[ G. R. No. L-6191. January 31, 1955 ] 96 Phil. 461
[ G. R. No. L-6191. January 31, 1955 ]
REPUBLIC OF THE PHILIPPINES, PLAINTIFF AND APPELLEE, VS. CIRILO P. BAYLOSIS, ET AL., DEFENDANTS AND APPELLANTS. D E C I S I O N
MONTEMAYOR, J.:
These expropriation proceedings initiated in the Court of First Instance of Batangas by the Bureau of Lands in behalf of the Republic of the Philippines, involve seven lots formerly a part of the Hacienda LIAN or LIAN ESTATE in the municipality of Lian, Batangas, which estate formerly belonged in its entirety to the Colegio de San Jose Inc., a Jesuit corporation, under Original Certificate of Title No. 15521. It seems that the Hacienda or rather the income therefrom was used for the support and education of young Filipinos studying for the priesthood. The Hacienda originally had an extension of several thousand hectares and was occupied and cultivated by lessees and by tenants (inquilinos). About the year 1931 the religious authorities decided to break up this big estate as far as possible into small lots averaging one hundred hectares each and sell it to bona fide lessees, the price to be payable on the installment plan.
One of these lessees was Nelson V. Sinclair. He had occupied under a contract of lease a portion of this estate since 1928, cultivating a portion by means of tractors and the remainder by means of aparceros under yearly contracts such as Exhibits 4, 4-A, 4-B (Baylosis).
In 1937 he bought from the Lian Estate the portion leased to him with an approximate area of 87 hectares. Subsequently, this portion was subdivided into seven lots, to wit: 306-YYYY, 306-BBBB, 306-CCCC, 306-DDDD, 306-EEEE, 306-Z and 306-LL. In 1947 Sinclair sold lot 306-YYYY with an area of about 25 hectares and 306- BBBB with an area of about 17 hectares to Cirilo P. Baylosis for P40,000 and P28,000, respectively, although the corresponding transfer certificates of title were not issued until 1948 and 1949, respectively. After the purchase, Cirilo P. Baylosis subdivided the two lots into small parcels and sold the same to his co-defendants in this case, except Sinclair and Luis Baylosis. In 1950 Sinclair sold to Cirilio P. Baylosis lot 306-CCCC with an area of about 13 hectares and lot 306-DDDD with an area of about 10 hectares for P39,000. (See Exhibit 16-Baylosis)
About October 7, 1946, some 68 persons claiming to be tenants and occupants of the parcels originally owned by Sinclair addressed a petition in Tagalog to the Rural Progress Administration, a rough translation in English of which follows:
We, the undersigned, are all workers in this land for a long time, and were the ones who cleared the place of its big trees.
That is why we are requesting the Government to buy the land and we shall pay the instalment to the Government."
Much later, on the basis of the petition, the Rural Progress Administration through its Manager Faustino Aguilar, on May 4, 1948, addressed a letter to Sinclair reading as follows:
“May 4, 1948
Mr. N. V. Sinclair 181 David, Escolta Manila
Sir:
There has been received in this Office a petition for the acquisition by the Government for resale to the tenants of the following six lots in Binubusan, owned and/or administered by you:
Lot N. 306—CCCC under tax declaration No. 852 Area—13.9125 hectares. Kind—Irrigated agricultural land. Assessed value—P6,400.00
Lot No. 306—Z under tax declaration No. 858 Area—8.7762 hectares. Kind—7.7762 hectares irrigated agricultural land 1.0000 hectare —riceland. Assessed value—P4,040.
Lot No. 306—YYY under tax declaration No. 864 Area—25.0159 hectares. Kind—Irrigated agricultural land. Assessed value—P9,760. :
Lot No. 306—BBBB under taof declaration No. 365 Area—17.9827 hectares. Kind—Irrigated agricultural land. Assessed value—P7,010
Lot No. 306—EEEE under tax declaration No. 866 Area—10.4955. Kind—Irrigated agricultural land. Assessed value—P4,090.
Lot No. 306—LL under tax declaration No. 350 Owner— Colegio de San Jose. Administrator—N. V. Sinclair. Area—14.3208 hectares. Kind—Fish pond. Assessed value—P5,730.
The reason given by the tenants in presenting their petition is that your relation with them is not altogether too satisfactory having on previous occasion tried to disregard the 70-30 crop sharing basis, although later have yielded to observance thereof upon the insistence of the tenants. They likewise complain that you are planning to eject them, a plan which if carried out, will result in untold sufferings on their part, without mentioning the pain of leaving the premises which they have occupied and tilled since time immemorial.
