  already been cited,  was one of the judges,  and joined in the views taken as to the political character of  the crime charged  against Castioni. The  prisoner was  discharged.  Applying,  by  analogy, the action of  the  English court in that case to the four  cases  now before me, under  consideration, the  conclusion follows  that the  crimes charged here, associated  as  they are  with the actual conflict  of armed forces, are  of a political  character.

“The draft of a treaty on International  Penal Law,  adopted by the congress of  Montevideo in  1888, and recommended by the International American Conference to the governments of the  Latin-American nations in 1890, contains the following provisions (Article 23):

‘Political  offenses, offenses subversive of  the internal and external  safety  of a state or  common offenses  connected  with these, shall not warrant extradition.  The  determination  of  the  character  of the  offense is incumbent  upon  the  nations  upon  which the  demand for extradition  is made; and  its  decision shall  be made  under  and according to  the provisions of  the  law  which shall prove to be most favorable to the accused:

“I am not aware that  any part of this Code has been made the basis of treaty  stipulations between any  of the American nations, but  the article  cited may  be  at least accepted as expressing the wisdom of leading  jurists and diplomats.   The article is important with respect to two of its features:   (1)  provides  that a fugitive shall not be  extradited for an offense connected with a  political offense, or with an offense subversive of the internal  or external safety of the state; and  (2) the decision  as to the character  of the offense shall be made  under and according  to  the provisions  of the law  which  shall prove most favorable to  the accused.  The first provision is  sanctioned by Calvo,  who, speaking  of the exemption from extradition of persons charged  with  political offenses, says:

‘The exemption  even  extends to acts  connected with  political crimes or offenses,  and it is  enough, as says Mr. Fuastin  Helio; that a common  crime   be connected with  a  political act, that it be the  outcome of  or  be  in  the outcome  of  or be in the execution  of such, to be covered by  the privilege which protects the latter Calvo, Droit  Int. (3me ed.) p. 413, section 1262.

“The second provision of the article  is founded on the  broad principles  of  humanity found everywhere in  the  criminal  law,  distinguishing its administration with respect to  even the worst features of  our civilization  from the  cruelties of barbarism.  When  this article was  under discussion  in the  international  American  conference in Washington, Mr. Silva, of Colombia, submitted some observations upon the difficulty of drawing  a line between an offense of a political character  and a common crime, and incidentally referred to the crime of robbery, in terms worthy of some consideration here. He said.:

‘In  the  revolutions,  as we  conduct them  in our countries,  the common offenses  are   necessarily  mixed  up  with  the  political  in many cases. A  colleague General Caamano  (of  Ecuador)  knows how we carry on wars.  A  revolutionist needs horses for moving, beef to feed his troops,  etc.; and since he  does  not go  into  the public  markets  to  purchase  these horses and that beef,  nor  the arms and  saddiles to  mount  and equip his forces,  he takes them from  the  first pasture or  shop he  find at  hand.  This is called robbery everywhere, and is a common offense in time of peace,  but in time of war  it is  a circumstance closely allied  to  the  manner of waging it.’  International  American  Conference, Vol.  2, p. 615.” (Italics supplied.)

We quote  the following  from footnote  (23)  on pages 249-250,  Vol. I, of  Cuello Calon’s aforesaid work on “Derecho Penal.”

“En algunos Codigo y leyes  de fecha proxima  ya se halla una definicion  de  estos delitos.   El Codigo penal  ruso, en el articulo 58, define  como ‘delitos  contra revolutionaries’ los hechos encaminados a derrocar o  debilitar el poder  de los  Consejos de  trabajadores y campesinos y  de  los  gobiemos de la Union de Republicas socialistas sovieticas,  a  destruir  o debilitar la seguridad  exterior de la Union de Republicas Sovieticas y las conquistas economicas, politicas y  nacionales fundamentals de la revolution proletariat  El Codigo Penal italiano de 1930 considera en su articulo  8.” como delito politico ’todo delito que  ofenda un interes politico del Estado o un derecho politico del ciudadano/  Tambien se reputa politico el delito comun determinado, en todo o en parte por motivos politicos.  En la ley alemana de extradition de 25 diciembre 1929 se definen asi:  ‘Son delitos politicos los atentados  punibles directamente ejecutados  contra  la existencia o la seguridad del Estado,  contra el  jefe o  contra un miembro  del gobierno del Estado  como tal, contra  una corporation constitucional, contra los  derechos politicos las buenas relaciones con el extranjero.’ parrafo 3.°,  2.

