[ G.R. No. L-6301. October 30, 1954 ] 96 Phil. 88
[ G.R. No. L-6301. October 30, 1954 ]
THE MUNICIPAL GOVERNMENT OF CALOOCAN, PROVINCE OF RIZAL, PLAINTIFF AND APPELLEE, VS. CHOAN HUAT & CO., INC., DEFENDANT AND APPELLANT. D E C I S I O N
PADILLA, J.:
The Municipality of Caloocan, a public corporation, commenced proceedings in the Court of First Instance of Rizal to expropriate pursuant to the provisions of Republic Act No. 267 a parcel of land containing an area of 12,068 square meters, situated in barrio Calaanan, municipality of Caloocan, province of Rizal, owned by Choan Huat & Co., Inc., the corporate stock of which belongs mostly to Chinese citizens. The parcel of land is known as lot No. 2468, Cadastral Case No. 28, G.L.R.O. Cadastral Record No. 2577, for which transfer certificate of title No. 68756/T-223 was issued in the name of the corporation.
The defendant moved to dismiss the complaint on the ground that Republic Act No. 267 does not apply to small parcels of land as the one sought to be expropriated invoking the rule laid down in the case of Guido vs. Rural Progress Administration,[*] 47 Off. Gaz., 1848; that the persons for whose benefit this proceedings is instituted are intruders who unlawfully and forcibly entered upon the parcel of land and through stealth and strategy ousted the owner’s care taker therefrom; that an action for forcible entry was filed in the justice of the peace court of Caloocan against the intruders; that after hearing judgment was rendered against them which was being executed; that the delay in the execution of the judgment was due to dilatory tactics resorted to by the defendants; and that this expropriation proceedings was commenced for the purpose of frustrating the execution of the judgment in said case.
The Court entered an order dismissing the complaint with costs, on the strength of the rule laid down in the case of Guido vs. Rural Progress Administration, supra. A motion to set aside the order of dismissal was filed on the ground that the defendant corporation being owned by aliens is disqualified to acquire and hold title to lands under the rule laid down in the case of Krivenko vs. Register of Deeds,[*] 44 Off. Gaz., 471. The Court set aside the order of dismissal and ordered the parties to submit the names of commissioners to be appointed to appraise the value of the land in accordance with the Rules of Court. After hearing, the commissioners submitted their report against which no opposition was filed. The Court disregarded the commissioners’ report that found from P10 to P30 to be the reasonable market value of the different parts of the parcel of land and fixed at P5 per square meter as the market value of the parcel of land sought to be expropriated and held it sold in eminent domain to the plaintiff. No costs were taxed. From this judgment the defendant corporation has appealed.
Although the appellant discussed in its brief under the second assignment of error the unreasonableness of the market value fixed by the Court of the parcel of land sought to be expropriated, yet it did not waive its objection to the expropriation thereof under the rule laid down in the case of Guido vs. Rural Progress Administration, supra. In that case this Court held:
There are indeed powerful considerations, aside from the intrinsic meaning of section 4 of Article XIII of the Constitution, for interpreting Act No. 539 in a restrictive sense. Carried to extremes, this Act would be subversive of the Philippine political, and social structure. It would be in derogation of individual rights and the time-honored constitutional, guarantee that no private property shall be taken for private use without due process of law. The protection against deprivation of property without due process of law and against the taking of private property for public use without just compensation occupies the forefront positions (paragraphs 1 and 2) in the Bill of Rights (Article III). The taking of private property for private use relieves the owner of his property without due process of law; and the prohibition that “private property should not be taken for public use without just compensation” (section 1 [par. 2], Article III, of the Constitution) forbids by necessary implication the appropriation of private property for private uses (29 C. J. S., 819). It has been truly said that the assertion of the right on the part of the legislature to take the property of one citizen and transfer it to another, even for a full compensation, when the public interest is not promoted thereby, is claiming a despotic power, and one inconsistent with every just principle and fundamental maxim of a free government. (29 C. J. S., 820.)
- In. paving the way for the breaking up of existing large estates, trusts in perpetuity, feudalism, and their concomitant evils, the Constitution did not propose to destroy or undermine property rights, or to advocate equal distribution of wealth, or to authorize the taking of what is in excess of one’s personal needs and the giving of it to another. Evincing much concern for the protection of property, the Constitution distinctly recognized the preferred position which real estate has occupied in law for ages. Property is bound up with every aspect of social life in a democracy as democracy is conceived in the Constitution. The Constitution realizes the indispensable role which property, owned in reasonable quantities and used legitimately, plays in the stimulation of economic effort and the formulation and growth of a solid social middle class that is said to be the bulwark of democracy and the. backbone of every progressive and happy country.