Before we take action on their petition we will appreciate your favor of informing us for your willingness to sell said parcels of land, in accordance with the provisions of Commonwealth Act No. 539 and the conditions of the sale.
Respectfully,
(Sgd.) Faustino Aguilar Manager”
On May 7th, Sinclair wrote the following answer:
“May 7, 1948
Rural Progress Administration Department of Justice Building Walled City, Manila
Attention: Mr. Faustino Aguilar, Manager
Gentleman:
This will acknowledge receipt today of your communication dated May 4th, with reference to the petition for your Administration to purchase lands of the writer located in barrio Binubusan, munic- ipality of Lian, Province of Batangas.
The reasons given by the petitioners are not true and it will be a pleasure to acquaint you with the facts concerned with each of the lots specified.
This information will be assembled at the earliest possible time and in order to expedite its submission to your goodselves, your letter is being forwarded to my representative at Lian.
In the meantime, it is requested that you kindly allow me sufficient time to submit the true facts pertaining to each lot before you take action on this Petition.
Respectfully,
(Sgd.) N. V. Sinclair Owner
On November 15, 1958, Manager Aguilar again wrote to Sinclair as follows:
“November 15, 1948
Mr. N. V. Sinclair 181 David Escolta Manila
Sir:
In connection with your letter dated May 7, 1948, advising us that you will forward to this Office under separate cover information regarding your refusal to sell to certain petitioners your lands in Binubusan, Lian, Batangas, known as lot Nos. 306-CCCC; 306-Z; 306-YYY; 306-BBBB; 306-EEE and 306-LL, please be informed that up to the present we have not as yet received said letter. As it is our desire to apprise the petitioners of the same, the favor of fin early information from you will be appreciated.
Likewise the petitioners again called at this Office and have made an offer to buy said lands at P600 per hectare on a 10-year period to pay. If the said price iflf acceptable to you, please advise us accordingly.
Respectfully,
(Sgd.) Faustino Aguilar Manager”
Thereafter, having been informed that Sinclair had sold his parcels or seme of them to one Cirilo P. B.aylosis, Manager Aguilar on January 17, 1949, wrote the following letter:
“January 17, 1949
Atty. Cirilo P. Baylosis Balayan, Batangas
Sir:
We have been informed that you bought the lands of N. V. Sinclair at Binubusan, Lian, Batangas, known as lots 306-YYY; 306- LL; 306-Z; 306-CCCC; 306-BBBB and 306-EEEE and that you are at present taking all the crops thereon including the share due to the tenants with the help of constabulary soldiers. If the report is true, we request that you refrain from taking such step in order to avoid any untoward incident that may arise therefrom.
The lands which you bought are the stibject of a petition for acquisition and resale to the tenants thereof which is pending final action by this Office.
Respectfully,
(Sgd.) Faustino Aguilar Manager”
Thereafter, on February 6, 1951, the Republic of the Philippines filed the original complaint for expropriation against Cirilo P. Baylosis and Sinclair, which complaint was twice amended, the second amended complaint being filed on April 16, 1952, so as to include all the persons to whom Sinclair and Cirilo P. Baylosis had sold portions of the lots sought to be expropriated.
On February 14, 1951, the Court of First Instance of Batangas after hearing the parties issued an order placing the plaintiffs in possession of the property sought to be expropriated after plaintiff had made a deposit of P27,105.22. On February 24, 1951, the tenants and occupants in whose behalf the expropriation proceedings were instituted moved to intervene, accompanying their motion with a complaint in intervention. Believing that their interests were sufficiently taken care of and defended by the plaintiff, the trial court deemed said intervention unnecessary. The defendants numbering about 21 filed 9 separate motions to dismiss based on several grounds, among which are: that the expropriation was being made not for public use; that the defendants would be deprived of their property without due process of law; that the plaintiff has no right under the guise of expropriation to take the property of a private citizen and deliver the same to another private individual; that the Constitution authorizes the expropriation of big landed estates but not of small areas like these owned by the defendants; that the present expropriation was intended to benefit only about 44 persons who do not represent the public and that many of said persons already have lands of their own; that tHe various defendants individually own only small portion of the property under expropriation; that the second amended complaint is defective in that it did not describe the specific property sought to be expropriated; and that the current price of irrigated lands in Batangas is about P3,000 per hectare and so plaintiff’s deposit was insufficient.
After hearing and the introduction of evidence, both oral and documentary, the trial court issued an order dated July 18, 1952, dismissing the various motions for dismissal and declaring the plaintiff entitled to take the property sought to be condemned for public use as described in the second amended complaint upon payment of just compensation to be ascertained by Commissioners to be appointed by the court for this purpose. The defendants are now appealing from that order directly to this Tribunal.