“La 6a.  Conferencia para la Unification del Derecho penal (Copenhague, 31 agosto—3  septiembre  1935)  adopto la siguiente notion del delito  politico:

“1. Por delitos  politicos se entienden los  dirigidos contra la organization y funcionamiento del Estado  o contra los  derechos que de  esta organization y funcionamiento provienen  para el  culpable.

“2. Tambien se consideran como delitos  politicos los delitos  de derecho comun que  constituyen hechos conexos con la ejecucion  de los delitos previstos en section 1.°:  como  los  hechos dirigidos a favoreeer la ejecucion de un delito politico o a permitir al autor de este delito sustraerse a la aplicacion de  la ley penal.

“3. No se consideraran  delitos politicos aquellos a  los  que su autor sea inducido por un motivo egoista  y vil.

“4. No se consideraran delitos los que  creen un peligro para la comunidad  o un  estado  de terror.”  (Italics supplied.)

Thus, national, as well  as international, laws and jurisprudence overwhelmingly favor the proposition that common crimes, perpetrated in furtherance of a political offense, are divested of their  character  as “common” offenses and assume the political complexion of the main crime of which they are  mere ingredients,  and, consequently, cannot be punished  separately from the  principal  offense, or complexed with the same, to justify the imposition of a graver penalty.

There is one other reason—and  a fundamental one at that—why Article 48 of our Penal Code cannot be applied in the case at  bar.  If murder were not complexed with rebellion, and the two crimes were punished separately (assuming that this  could be  done), the following  penalties would  be imposable  upon the  movant, namely: (1)  for the crime of rebellion, a fine not  exceeding P20,000 and prisidn mayor, in the corresponding period, depending upon the modifying  circumstances present, but never exceeding 12 years of prisidn mayor; and  (2) for the crime of murder, reclusidn  temporal in its maximum period to death,  depending upon  the modifying  circumstances present.   In other words, in the absence of aggravating circumstances, the extreme penalty  could not  be imposed upon him, However, under Article 48, said penalty would have to be meted out to him,  even  in  tke absence of a single  aggravating circumstance. Thus, said provision, if construed in conformity with the theory of the  prosecution,  would be unfavorable to the movant.

Upon the other, hand, said Article 48 was  enacted  for tfee purpose of  favoring the culprit, not of sentencing him to a penalty more severe than that which would be proper if the several acts performed by him were punished separately.   In the word  of  Rodriguez Navarro:

“La unificacion de penas en los  casos de concurso de delitos  a que hace referenda este articulo (75 de Codigo de 1932), esta basado francamente en el principio pro reo.” (II Doctrina Penal del Tribunal Supremo de Espana, p. 2168.)’

We are aware of the fact that  this observation  refers to Article 71  (later 75)  of the Spanish Penal Code  (the counterpart of our Article 48), as amended in 1908 and then  in  1932,  reading:

“Las disposiciones del articulo anterior no son aplicables  en el caso de que un solo hecho constituya dos o mas delitos, o cuando el uno de ellos sea medio necesario para cometer el otro.

“En estos casos solo se impondra la pena correspondiente al delito mas grave  en su grado maximo, hasta el limite que  represente la suma  de  las que pudieran imponerse,  penando separadamente los delitos.

