[ G.R. No. L-7020. June 30, 1954 ] 95 Phil. 378
[ G.R. No. L-7020. June 30, 1954 ]
ALICIA GO, ET AL., PLAINTIFFS AND APPELLEES, VS. ALBERTO GO, ET AL., DEFENDANTS AND APPELLANTS. D E C I S I O N
BAUTISTA ANGELO, J.:
On December 18, 1951, plaintiffs brought an action in the Municipal Court of Manila to recover from defendants the possession of a house situated at 921 Dagupan St., Manila, and the sum of P2,000 as damages and P200.00 as attorney’s fees.
Defendants in their answer set up several special defenses and a counterclaim. The counterclaim was divided into three causes-of action as follows: the first is for P2,000 representing the value of certain furniture and equipment belonging to defendants and which are claimed to have been taken away by plaintiffs from the house in litigation; the second is for P1,000 representing expenses incurred by defendants arising from the falsity of the facts alleged in the complaint; and the third is for P500 as attorneys fees arising from the institution of the present action.
The court found for the plaintiffs, after due hearing, ordering defendants to vacate the house in litigation and to pay the costs, but denied the claim for damages both of plaintiffs and defendants on the ground that their amounts are beyond its jurisdiction. The defendants, in due time, perfected their appeal to the Court of First Instance, and after the latter had filed their answer as required by the rules, plaintiffs filed an amended complaint wherein they reiterated their original allegations with some slight modifications. To his amended complaint, defendants filed an amended answer reiterating the counterclaim they had alleged in their original answer which, as previously stated, has been divided into three causes of action involving an aggregate amount of P3,500.
Claiming that the amount involved in the counterclaim is beyond the jurisdiction of the Municipal Court, and, therefore, the Court of First Instance cannot act on it in the exercise of its appellate jurisdiction, plaintiffs filed a motion to dismiss under Rule 8, section 1 (a), of the Rules of Court. This motion was resisted by defendants, but the court, in its order issued on March 30, 1953, overruled the opposition and granted the motion to dismiss. Hence, this appeal.
Appellants, in their brief, present the question for determination in this appeal in the following wise:
“The issue involved in this appeal is purely a question of law: whether or not the counterclaim was within the jurisdiction of the Municipal Court, and, hence, whether or not the Court of First Instance has appellate jurisdiction thereon. We respectfully submit that the legal points involved are of paramount importance, as a definition is sought of the rule which should control, not only in the case at bar, but also in other cases, in the determination of the jurisdictional amount in case there are several causes of action: whether the jurisdiction is determined by the amount of each cause of action, or by the aggregate amount of the several causes of action; and whether in compulsory counterclaims the amount thereof is immaterial in the question of jurisdiction.” (Italics supplied).
A case that may throw light on the issue before us is A. Soriano & Co. vs. Gonzalo M. Jose, et al., 86 Phil. 523, decided on May 30, 1950, where various employees brought a joint complaint against their employer in the municipal court to collect a month salary each in lieu of 30 days’ notice. The question there decided was whether the jurisdiction of the municipal court is governed by the amount of each claim or by the aggregate sum of all the claims when there are several plaintiffs suing jointly but have independent causes of action. In that case, we held that “where several claimants have separate and distinct demands against a defendant or defendants, which may be properly joined in a single suit, the claims cannot be added together to make up the required jurisdictional amount; each separate claim furnishes the jurisdictional test.” The purpose of the rule permitting the joining of parties is to save unnecessary work, trouble, and expense, consistent with the liberal spirit of the new rules. This ruling, no doubt, applies with equal force to a counter claim in view of the similarity of rules applicable to both complaint and counterclaim.
The question that now rises is: Can this ruling be applied when there is only one plaintiff or one defendant, or several plaintiffs or defendants but with a common claim, divided into several causes of action involving transactions different one from the other? Stated in another way, does this ruling apply to a counterclaim set up by several defendants which have a common claim against the plaintiff divided into several causes of action for the reason that they arise from transactions one different from the other?
A case which may be considered on all fours with the present case is that of Villasenor vs. Erlanger & Galinger, 39 Phil., 574, wherein this Court, in discussing the test to be considered in determining the jurisdiction of a justice of the peace, laid down the following rule: “When a separate debt is due, it is demandable in a separate action. Therefore, neither a debtor nor a third party may plead lack of jurisdiction because the sum of two separate debts exceeds the amount for which action may be brought in a court of a justice of the peace. On the other hand, if a debt is single a creditor may not divide it for the purpose of bringing the case within the jurisdiction of a justice of the peace.” This case is authority for the statement that if a claim is composed of several accounts each distinct from the other or arising from different transactions they may be joined in a single action even if the total exceeds the jurisdiction of a justice of the peace. Each account furnishes the test. But if the claim is composed of several accounts which arise out of the same transaction and cannot be divided, the same should be stated in one cause of action and cannot be divided for the purpose of bringing the case within the jurisdiction of the justice of the peace.
The same rule obtains in the American jurisdiction. Thus, it has been generally held that “In order that two or more claims may be united to make the jurisdictional amount, they must belong to a class that under the statute will permit them to be properly joined in one suit, and not such as should be made the subject of independent suits; and where two or more causes of action are improperly united in one suit the amounts involved in the different causes’ cannot be added together so as to make an amount in controversy sufficient to confer jurisdiction on the court in which the suit is brought * * *. But, “in so far as causes of action which may be properly joined are concerned, and which concern all the parties litigants, there is, however, a lack of harmony on the question of whether or not their various amounts should be aggregated in order to determine the amount in controversy for jurisdictional purposes.” (21 C. J., pp. 76-78.)
In the last analysis, therefore, the question to be determined is whether the three causes of action into which the counterclaim of the defendants has been divided refer to transactions which should be stated separately, or transactions which have a common origin and should be joined in one cause of action for jurisdictional purposes. An analysis of the facts reveals that the three causes of action of the counterclaim are different one from the other, or at least the first is completely different and arises from a set of facts different from those which gave rise to the other two. The first refers to the recovery of the amount of P2,000 arising from the alleged unlawful taking by the plaintiffs of certain furniture and equipment belonging to the defendants; while the second and third causes of action arose, not from the illegal taking of property, but from the alleged unlawful institution by the plaintiffs of the action of ejectment in the Municipal Court. From this it can be seen that the first cause of action cannot be joined with the other two in one single claim because they arise from different sets of facts.
Another consideration that should be borne in mind is whether the counterclaim is compulsory or not. If it is, such as if it arises from, or is necessarily connected with, the facts alleged in the complaint, then that counterclaim should be set up regardless of its amount. Failure to do so would render it barred under the rules1. In this particular case, while the first cause of action cannot be considered compulsory because it refers to a transaction completely unrelated with the main claim, the second and the third belong to this class because they necessarily arise from the institution of the main action. Viewed in this light, it can be said that the counterclaim of the defendants should be deemed as coming within the jurisdiction of the municipal court, because the respective amounts, considered separately, do not exceed its jurisdiction. From all angles we view the order appealed from it would appear that it is unwarranted and has no legal basis.
Wherefore, the order appealed from is hereby set aside, without pronouncement as to costs.
Paras, C. J., Bengzon, Reyes, Jugo and Concepcion, JJ., concur.