The trial court declared that the present expropriation proceedings are based on Section 4, Article XIII of the Constitution which provides that—
“The Congress may authorized upon payment of just compensation, the expropriation of lands to be subdivided into small lots and conveyed at cost to individuals.”
and section 1 of Commonwealth Act 539 which provides that the President of the Philippines is authorized to acquire private lands through purchase or expropriation and subdivide the same into home lots or small farms for resale to bona fide tenants or occupants. The trial court also said that although this Tribunal in the case of Guido vs. Rural Progress Administration, G. R. No. L-2089 (47 Off. Gaz.,No. 4 p. 1848) held that section 4 of Article XIII of the Constitution had reference to large estates, still, the total area of the parcels now sought to be expropriated, whicn, is between 67 arid 77 hectares, may hot be considered small; that the tenants and occupants of the land for whom these expropriatioh proceedings were instituted have by themselves and their ancestors been occupying, clearing and cultivating the land for many years and that they are entitled now to purchase the same; that the situation in the area in question was far from peaceful because there was misunderstanding and trouble between tenants on one side, and their landlords (the defendants herein) on the other, regarding their shares in the harvests and that the only way to solve this tenancy problem was to expropriate the land and sell it to the tenants; that both Sinclair and Cirilo P. Baylosis were formerly agreeable to sell this land to others for a profit as shown by the fact that they had actually sold portions thereof to others and that consequently, they can now have no valid objection to the expropriation, that heretofore the Government had already expropriated a large portion of Lian Estate or Hacienda, divided the same into small lots and thereafter resold them to tenants, thereby showing that by its nature, location and destination, the property is suitable for the purpose for which it is being expropriated, and that these proceedings are in keeping with what the Government had alreay done with respect to other portions; that although it is contended that several of the tenants and occupants have already lands of their own aside from the portions they are now occupying, still, they are actual occupants and it would noi be fair or just that they would not be included in the benefits of the expropriation, and that in any event, once the expropriation is carried out, it is for the Government to screen and process the tenants, and that those found already owning lands may be disqualified to buy the land being expropriated. As to the portions into which lots 306-YYYY and 306-BB have been sub-divided and then sold by Cirilo P. Baylosis to his co-defendants, the trial court observed that said sales were made after Baylosis had been served on January 17, 1949, with notice by the Rural Progress Administration of the intention of the Government to purchase said lots, and that considering that the purchasers are relatives of Baylosis, and that the transfer certificates of title were issued in 1950, there was reason to believe that these sales by Baylosis were simulated, and intended to frustrate the attempt of the Government to expropriate.
For a better and a clearer understanding of the facts in this case, particularly the parcels involved, their areas and owners, the particular portions sought to be expropriated and the number of tenants and occupants sought to be benefitted by the expropriation, we have prepared the following tables or graphs, marked “A” and “G,” based on the pleadings and on the order appealed from.
Table “A” Area
- Lot 306-YYY ………………………..
25.0159 square meters
To be acquired……….
22.4033 square meters
Occupants …………………………….. 21
Dependents……………..
100
- Lot 306 BBB …………………..
17.9827 square meters
To be acquired ……….
13.4564 square meters
Occupants …………………………….. 10
Dependents …………….
40
- Lot 306-CCC ……………………
13.9129 square meters
Whole to be acquired
Occupants ………………………………. 9
Dependents …………….
40
- Lot 306-EEEE …………………..
10.4955 square meters
To be acquired ………..
9,1809 square meters
Occupants ………………………………. 4
Dependents …………….
20
- Lot 306-Z ……………………
8.7762 square meters
To be acquired …………
4.0000 square meters
Occupants ………………………………. 1
Dependents …………….
4
- Lot 306-LL …………………….
14.3203 square meters
To be acquired………….
1.5000 square meters
Occupants…………………………………1
Dependents …………….
4
- Lot 306-DDDD…………………….
5.8946 square meters
To be acquired …………
3.0000 square meters
Occupants ………………………………. 1
Dependents …………….
4
Owners …………………………………..23
Dependents …………….
90
Occupants ……………………………….44
Dependents …………….
214
TABLE “B”
Names of defendants
Lot No. and Title No.
Area in hectares
Maria Lunesa……………………………
306-YYY-l
4.9996
TCT-2959
Pastora Baylosis ………………………
306-YYY-2
2.0000
TCT-3079
Spouses Marcelo Basit and Magdalena Bayungan …..
306-YYY-3
2.0000
Spouses Tomas Asuncion and Bonifacio Bayungan ….
306-YYY-4
1.0315
Spouse Raymunda Hernandez and Juan Gonzales ….