“Cuando  la pena asi computada exceda de este limite,  se sancionaran los  delitos por separado.”  (Rodriguez  Navarro, Doctrino Penal del  Tribunal Supremo, Vol. II,  p. 2163.)

and that bur Article 48 does not contain the qualification inserted in said amendment, restricting the  imposition  of the penalty for the  graver offense  in  its maximum period to the case when it does not exceed the sum total of the penalties imposable if the acts charged  were dealt’ with separately.  The  absence of  said  limitation  in  our Penal Code does not, to our mind, affect substantially the spirit of  said Article 48.   Indeed, if one act constitutes two  or more offenses, there can be no reason to inflict a  punishment graver than  that prescribed  for  each one  of  said offenses put together.   In  directing that the penalty for the graver offense be, in such case, imposed in its maximum period, Article 48 could have had  no other  purpose than to  prescribe a penalty  lower than the aggregate  of the penalties for  each offense,  if  imposed  separately.  The reason for this  benevolent spirit of Article 48 is readily discernible.  When two or more crimes are the result of a single act, the offender is deemed less perverse than when he commits said crimes thru separate and distinct acts. Instead of sentencing him  for  each  crime independently from the other, he  must  suffer  the  maximum  of the penalty for the more serious one, on the assumption that it is less grave than the sum total of the separate penalties for each offense.

Did the framers  of Article 48 have a different purpose in dealing therein with an offense which is a means necessary for the commission of another?  To begin with, the culprit can not, then,  be considered  as displaying a greater degree of malice  than when the two offenses are independent of each  other.  On the contrary,  since one offense is a necessary means for the commission of the other, the evil intent is one, which, at least, quantitatively, is lesser than when the two offenses are unrelated to each  other, because, in such  event, he is twice guilty of having harbored criminal  designs and  of carrying the same  into execution. Furthermore, it  must  be presumed that the object of Article US,  in  its entirety, is  only one.  We  cannot  assume that the purpose of the lawmaker, at the beginning of the single sentence of which said article consists, was to favor the accused, and  that,  before the sentence endedf the former had a change  of heart and  turned  about face against the latter.   If the second part of Article 48 had been meant to be unfavorable to the accused—and, hence, the exact opposite  of  the  first  part—each would  have  been placed in separate provisions, instead of in one single article.  If the first part sought to impose, upon the culprit, a  penalty less grave than that which he would deserve if the two or more offenses  resulting from his single act  were punished separately, then this, also,  must be the purpose of the second part, in dealing with an offense which  is a necessary means for the  commission of another.

The accuracy of this conclusion is borne out by the fact that, since 1850,  when the counterpart of our Article US was inserted in the Penal Code of Spain,  or for  over a century,  it does not appear to  have been applied  by the Supreme Court thereof to crimes of murder committed in furtherance of an insurrection.

Incidentally, we cannot  accept  the  explanation  that crimes committed as a means necessary for the success of a rebellion had  to  be prosecuted  separately under the provisions of Article 259  of the Penal Code of Spain, which is the counterpart of Article 244  of our old Penal Code. To begin with, these articles are part of a substantive law. They do not govern the manner or method of prosecution of the culprits.  Then again, said  precepts ordain that  common crimes committed during a  rebellion or sedition, or on the occasion thereof, “shall be  respectively punished  according to the provisions of this Code.”  Among  such provisions was Article 90 (later Article 71, then Article 75) of the Spanish Penal Code, and Article 89 of our  old Penal Code, of which Article 48 of the Revised Penal Code of the Philippines is a  substantial  reproduction. Hence, had the Supreme  Court  of Spain or the Philippines believed that murders committed as a means necessary  to attain the aims of an uprising  were “common” crimes,  the same would have been complexed with the rebellion or sedition, as the case may  be.

The cases of People vs. Cabrera  (43 Phil., 64) and People vs.  Cabrera (43  Phil., 82) have  not escaped our attention.  Those cases involved members of the constabulary who rose publicly, for the purpose  of performing  acts of hate  and vengeance upon the police force of Manila, and in an encounter with the latter, killed some members thereof.   Charged with and convicted  of sedition in the first case, they were accused of murder in the second case.  They pieaded double jeopardy in the second case, upon the ground tiiat  the facts alleged in the information were  those  set forth in the charge in the first case, in which  they had been convicted.  This plea was rejected upon the ground that the organic law prohibited double jeopardy for the same offense, and that the offense of sedition is distinct and different from that of murder, although both were the result of the same act.