The promotion of social justice ordained by the Constitution does not supply paramount basis for untrammeled expropriation of private land by the Rural Progress Administration or any other government instrumentality. Social justice does not champion division of property or equality of economic status; what it and the Constitution do guaranty are equality of opportunity, equality of political rights, equality before the law, equality between values given and received, and equitable sharing of the social and material goods on the basis of efforts exerted in their production. * * *. In reality, section 4 of Article XIII of the Constitution is in harmony with the Bill of Rights. Without that provision the right of eminent domain, inherent in the government, may be exercised to acquire large tracts of land as a means reasonably calculated to solve serious economic and social problems. * * *.
In a broad sense, expropriation of large estates, trusts in perpetuity, and land that embraces a whole town, or a large section of a town or city, bears direct relation to the public welfare. The size of the land expropriated, the large number of people benefited, and the extent of social and economic reform secured by the condemnation, clothes the expropriation with public interest and public use. The expropriation in such case tends to abolish economic slavery, fendalistic practices, endless conflicts between landlords and tenants, and other evils inimical to community prosperity and contentment and public peace and order. Although courts are not in agreement as to the tests to be applied in determining whether the use is public or not, some go so far in the direction of a liberal construction as to hold that public use is synonymous with public benefit, public utility, or public advantage, and to authorize the exercise of the power of eminent domain to promote such public benefit, etc., especially where the interests involved are of considerable magnitude. * * *.
The condemnation of a small property in behalf of 10, 20 or 50 persons and their families does not inure to the benefit of the public to a degree sufficient to give the use public character. The expropriation proceedings at bar have been instituted for the economic relief of a few families devoid of any consideration of public health, public peace and order, or other public advantage. What is proposed to be done ia to take plaintiff’s property, which for all we know she acquired by sweat and sacrifice for her and her family’s security, and sell it at cost to a few lessees who refuse to pay the stipulated rent or leave the premises.
No fixed line of demarcation between what taking is for public use and what is not can be made; each case has to be judged according to its peculiar circumstances. It suffices to say. for the purpose of this decision that the case under consideration is far wanting for those elements which make for public convenience or public use. It is patterned upon an ideology far removed from that consecrated in our system of government and embraced by the majority of the citizens of this country. If upheld, this case would open the gates to more oppressive expropriations. If this expropriation be constitutional, we see no reason why a 10-, 15-, or 25-hectare farm land might not be expropriated and subdivided, and sold to those who want to own a portion of it. To make the analogy closer, we find no reason why the Rural Progress Administration could not take by condemnation an urban lot containing an area of 1,000 or 2,000 square meters for subdivision into tiny Jots for resale to its occupants or those who want to build thereon. Pp. 1850-1854.)
The parcel of land sought to be expropriated in the case just mentioned had an area of 22,655 square meters. The rule laid down in that case was reiterated in Commonwealth vs. Borja,[*] G. R. No. L-1496, 29 November 1949, where the parcel of land involved contained an area of 10,565 square meters; City of Manila vs. Arellano Law
School,[1] 47 Off. Gaz., 4197, where the parcel of land involved comprised an area of 7,270 square meters; and Lee Tay & Lee Chay, Inc., vs. Choco,[2] G. R. No. L-3297, 29 December 1950, where the parcel of land comprehended an area of 900 square meters. In these cases this Court held that the parcels of land involved therein could not ,be expropriated for resale to the occupants, because the same do not come within the purview of the constitutional provision which authorizes “the expropriation of lands to be subdivided into small lots and conveyed at cost to individuals."[3] a Even Republic Act No. 1162, approved on 18 June 1954, which authorizes the City of Manila to expropriate lands, applies only to landed estates or haciendas which have been and are actually being leased to tenants. This last Act is a further indication of the intent and purpose of Congress not to allow the expropriation of small parcels of land. The fact that the parcel of land is owned by a corporation the stock of which belongs mostly to Chinese citizens would not authorize the exercise of the power of eminent domain under Republic Act No. 267. If the corporation is disqualified to own land under the rule laid down in the Krivenko case because of alienage of the owners of its corporate stock, the exercise of the power of eminent domain is not the proper proceedings to divest it of its title. Besides, condemnation proceedings is brought upon the postulate that the defendant owns the property to be expropriated. It is an inconsistency to recognize and at the same time deny the ownership or title of the person to the property sought to be expropriated. As the municipal corporation that seeks to expropriate the parcel of land in question has no authority to condemn it, the hearing held by the commissioners to find out and determine its reasonable market value and the order of the Court fixing such value at P5 per square meter are a nullity and should be set aside.
The judgment appealed from declaring the parcel of land sold in expropriation to the plaintiff municipal corporation and the setting aside of the order of dismissal are annulled and the order of the Court dismissing the complaint is revived, without pronouncement as to costs.
Paras, C. J., Bengzon, Montemayor, Jugo, Bautista Angelo, Concepcion, and Reyes, J. B, L., JJ., concur.