306-YYY-5
1.0998
TOT-2960
Spouses Tirso de Padua and Maria Dolores Bayungan ….
306-YYY-6
3.000
TOT-3311
Spouses Luis Baylosis and Manuela Pineda ….
306-YYY-8
9.9974
TOT-3510
Spousea Benito Baylosis and Macaria L. Torres ….
306-BBB-1
2.4256
306-BBB-9
.9639
TOT-2877
Spouses Alejandro Abellera and Juliana Camellon ….
306-BBB-7
1.0711
TAT-2897
Spouses Roberto Capoon and Gavina Baylosis….
306-BBB-7
3.7725
Luis Baylosis—Part of lot …………
306-Z
3.8009
Cirilo P. Baylosis …………………….
T-3133
8.8051
T-3426
N. V. Sinclair & C. P. Baylosis ………..
306-CCCC
13.9125
306-EEEE
9.1809
N. V. Sinclair
306-LL
4.0000
306-DDDD
5.8946
Table “A” shaws the number of lots to be affected by the expropriation including the areas to be expropriated, and the number of their occupants and dependents. Table “B” shows the names of the owners of the original seven lots involved and of the smaller lots into which they had been subdivided and their areas. Table “A” further shows the area sought to be expropriated from each individual lot, totaling approximately 67 hectares. The number of tenants or occupants is about 44 and the number of their dependents is about 214. For the defendants owners, there are about 23 of them with about 90 dependents.
It will be seen from the tables that neither the exact location of the portion to be expropriated from each lot nor its form or shape is stated or defined, thereby supporting the contention of the defendants on this point. Table “A” also shows that the Government wants to expropriate, not one whole parcel or the seven lots comprising said parcel but is selecting only portions of said seven different and separate lots, presumably those actually occupied and cultivated by the tenants. If the expropriation is carried out, we do not know what portions would be left to the owners, the forms therof and whether or not it would be worthwhile for the said owners to keep them.
Let us now discuss the several reasons given by the trial court for upholding the right of the Government to expropriate in this case. It says that the tenants and occupants for whose benefit the land is being expropriated have by themselves and their ancestors been occupying and cultivating the same for many years and are therefore entitled to purchase the same. We. are afraid that that holding has no legal basis. The mere fact that d person as a tenant has occupied and cultivated and even cleared the land for his landlord does not entitle him to purchase the same against his landlord’s will, by means of expropriation. Expropriation by the Government, obliging a land owner to part with his real estate is authorised only when done for public use or for public benefit and not to enable one to own real property at the expense of another especially when said owner has no other real property except the one being expropriated. Some of the defendants herein (Alejandro Abellera and Benito Baylosis) have no other land except the small lots bought by them from Cirilo P. Baylosis and now subject of the present expropriation proceedings. Defendant Juan Gonzales told the Court that he is actually by himself, plowing and cultivating the small lot of about one hectare that he bought from Cirilo P. Baylosis, now sought to be condemned. We should not forget that the Constitution protects private property, prohibits a citizen being deprived of his property without due process of law, and that even in condemnation proceedings when said citizen is given just compensation for his property expropriated, still, the expropriation to be valid must be for a public use or public benefit.
Again, the trial court says that there are tenancy problems in the lands being expropriated, there being misunderstanding between the owners and the tenants as to the share of each in the harvest, and that the only way this problem could be solved is to expropriate the land. This seems to be a novel theory which finds no statutory or constitutional support. If this theory were correct and is to be followed and applied, then all that a tenant has to do in order to be able to buy the land of his landlord is for him, or better still, with the help and cooperation of his co-tenants, to violate the tenancy law, refuse to give the 30% corresponding to his or their landlord or even deny the title of said landlord, thereby creating a tenancy problem, upon which the Government will immediately step in and commence expropriation proceedings, claiming that the only solution of the trouble between the landlord and the tenants lies in expropriation. We cannot believe Jhat was ever the intention of either tfie framers of the Constitution or of the members of Congress. That is the reason why Congress has promulgated the Tenancy Law, clearly specifying the rights and obligations of both landlord and tenant, their respective shares in the harvest, and the removal of a tenant only for certain specified reasons or causes; and that is why we have the Tenancy Division in the Court of Industrial Relations to handle and decide tenancy disputes.