The question whether one offence was  inherent in, or identified with, the other was not discussed or even considered in said cases.  Besides, the lower court applied, in the murder case Article 89 of the old Penal Code—which is the counterpart of Article 48 of the Revised Penal Code— but this Court refused to do so.   Again, simply because one act may constitute two or more offenses, it does  not follow necessarily that a person may be prosecuted for one after conviction for the other,  without violating the  injunction against double jeopardy.  For  instance, if a man fires a shotgun at another,  who suffers thereby several injuries, one of which produced his death, may he, after  conviction for murder or homicide, based upon said fatal  injury, be accused or convicted, in a separate case, for the non-fatal injuries sustained by the victim? Or may the  former be convicted of the complex crime of murder or homicide with serious and/or less serious physical injuries?   The mere formulation of these questions  suffices to show that the limitation of the  rule on  double jeopardy to a subsequent prosecution for  the same offense  does not constitute  a license for the separate prosecution of two offenses resulting from the same act, if one offense is an essential element of the other.  At any rate, as regards this phase of the issue, which was not touched in the Cabrera cases, the rule therein laid down must necessarily be considered modified by our decision in the cases of  People vs.  Labra  (46  Off. Gaz., Supp. No. 1, p. 159) and  Crisologo  vs. People  and Villalobos  (supra),  insofar as inconsistent therewith.

The main argument  in support of the  theory seeking to complex rebellion with murder and other offenses is that “war”—within the purview of the laws on rebellion  and sedition—may be “waged” or  “levied”  without killing.

This premise does not warrant, however, the conclusions drawn therefrom—that any killing done in furtherance of a rebellion or sedition is independent therefrom, and may be complexed therewith, upon the ground that destruction of human life is not indispensable to the waging or levying of war.   A  person may kill  another without  inflicting physical  injuries upon the latter, such, for instance, as by poisoining, drowning, suffocation or shock. Yet it  is admitted that he who fatally stabs another cannot be convicted  of homicide  with  physical  injuries.  So too,  it is undeniable that treason may be committed without torturing or murdering  anybody.   Yet, it is well-settled that a citizen who gives aid and comfort to the enemy by taking direct part in  the  maltreatment and assassination of his (citizen’s) countrymen,  in  furtherance of the  wishes of said enemy, is  guilty of plain treason,  not  complexed with murder or physical injuries, the later being—as charged and proven—mere ingredients of the former.  Now then, if homicide may be an ingredient of treason, why can it not be an ingredient of rebellion?  The proponents of the idea of rebellion complexed with homicide, etc., have not even tried to  answer this question.   Neither have they assailed the wisdom of  our aforementioned  decisions  in treason cases.

The Court is conscious of the keen interest displayed, and the considerable efforts exerted, by the Executive Department in the apprehension  and prosecution of those believed to be guilty of  crimes against public order, of the lives  lost,  and the time  and money spent in connection therewith, as well as of the possible  implications or repercussions in the security of the State. The careful consideration  given to said policy  of  a  coordinate and co-equal branch of the Government is reflected  in the time consumed, the extensive and intensive research work undertaken, and the  many meetings held by the  members of the court for the purpose of elucidating on the question  under discussion and of settling  the same.

The role  of  the judicial department under the Constitution is, however, clear—to settle justiceable controversies by the application of the law.  And the latter must be enforced as it is—with all its flaws and defects, not affecting its  validity—not as the judges would have it.   In  other words, the courts must apply the policy of the State as set forth in its laws, regardless of the wisdom thereof.

