[ G.R. No. L-6407. July 29, 1954 ] 95 Phil. 462
[ G.R. No. L-6407. July 29, 1954 ]
THE PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, PLAINTIFF AND APPELLEE VS. PASCUAL CASTRO, DEFENDANT AND APPELLANT. D E C I S I O N
BAUTISTA ANGELO, J.:
Apolonio Bustos, the complainant, was the head teacher of the barrio school of San Jose, Macabebe, Pampanga, and Pascual Castro, the accused, a teacher in said school. In the morning of January 19, 1952, while the complainant was on his way to the barrio chapel to hear mass he met a group of persons including the accused. The complainant invited the accused to hear mass but instead of accepting his invitation a discussion ensued in the course of which the accused gave the complainant a fist blow on the face causing him injuries which required medical attendance for a period of five days.
On April 14, 1952, a complaint for slight physical injuries was lodged by the complainant against the accused in the Justice of the Peace Court of Macabebe, Pampanga. After trial, the accused was found guilty as charged and sentenced to suffer fifteen days of arresto menor and to pay the costs. From this decision, the accused appealed to the Court of First Instance where he pleaded not guilty. Before trial on the merits, but after he had entered his plea, the accused moved to dismiss the charge on the ground that the crime had already prescribed. This plea was ignored, and after the presentation of evidence, the court rendered judgment reiterating the same penalty imposed upon the accused by the inferior court. Hence, this appeal.
The only issue to be determined is whether the lower court erred in not dismissing the information on the ground that the offense charged had already prescribed.
It appears that the incident which gave rise to the injuries now complained of occurred on January 19, 1952 while the corresponding criminal complaint was filed before the justice of the peace court on April 14, 1952, or after the period of two months had elapsed. And considering that a light offense prescribes in two months (article 90, Revised Penal Code), it is now contended that the crime had already prescribed and as such it cannot serve as basis of criminal prosecution.
The Solicitor General does not agree with this contention. He claims that, since the accused failed to move to quash before pleading, he must be deemed to have waived this defense under rule 113, section 10, of the Rules of Court.
The rule thus invoked in effect provides that if the accused does not move to quash the information before he pleads thereto, “he shall be taken to have waived all objections which are grounds for a motion to quash except when the complaint or information does not charge an offense, or the court is without jurisdiction of the same.” And one of the grounds on which a motion to quash may be predicated is that the criminal action or liability has been extinguished. (Section 2, paragraph f, rule 113.) On the other hand, the law provides that the criminal liability may be extinguished by prescription of the crime. (Article 89, Revised Penal Code).
The question that now arises is: Does the failure of the accused to move to quash before pleading constitute a waiver to raise the question of prescription at a later stage of the case?
A case in point is People vs. Moran, 44 Phil., 387. In that case, the accused was charged with a violation of the election law. He was found guilty and convicted and the judgment was affirmed, with slight modification, by the Supreme Court. Pending reconsideration of the decision, the accused moved to dismiss the case setting up the plea of prescription. After the Attorney General was given an opportunity to answer the motion, and the parties had submitted memoranda in support of their respective contentions, the court ruled that the crime had already prescribed holding that this defense can not de deemed waived even if the case had been decided by the lower court and was pending appeal in the Supreme Court. The philosophy behind this ruling was aptly stated as follows: “Although the general rule is that the defense of prescription is not available unless expressly set up in the lower court, as in that case it is presumed to have been waived and cannot be taken advantage of thereafter, yet this rule is not always of absolute application in criminal cases, such as that in which prescription of the crime is expressly provided by law, for the State not having then the right to prosecute, or continue prosecuting, nor to punish, or continue punishing, the offense, or to continue holding the defendant subject to its action through the imposition of the penalty, the court must so declare.” And elaborating on this proposition, the Court went on to state as follows:
“As prescription of the crime is the loss by the State of the right to prosecute and punish the same, it is absolutely indisputable that from the moment the State has lost or waived such right, the defendant may, at any stage of the proceeding, demand and ask that the same be finally dismissed and he be acquitted from the complaint, and such petition is proper and effective even if the court taking cognizance of the case has already rendered judgment and said judgment is merely in suspense, pending the resolution of a motion for a reconsideration and new trial, and this is the more so since in such a case there is not yet any final and irrevocable judgment.”
The ruling above adverted to squarely applies to the present case. Here, the rule provides that the plea of prescription should be set up before arraignment, or before the accused pleads to the charge, as otherwise the defense would be deemed waived; but, as was well said in the Moran case, this rule is not of absolute application, especially when it conflicts with a substantive provision of the law, such as that which refers to prescription of crimes. Since, under the Constitution, the Supreme Court has only the power to promulgate rules concerning pleadings, practice and procedure, and the admission to the practice of law, and cannot cover substantive rights (section 13, article VIII, of the Constitution), the rule we are considering cannot be interpreted or given such scope or extent that would come into conflict or defeat an express provision of our substantive law. One of such provisions is article 89 of the Revised Penal Code which provides that the prescription of crime has the effect of totally extinguishing the criminal liability. And so we hold that the ruling laid down in the Moran case still holds good even if it were laid down before the adoption of the present Rules of Court.
The learned dissenter opines that the Moran case has already lost its validity because at the time it was decided there was no rule prescribing waiver of prescription and, besides, this question was not raised and could not have been raised because the law was enacted only when the case was already pending in the Supreme Court. In other words, the learned dissenter is of the opinion that the Moran case cannot be invoked as authority because the question of waiver was not specially raised therein unlike the present case.
We cannot agree to this apprisal of the Moran case for precisely the ruling laid down therein was predicated upon the theory that the defense of prescription, even if not set up in its proper time, is not deemed waived it being an exception to the general rule. Thus, it was there said that, “Although the general rule is that the defense of prescription is not available unless expressly set up in the lower court, as in that case it is presumed to have been waived and cannot be taken advantage of thereafter, yet this rule is not always of absolute application in criminal cases * * *.”
It is true that the doctrine in the Moran case was not adhered to in the case of Santos vs. Supt. of the Phil. Training School for Girls, 55 Phil., 345, but that was because the plea of prescription was raised in a petition for a writ of habeas corpus. It has been held that such plea is not available “on an application for a writ of habeas corpus (16 C. J. 416), for the reason that “All questions which may arise in the orderly course of a criminal prosecution are to be determined by the court to whose jurisdiction the defendant has been subjected by the law, and the fact that a defendant has a good and sufficient defense to a criminal charge on which he is held will not entitle him to his discharge on habeas corpus.” (12 R. C. L. 1206.) [1] (Italics supplied). The Santos case did not nullify our ruling in the Moran case.
An attempt was made to maintain the case by showing that as a result of the incident in question a criminal complaint for attempted homicide was filed against the accused prior to the charge of slight physical injuries which was dismissed without prejudice and must have had the effect’ of interrupting the period of prescription; but this attempt cannot be given serious consideration it appearing that the date when the criminal complaint for attempted homicide was filed, does not appear in the record. The only data we have on hand is that the complaint was dismissed on March 27, 1952. The failure of the Government to furnish us sufficient data prevents us from concluding that the prescription period has not yet elapsed since the charge for attempted homicide may have been filed after March 20, 1952 and dismissed on March 27. Under the facts presently obtaining the only alternative is to dismiss the case as prayed for by the defense.
Wherefore, the judgment appealed from is reversed, and the case is dismissed, with cost de oficio.
Paras, C. J., Pablo, Padilla, Jugo, Labrador and Concepcion, JJ., concur.
Reyes, A.J., concurs in the result.