Furthermore, it is not exactly correct to say that there is a tenancy problem in the land in question, and even if there were, the fault may be attributed to the tenants themselves rather than to the owners. It will be remembered that in the petition filed by about 68 persons claiming to be occupants of the parcels originally owned by Sinclair dated October 6, 1946, addressed to the Rural Progress Administration, nothing was said about tenancy trouble. All that they said in said petition was that they had been working on the land for a long time and had cleared the place of big trees, and that they wanted to buy the land and pay the price to the Government in installment. Indeed, the evidence shows that Sinclair never had any trouble with his tenants. And there is reason to believe and evidence to support the belief that the tenancy trouble on the land in question began only around the year 1948 after the tenants and occupants were presumably given the hope and the assurance by the Rural Progress Administration that the Government was going to acquire the land for them either through purchase or expropriation. It was then according to Cirilo P. Baylosis that the tenants refused to give him and his co-defendants their share of the harvest and even refused to acknowledge him as owner of the land he had bought from Sinclair. So, according to Cirilo P. Baylosis, he and his co-defendants to whom he had resold portions of the land bought from Sinclair, had to go to the Tenancy Law Enforcement Office and complain against the tenants and said Tenancy Office in several orders concurred in by the Court of Industrial Relations held that even under Commonwealth Act 538 which authorizes the suspension of cases of ejectment against tenants of lands included in condemnation proceedings, the tenants should first pay the current rents or give the shares of the landlords in the harvest, a thing which the tenants in those cases had failed and refused to do and so the cases against the tenants were decided against them. (See Exhibits V-1-1, V-2-1, V-3-1 and V-4-1)
The trial court also said that if Sinclair and Cirilo P. Baylosis formerly were willing to sell their holdings or portions thereof to others as they have done to their co-defendants, there was no reason why the defendants should now object to the Government purchasing said lands through expropriation. But there is a difference and room for distinction. The right to dispose or not to dispose of one’s property is one of the attributes of ownership. A person just because he is willing to sell his property to “A” may not be obliged to sell it to “B” unless the law in certain specific cases such as legal redemption compels him to do so. Again, a land owner may be willing or even offer to sell his land today to “A”, but unless the offer is accepted and acted upon, he may change his mind and refuse to sell to “A” next year or refuse to sell it to anyone for that matter.
The evidence shows that both Sinclair and Cirilo P. Baylosis at one time were willing to sell to some of the tenants and occupants herein involved under certain conditions and provided that they buy in groups, presumably to avoid subdivisions and the problem of dealing with many individual buyers, but the tenants failed to buy. Naturally, they may not now compel Sinclair and Cirilo P. Baylosis to sell to them through the Government by means of expropriation. Besides, the bulk of the lands that Sinclair and Cirilo P. Baylosis had formerly offered to them for sale which offer they failed to take advantage of, has now been sold to others, the other co-defendants herein, in small lots.
One reason not improbable why the tenants and occupants failed to take advantage of the former offer of Sinclair and Cirilo P. Baylosis to sell the lands to them was the matter of price. According to the letter of the Rural Progress Administration to Sinclair on November 15, 1948, those who signed the petition of October 17, 1946, claiming to be the tenants and occupants of the land, offered to buy the same at P600 per hectare, payable within a period of ten years. The defendant owners of the land herein claim that the current price of first class riceland in Batangas is around P3,000 per hectare. Even taking as a basis the price paid by Cirilo P. Baylosis for the lots bought by him from Sinclair, now being expropriated, the price is way over P1,000 almost P2.000 per hectare. Naturally, Sinclair and Baylosis were unwilling to sell at P600 a hectare, to say nothing of said price being paid in ten years. And that is the reason why the defendants herein claim that the deposit of P27,000 made by the tenants and occupants, is insufficient to cover the price of the land, said amount of the deposit being equivalent to only about P400 per hectare for the 67 hectares sought to be expropriated.
Supposing that the expropriation is carried out and the Commissioners and the trial court find that the land expropriated is worth P2,000 or more per hectare, would the tenants and occupants be still willing and would they be able to pay said price? Supposing that they were not, then what would happen? Would the Government undertake to pay the difference between the actual value of the land expropriated for them and their offer to pay only P600 per hectare, and this payable in ten years at that? Section 4, Article XIII of the Constitution on which tiie present expropriation proceedings are supposed to be based says that the lands expropriated are to be subdivided into small lots and conveyed at cost to individuals. That means that the Government will not make any profit in the transaction, but it also conveys the idea that the Government will sell at a price to include what it cost the Government to expropriate. The cost of subdivision, registration fees and transfer certificates of title will probably have to be added to the cost of the land. Again, it may be asked, what will the Government do if the tenants and occupants are neither willing nor able to pay said total cost?