It is evident to us that the policy of  our statutes on rebellion is  to  consider all acts committed in furtherance thereof—as  specified in Articles 134 and 135 of the Revised Penal  Code—as constituting  only  one crime, punishable with one single penalty—namely, that prescribed in said Article 135.  It is interesting  to note, in  this connection, that the penalties provided in our old Penal Code  (Articles 230 to 232) were much  stiffer, namely:

Life imprisonment to death—for the promoters, maintainers and leaders of the rebellion, and, also,  for  sub-ordinate officers  who  held positions  of authority,  either civil or ecclesiastical, if the purpose of the movement was to proclaim  the independence of any  portion of the Philippine territory;     Reclusion  temporal in its  maximum period—for said promoters,  maintainers and leaders of the  insurrection, and for its subordinate  officers, if the  purpose of the rebellion was  any  of those enumerated  in  Article  229, except that  mentioned in the preceding paragraph;      Reclusion temporal: (a) for subordinate officers other than those already adverted to; and  (b) for mere participants in the rebellion falling under the first paragraph of No. 2 of Article 174; and        Prision mayor in its medium period to reclusion temporal in its  minimum period—for participants not falling, under No. 3.

After the  cession of the Philippines to the United States, the rigors of the old Penal Code were tempered.  Its aforementioned provisions  were superseded by section  3 of Act No. 292, which reduced the penalty to imprisonment for not more than ten (10) years and a fine not exceeding $10,000, or P20,000, for “every person who incites, sets on foot, assists or engages in any rebellion  or insurrection *  *  *  or who gives aid and comfort to any one so engaging in  such rebellion or insurrection.”  Such liberal attitude was adhered to by the authors of the Revised Penal Code.  The penalties therein are substantially identical to those prescribed in  Act  292.  Although  the Revised  Penal  Code increased slightly the  penalty of imprisonment for the promoters,  maintainers  and leaders  of  the uprising,  as well as for public officers joining the same, to a maximum not exceeding twelve (12) years of priswn mayor, it reduced the,  penalty  of imprisonment  for mere participants  to not  more than  eight  (8) years  of  priswn  mayor,  and eliminated the fine.

This benign mood of the Revised Penal  Code becomes more significant when we bear  in mind it  was approved on December 8, 1930 and became effective on January 1, 1932.  At that  time the communists in the  Philippines had  already  given ample proof  of  their widespread activities and of their designs and potentialities.  Prior thereto, they had been  under surveillance by the agents of the law, who gathered evidence of their subversive movements, culminating in the prosecution  of Evangelista, Manahan (57 Phil., 354; 57  Phil., 372), Capadocia (57 Phil., 364), Feleo  (57 Phil., 451), Nabong (57 Phil., 455), and  others. In fact, the first information against the first two  alleged that they committed the crime of inciting to  sedition “on and during the month of November, 1930, and for sometime prior and subsequent thereto.”

As if this were not enough, the very Constitution adopted in  1935, incorporated  a formal and solemn  declaration (Article II, section 5) committing the Commonwealth, and, then the Republic  of the Philippines, to the  “promotion of  social justice”.  Soon  later,  Commonwealth  Act No. 103, creating the Court  of Industrial Relations, was  passed.

Then followed a number  of  other statutes  implementing said constitutional mandate.   It is not necessary to go into the details of said legislative enactments.   Suffice  it to say that the same are predicated upon a recognition of the fact that a good many of the  problems confronting the State are due to social and economic evils, and  that, unless the latter  are removed or, least  minimized, the former will keep on harrassing the community and affecting the well-being of its members.

