[ G.R. No. L-6953. March 31, 1955 ] 96 Phil. 742
[ G.R. No. L-6953. March 31, 1955 ]
NATIONAL LABOR UNION, PETITIONER, VS. BERG DEPARTMENT STORE, INC., RESPONDENT. D E C I S I O N
PARAS, C.J.:
On February 12, 1952, the petitioner, and the respondent entered into a collective bargaining agreement which, insofar as it affects this case, provides as follows:
“’(c) The contracting parties agree that in furtherance of such discipline, the following grounds shall be considered as just causes for dismissal without notice:
Culpable violation of the law, rules, and regulations applicable to labor; Voluntary injury to any fellow employee or officer of the Company; Willful damage to merchandise, machinery, furniture or equipment of the Company; Smoking in prohibited areas which will endanger the security of the establishment; Drunken and/or disorderly conduct; Dishonesty; Punching somebody else’s card; Unauthorized possession of firearms or other deadly weapons; Inefficiency or reiterated lack of courtesy and service; Lack of respect or courtesy to customers; Habitual lateness.
" ’d. In obedience of economic principles, closing of a department or recession, of the business shall also serve as ground for the dismissal of employees.
" ’e. In cases of dismissal of permanent, regular or full-time employees, not governed by clauses C, the Company agrees to give 30 days notice or 30 days pay in lieu thereof.'”
The dismissal by the respondent of two of its employees, Emilia David and Miguel Pañganiban, caused the petitioner, National Labor Union, to file in the Court of Industrial Relations on March 14, 1953, a petition, alleging that said dismissal was without any just cause, and praying that the respondent be ordered to reinstate them with back pay from January 31, 1953. The respondent filed an answer, alleging that the grounds for the dismissal were immorality, inefficiency, disorderly conduct and culpable violation of existing rules and regulations of the company, and praying that the petition be denied and the petitioner ordered to pay P500 under the counterclaim set up by the respondent. Associate Judge Juan L. Lanting rendered a decision dated June 12, 1953, finding that the “respondent has failed to prove by preponderance of evidence the charges or offenses attributed to Emilia David and Miguel Pañganiban, but denying the petition on the ground that their dismissal was justified under clause (c) of the collective bargaining agreement which allows the respondent to dismiss any employee even without cause provided that it gives him 30 days’ notice or 30 days’ pay in lieu of such notice. Judge Lanting denied the respondent’s counter-claim. The motion for reconsideration filed by the petitioner was denied by the Court of Industrial Relations in banc in its resolution of July 13, 1953, by a vote of three to two. The case is now before us on appeal by certiorari taken by the petitioner.
The collective bargaining agreement entered into between the petitioner and respondent enumerates in clauses (c) and (d) specific grounds for dismissal of respondent’s employees, and the Court of Industrial Relations found as a fact that the employees herein involved were not dismissed on any of said grounds The only question that arises is whether clause (e) of the agreement providing that “in cases of dismissal of permanent, regular or fulltime employees, not governed by clause (c), the Company agrees to give 30 days notice or 30 day pay in lieu thereof,” authorizes the respondent to dismiss any employee even without cause, on condition that it gives 30 days’ notice or 30 days’ pay in lieu thereof. Our answer has, without any hesitancy, to be in the negative. It is significant that the petitioner and the respondent, in their collective bargaining agreement, had undertaken to limit the grounds for dismissal to those listed in clauses (c) and (d), and we do not think that clause (e) was added to serve as a blanket authority for the respondent to dismiss on any ground other than those already specified, or even without cause. The more logical construction is that clause (e) was inserted in the agreement for the benefit of respondent’s employees who may be dismissed by the respondent, not on any ground under clause (c), but for causes pointed out in clause (d), namely, closing of a department or recession of business. We say this is logical, because if an employee is dismissed for any cause enumerated in clause (c), it is fair that the company should not be required to give 30 days’ notice or 30 days’ pay in lieu thereof; whereas if any employee is separated due to the closing of a department or recession of the business of the respondent, it is also fair that the innocent employee be at least entitled to a 30-day notice or 30 days’ pay in lieu thereof. This construction is also borne out by the very term of clause (e) which expressly mentions dismissals not governed by clause (c) necessarily restricting its application only to separations under clause (d). It is difficult to believe that the petitioner, in entering into the collective bargaining agreement, could have bartered the right of its members to feel secure in their employment, for a month’s pay.
The contention of counsel for respondent that the latter should be allowed to dismiss the employees herein involved, for the reason that they had already lost its confidence, can not be sustained since the alleged loss of confidence must necessarily have resulted from the grounds which prompted the respondent to dismiss them; and inasmuch as the Court of Industrial Relations has found said grounds to be unsubstantiated, there can be no valid reason for said loss of confidence.
Wherefore, the appealed decision is hereby reversed and the respondent ordered to reinstate Emilia David and Miguel Panganiban with back pay from January 31, 1953. So ordered with costs against the respondent.
Jugo and Labrador, JJ,, concur.