There is another point that merits consideration. The defendants claim and correctly that many of the tenants and occupants now insisting on expropriation have lands of their own. According to the list prepared by the Bureau of Lands containing the names of persons who are occupying and holding portions of land being administered by the Bureau of Lands in Batangas (ExhilHt 13-Baylosis), many, if not the majority of the tenants and occupants of the lands now sought to be expropriated are included in said list The evidence further shows that several of the tenants, among them Victor Magpantay, C. Balaquiot, Luciano Panganiban, Isabelo Manguera and Andres Castronuevo have lands of their own; that some of the lands are sugar lands for which they hold sugar quotas and one of the said tenants, Andres Castronuevo, is cultivating a portion of the land sought to be expropriated and which he wants to buy, not by himself but through an aparcero or tenant.
In relation to this claim of the defendants that some of the tenants and occupants have lands of their own and so are not qualified to be the beneficiaries of expropriation, the trial court said that that is no problem because the Government can later screen and process said, tenants and occupants, and that if some are found to be disqualified because they are already land owners, then they should not be allowed to purchase the portions occupied by them. But if and when this happens, what becomes of said portions taken away from their former owners over their vigorous opposition and which portions later proved to be not subject to expropriation for the reason that the persons occupying them do not deserve and are not qualified to purchase them? A real injustice will have been done to the owners of these portions because they had been included and made defendants in these proceedings, deprived of their holdings against their will, only to find out later that the expropriation as to these portions was improper and unjustified.
The defendants have introduced evidence without refutation through the testimony of one Anacleto Jonson, an employee of the Bureau of Lands in charge of the 3,700 hectares of the Lian Estate expropriated by the Government way back in 1940 and 1941, and intended to be subdivided into small lots and resold to their tenants and occupants, on the status of said lands. According to Jonson, since then which up to now, involves a period of about thirteen years, said area of 3,700 hectares remains unsubdivided; that no portion of said big area has been resold or even contracted to be resold by the Government to their occupants and tenants, and all that the Government is doing is to administer the same and receive the portion of the yearly harvest corresponding to the owner. In other words, all that has been done, thirteen years after the expropriation was to transfer the ownership and administration of this big area with about 800 tenants and families from the lian Estate to the Government which has assumed the role of lessor and landlord. No reason or explanation was given for this rather strange if not anomalous situation. The defendants, owners of the land being condemned, feeling a little bitter against the Government, condemns its action in instituting the present proceedings, and point to this unfortunate situation and status of the 3,700 hectares expropriated in 1941 as an example of the Government’s rather over-ambitious program of expropriation. They say:
“* * *. In 1939, the Commonwealth of the Philippines, filed the expropriation proceedings in the Court of First Instance of Batangas of certain portions of the Lian Estate still owned by Colegio de San Jose, Inc., and occupied by 800 persons (t.s.n. p. 359). The Colegio de San Jose, Inc., finally executed the Deed of Sale for 4,300 hectares of land on May 1940, and title and ownership to these lands were then transferred to the Commonwealth of the Philippines (t.s.n., pp. 73-74, 357-359). However, notwithstanding, the expropriation of this Urge estate of 4,300 hectares of homesites and agricultural lands by the Commonwealth of the Philippines 13 years ago, for resale to the poor and landless, up to the present time this property has not been subdivided into small lots, nor sold to the actual occupants (t. s. n., p. 360). Notwithstanding this state of affairs, the plaintiff is still bent on expropriating another 67 hectares of agricultural lands consisting of 18 small lots of small areas which do not adjoin each other and belonging to 20 small landowners (Record on Appeal, pp. 2-14) who are intended by the framers of the Constitution to be protected by section 4, Article XIII of the Constitution.” (Appellant’s brief, pp. 7-8).
This Tribunal in the case of Guido vs. Rural Progress Administration, supra, held that Section 4 Article XIII of the Constitution has reference only to large estates, trusts in perpetuity, and lands that embrace a whole town or a large portion of a. town or city. The lands now sought to be expropriated with a total area of 67 hectares, even if considered as one whole parcel which they are not, can of course not be regarded as a landed estate. During the discussion of this case it was urged by the minority that as long as any land formerly formed part of a landed or large estate, it may, regardless of its present area be still subject to expropriation under section 4, Article XIII of the Constitution, citing the doctrine laid down in the case of Rural Progress Administration vs. Reyes, G. R. No. L-4703, October 8, 1953. It is true that said ruling was made in the Reyes case but we should bear in mind that that was a decision by a highly divided court, six for the majority and four dissenting, but two majority concurring only in the result and one of them concurring in a separate opinion. It seems that the members of the Tribunal espousing the majority opinion therein were greatly impressed by the fact that notwithstanding the small area involved, about two hectares, there were 113 persons living on the same, and dependent on the products of the fisheries on it, and evidently had no other place to go to live. We feel that the decision in that Reyes case was a departure from the doctrine laid down in the leading case of Guido which doctrine has been subsequently affirmed and reiterated in a long line of cases, and we now believe that in abandoning the ruling made in the Reyes case, this Tribunal is merely returning to and re-affirming the sound and wholesome doctrine laid down in the Guido Case.