Thus, the settled policy  of  our laws  on rebellion, since the begining of  the century, has been  one of  decided leniency,  in  comparison with  the laws  enforce  during the Spanish regime.   Such policy has not suffered the slightest alteration.  Although the  Government  has,  for the  past five or six years, adopted a more vigorous course of action in the apprehension of violators of said law and in their prosecution, the established policy of the State,  as regards the punishment  of the culprits  has remained  unchanged since 1932.  It is not for us to  consider  the merits and demerits  of  such policy.   This falls within the province of the policy-making branch of the government—the Congress of the Philippines.  However, the following quotation from Cuello Calon indicates the schools  of thought on this subject and the reason  that may have influenced our  law-makers in making their choice:

“Durante muchos siglos, hasta tiempos relativamente cercanos, se reputaban  los hechos que hoy  llamamos delitos politicos como mas graves y peligrosos que los crimenes  comunes. Se  consideraba que mientras estos  solo causan un dano  individual,  aquellos produqen profundas  perturbaeiones en lla vida collectiva llegando a poner en peligro  la misma vida del Estado.  En consonancia con estas  ideas fueron reprimidos con extraordinaria  severidad y designados con la denominacion romana de delitos de lesa majestad se catalogaron en las leyes penales como los crimenes mas temibles.

“Pero desde hace  poco mas  de un  siglo se ha realizado  en este punto una  transformation profunda merced a la cual la delincuencia politica dejo de apreciarse  con los severos criterios de antano quedando sometida a un regimen penal, por regla  general suave y benevolo.

“El origen de este cambio se remonta, segun opinion muy difundida, a la revolucion que tuvo lugar en Francia en  el ano 1830,  El gobierno de Luis Felipe  establecio una  honda  separacion entre los delitos comunes y los politicos, siendo estos sometidos a una penalidad mas suave y sus autores exceptuados de la extradicion.  Irradiando a  otros  paises tuvieron  estas  tan  gran  difusion que  en  casi todos  los de regimen liberal-individualista se ha llegado  a crear un tratamiento desprovisto  de severidad para la represi6n  de estos hechos.   No solo las penas con que se conminaron perdieron gran parte de su antigua  dureza, sino que en algunos paises se cre6 un regimen penal mas suave para estos delicuentes, en otros se abolio para ellos la pena de muerte.  Tan profundo  contraste entre el antiguo y el actual tratamiento de la criminalidad politica en la mayoria de los paises solo puede ser explicado por las ideas  nacidas y difundiclas bajo los regimenes politicos liberales acerca de estos delitos y  delincuentes.  Por una parte se ha afirmado que la  criminalidad de estos hechos no contiene la misma inmoralidad que la delincuencia comun, que es tan solo relativa, que depende del  tiempo, del lugar,  de las circumstancias, de las instituciones del pais.  Otros invocan la  elevacion de los moviles  y sentimientos determinantes de estos hechos, el amor a la patria, la adhesion ferviente a determinadas  ideas o principios, el espiritu de sacrifkio por el triunfo de un ideal.

“Contra su  trato benevolo, del que no pocas veces se han  beneficiado peligrosos  malhechores, se ha iniciado hace algun tiempo una fuerte reaccidn (vease Cap.  XV, 3.”, b), que Uego a alcanzar considerable severidad en las Iegislaciones de tipo  autoritario,  y  que tambien ha hallado eco, en forma mas suave, en las de otros paises de constitucion democratica en los que, especiahnente en los ultimos anos, la  frecuehcia de agitaciones politicas y  sociales ha originado la publicacion  de numerosas leyes encaminadas a la proteccidn penal del Estado.”   (Cuello Calon,  Derecho Penal, Tomo 1, pp. 250-252.)

Such  evils as may result from the failure of the policy of the  law  punishing  the  offense  to  dovetail  with  the policy of  the law enforcing agencies in the apprehension and prosecution of the offenders are matters which may be brought to  the attention of the departments  concerned. The  judicial  branch can not amend the former in  order to  suit  the latter.   The  Court cannot indulge in judicial legislation without violating the principle of  separation of powers, and, hence, undermining the foundation of our republican system.   In short, we cannot accept  the theory of the prosecution without causing much bigger  harm than that which would allegedly result from the adoption of the opposite view.