The main purpose of the constitutional provision contained in section 4, Article XIII of that instrument was to break up landed estates into reasonably small portions. Once said landed estate is broken up, the purpose of the constitution is achieved. Otherwise, were we to adhere to1 the rule made in the Reyes case that if a piece of land, regardless of size, formerly formed part of a big landed estate, it is necessarily subject to expropriation, then there would be no limit or foreseeable end to expropriation. A landed estate of say 3,000 hectares is broken up into say 50-hectare lots and sold to the lessees or occupants thereof. The tenants in that 50-hectare lot want to buy their holdings and because the lot was formerly a part of a landed estate, it is again expropriated and subdivided into say 5-hectare lots. A buyer o£ this 5- hectare portion may have tenants cultivating portions thereof and these tenants would again insist on expropriation into say one hectare lots and so this expropriation would and may go on endlessly until the minimum of a few square meters is reached, just to accommodate one single tenant. We hold that that could not have been the intention of the framers of the Constitution. We also say that once a landed estate is broken up into portions of reasonable area, the buyers thereof are protected by the Constitution against further expropriation.
The trial court in justifying the present expropriation held that the land sought to be condemned with an area between 67 and 77 hectares is not small. It perhaps meant to say that it is large, and so may be regarded as a landed estate coming within the contemplation of the Constitution for purposes of expropriation. As a matter of fact, the land is only about 67 hectares in area. Not only this but it has already been subdivided into smaller portions ranging from thirteen hectares to as small as one hectare and now owned by different individual families. But even considering the land as a whole parcel of 67 hectares, may it be considered a landed estate whose ownership by one person is discouraged by the Constitution, and so subject to expropriation?
Our attention is called by the defendants-appellants to Land Administrative Order No. R-3 issued by the Department of Agriculture and Natural Resources. Executive Order No. 376 dated November 28, 1950, abolished the Rural Progress Administration which was formerly in charge of the expropriation of landed estates and transferred said function to the Bureau of Lands, creating therein a Division of Landed Estates. The Bureau of Lands is under the Department of Agriculture and Natural Resources and the latter promulgated Administrative Order No. R-3 under the provisions of Section 79-B of the Revised Administrative Code. This Administrative Order is entitled “Rules and Regulations Governing the Acquisition and Diposition of Landed Estates. Section 3 thereof reads as follows:
“3. Minimum Area of Private Estates to be acquired.—Except in special cases, no proceedings shall be initiated for the appropriation of an estate unless the area thereof be at least 5 hectares if for residential purpose; and at least 100 hectares if for agricultural purposes. This shall be without prejudice to the acquisition of smaller areas thru negotiation.”
According to the above reproduced section, no agricultural land will be expropriated for purposes of resale if less than 100 hectares in area. Although this Administrative Order was issued on October 19, 1951, after the commencement of the present expropriation proceedings, nevertheless it embodies the policy of the Government as to the size of agricultural lands that may be expropriated under section 4, Article XIII of the Constitution. In other words, the Government considers 100 hectares of agricultural land not to be too large to be owned by an individual, family, or entity so as to be subject to expropriation And this policy is but just and is consistent and in keeping with the policy contained in our laws governing the public domain. Under the old Public Land Law (Act No. 926), a person and his family may apply for and obtain a homestead with an area of 16 hectares. This was evidently found to be too small for purposes of expansion for a family and the area for a homestead was later increased to 24 hectares under Act 2874 and Commonwealth Act 141. That means that a man, poor and landless, who has to apply to the Government for a homestead may own as much as 24 hectares of land. Commonwealth Act 141 provides that an individual may purchase 144 hectares of public land, meaning to say, that 144 hectares is not too large a parcel to be owned by a person or a family. And as to corporations the Public Land Act authorizes them to purchase or lease 1024 hectares of the public domain. In view of this policy of the Government as to the size of agricultural land which a corporation or an individual may legitimately own, even purchase from the Government itself, it is clear that a parcel of 67 hectares in area such as the land now sought to be expropriated is not a landed estate or too large a parcel so as to justify expropriation; and if we consider the fact that these 67 hectares were originally seven distinct and separate parcels owned by Sinclair and later subdivided into about 17 parcels now owned by twenty-three, one would realize the impropriety of expropriating so as to enable the tenants and occupants thereof to buy them In the Guido case we indirectly held through Mr. Justice Tuason that parcels of 10, 15 or 25 hectares in area may not be expropriated for the purpose of reselling them to the tenants and occupants, and that to do so would be an act of oppression. What the Government is now trying to do in the present case is to take away parcels ranging from one to thirteen hectares in area from about 23 land owners with about 90 dependents and transfer them to about forty-four tenants with about 214 dependents. We hold that that cannot be done, not only because it has no statutory or constitutional support but also because it is unjust. What section 4, Article XIII of the Constitution intended and sought to do was merely to break up landed estates, and trusts in perpetuity. It intended to discourage the concentration of and excessive landed wealth in an entity or a few individuals, but surely it did not intend or seek to distribute wealth among citizens or take away from a citizen land which he did not actually need and give it to another who needs it. That does not come within the realm of social justice. Said this Tribunal in the Guido case:
“The promotion of social justice ordained by the Constitution does not supply paramount basis for untraxnmeled expropriation of private land by the Rural Progress Administration or any other government instrumentality. Social justice does not champion division of property or equality of economic status; what it and the Constitution do guaranty are equality of opportunity, equality of political rights, equality before the law, equality between values given and received, and equitable sharing of the social and material goods on the basis of efforts in their production.”
The trial court held that Cirilo P. Baylosis subdivided lots 306-YYY and 306-BB and sold them to many of his co-defendants in the year 1950, as shown by the dates of the registration of the sales in the Office of the Register of Deeds, this, after he had been notified by the Rural Progress Administration in 1949 of the intention of the Government to expropriate those lots, and that furthermore, many if not all of the purchasers of his lots as subdivided were his relatives, thereby giving said court reason to believe that those sales by Cirilo were all simulated, intended to frustrate the attempt of the Government to expropriate. In the first place, Cirilo asserts I that he made the subdivision and made the sales before he received the notice from the Rural Progress Administration in 1949 but because it took the Bureau of Lands a long time to approve the subdivision survey and plan, the sales were not registered until 1950. In the second place, the mere fact that a land owner subdivides his land and sells them to his relatives does not mean that the sales are simulated or fraudulent. It is not unnatural for a person who has something to sell, to give preference to his relatives; and with respect to lands, to have as his neighbors and adjoining owners people whom he knows and are related to him. In the third place, and this is the most important, even assuming that Cirilo P. Baylosis was previously notified of the intention of the Government to expropriate his land, said notice by no means could legally prevent him from disposing of his property; otherwise, the mere announcement or notice of the intention of the Government to expropriate a parcel of land, however indefinite and uncertain that intention may be, would as it were freeze said property in the hands of its owner. Thereafter, the owner may not deal with his own property, mortgage it, much less sell it and all he could do is to wait patiently, for any future action of the Government in the way of expropriation. Said expropriation may come long afterwards or may not come at all because the Government may change its mind, and in the meantime the landowner is rendered helpless as regards his own property. In the present case, as already stated, the petition for expropriation was not filed by the Government until the year 1951, more than two years after the notice of the Government’s intention to expropriate was served on Cirilo. We hold that mere notice of the intention of the Government to expropriate lands in the future does not and cannot bind the landowner and prevent him from dealing with his property. To bind the land to be expropriated and the owner thereof, the expropriation must be commenced in court and even then we are not certain that the owner may not deal with his property thereafter, mortgage or even sell it if he can find persons who would step into his shoes and deal with the Government, either resist the expropriation if in their opinion it is illegal or accept the expropriation and remain with what is left of the property if the entire property is not needed by the Government.
In conclusion we hold that under section 4, Article XIII of the Constitution, the Government may expropriate only landed estates with extensive areas, specially those embracing the whole or a large part of a town or city; that once a landed estate is broken up and divided into parcels of reasonable areas, either thru voluntary sales by the owner or owners of said landed estate, or thru expropriation, the resulting parcels are-no longer subject to further expropriation under section 4, Article XIII of the Constitution; that mere notice of the intention of the Government to expropriate a parcel of land does not bind either the land or the owner so as to prevent subsequent disposition of the property such as mortgaging or even selling it in whole or by subdivision; that tenancy trouble alone whether due to the fault of the tenants or of the landowners does not justify expropriation; that the Constitution protects a landowner against indiscriminate and unwarranted expropriation; that to justify expropriation, it must be for a public purpose and public benefit, and that just to enable the tenants of a piece of land of reasonable area to own portions of it, even if they and their ancestors had cleared the land and cultivated it for their landlord for many years, is no valid reason or justification under the Constitution to deprive the owner or landlord of his property by means of expropriation.
In view of the foregoing, the order appealed from is reversed; the motions for dismissal filed by defendants-appellants are granted; and the petition for expropriation is dismissed, with costs in both instances.
Bengzon, Padilla, Jugo, and Bautista Angelo, JJ., concur.