In  conclusion, we hold that, under the allegations of the amended information against defendant-appellant Amado V. Hernandez, the murders, arsons end robberies described therein are mere ingredients of the crime of rebellion allegedly committed by said defendants, as means “necessary” (4) for  the perpetration of said offense of rebellion;  that the crime  charged in the aforementioned amended information is,  therefore, simple  rebellion,  not  the  complex crime of rebellion with multiple murder, arsons and  robberies; that the  maximum penalty imposable under such charge cannot exceed twelve (12) years of prisidn mayor and a fine of P20,000;  and that, in conformity with the policy of  this  court  in dealing  with  accused persons amenable to  a similar  punishment, said defendant  may may be allowed bail.

It is urged that,  in  the exercise  of  its discretion, the Court should deny the motion under consideration, because the security of the State so requires, and because the judgment of conviction appealed from indicates that the evidence of guilt of Amado  V.  Hernandez is strong.  However, as held in a  resolution of this  court, dated  January 29, 1953,  in  the case of  Montano vs. Ocampo  (G. R. L-6352):

“* *  * to  deny bail it is not enough that the evidence of  guilt is  strong; it must also appear that  in case of conviction the defendant’s criminal liability would probably call for a capital punishment.   No clear or conclusive showing before this Court has  been made.”

In fact,  in  the case at bar, defendant Amado  V. Hernandez was sentenced by the  lower court, not to the extreme penalty, but  to life imprisonment.  Furthermore, individual freedom is too basic, too transcendental and vital in a republican state, like ours,  to be denied upon mere general  principles  and  abstract consideration  of  public safety.  Indeed, the  preservation of liberty is such a major preoccupation of our political system that, not  satisfied with guaranteeing its enjoyment in the very first paragraph of  section  (1) of the Bill of Rights, the framers of our Constitution devoted paragraphs (3), (4),  (5),  (6), (7), (8), (11), (12), (13),  (14), (15), (16),  (17), (18), and (21) of said  section  (1) to the protection  of several aspects of freedom.  Thus, in  line with the  letter and  spirit of  the fundamental  law, we said  in  the aforementioned case of Montano vs.  Ocampo:

“Exclusion from bail in capital offenses being an exception to the otherwise absolute right guaranteed  by the constitution, the natural tendency of the courts has  been toward a fair and liberal appreciation, rather than otherwise, of the evidence in the  determination of the  degree  of proof and presumption of guilt necessary to warrant a deprivation  of that  right.”

“In the evaluation of the evidence the probability of flight is one other important factor to be  taken into account.  The sole purpose of confining accused in jail before conviction, it has been observed, is to assure his presence at the trial.   In other words, if denial of bail is authorized in capital cases, it  is only  on the  theory that the  proof being strong, the  defendant  would  flee,  if  he has the opportunity, rather than face the verdict of the jury.   Hence, the exception to the fundamental right to  be bailed should be applied in direct ratio to the extent  of the probability of evasion of prosecution.

“The possibility of escape  in this case, bearing in mind the defendant’s official and social standing and his other personal circumstances,  seems remote if not nil.”

This view applies fully to Amado V. Hernandez, with the particularity that there is an  additional circumstance  in his  favor—he has been detained since January 1951, or for more than five  (5)  years, and it may still take  some time to  dispose of the case, for the same has not been,  and is not in a position to be, included, as yet, in our calendar, in-asmuch  as the briefs for some appellants—other than Hernandez—as well  as  the  brief for the  Government,  are pending submission.  It  should be noted,  also, that the decision appealed from  the  opposition to  the  motion  in question do not reveal satisfactorily and  concrete, positive act of the accused showing, sufficiently,  that his provincial .release, during the pendency of the appeal, would jeopardize the security of the State.

Wherefore, the aforementioned motion for bail of defendant-appellant Amado V. Hernandez is hereby granted and,  upon the filing of a bond, with sufficient sureties, in the sum of F30,000, and its approval by the court, let said defendant-appellant be  provisionally released.   Is  13  so ordered.

Paras, C. J.,  Reyes,  A., Bautista Angelo and Reyes. J. B. L., JJ., concur.

Bengzon, J., concurs in the result.