[ G.R. No. L-5758. March 30, 1954 ] 94 Phil. 680
[ G.R. No. L-5758. March 30, 1954 ]
ISIDRO DE LEON, PETITIONER, VS. HONORABLE DOMINGO IMPERIAL, ET AL., RESPONDENTS. D E C I S I O N
BAUTISTA ANGELO, J.:
Petitioner was one of the candidates for councilor of the municipality of Makati, Province of Rizal, in the elections held on November 13, 1951. There were eight councilors to be elected and as a result of the canvass made by the board of canvassers on November 18,1951, petitioner occupied the eighth place and was proclaimed elected, having obtained 3,160 votes. On April 12, 1952, or four months and twenty-four days after petitioner’s proclamation, Fortunato Gutierrez, hereafter designated as respondent, filed a petition in the Commission on Elections alleging that due to a mistake in addition the municipal board of canvassers credited petitioner with 3,160 votes when in fact he obtained only 3,060 votes, whereas respondent obtained 3,098 votes, or a majority of 38 votes over petitioner. Respondent prayed that the municipal board of canvassers be ordered to make a new canvass and a new proclamation declaring him the eighth councilor-elect in lieu of petitioner.
On May 26, 1952, petitioner filed a motion to dismiss alleging among other things that the Commission on Elections has no power to order the correction asked for on the ground that the period within which it could be made has already prescribed. This motion was denied and the Commission directed the municipal board of canvassers to reconvene and recanvass the election returns as prayed for, and, having found that respondent had polled more votes than petitioner, proclaimed the former eighth councilor-elect of Makati.
The present petition, as amended, seeks the annulment of this proclamation as illegal and the reinstatement of petitioner to the office of eighth councilor of Makati. And, incidentally, it may be stated, that petitioner has, in addition, filed in the Court of First Instance of Rizal an election protest dated June 2, 1952, contesting the election of respondent.
The only question posed in this petition is whether the Commission on Elections has the power to order the municipal board of canvassers of Makati to correct a mistake committed in addition in the canvass it has made after the candidate erroneously proclaimed had assumed office and the period to contest his election had expired.
The powers of the Commission on Elections are defined in the Constitution. It provides that it “shall have exclusive charge of the enforcement and administration of all laws relative to the conduct of elections and shall exercise all other functions which may be conferred upon it by law. It shall decide, save those involving the right to vote, all administrative questions, affecting elections, including the determination of the number and location of polling places, and the appointment of election inspectors and of other election officials.” (Art. X, Section 2.) The Revised Election Code supplements what other powers may be exercised by said Commission. It is clear that powers not expressly or impliedly granted to it are deemed withheld.
In a municipal election, the board of inspectors counts the votes, makes a statement of the count, proclaims the result of the election, and issues a certificate of the number of votes polled by each candidate. After the announcement of the result, the board of inspectors “shall not make any alteration or amendment in any of its statements, unless it be so ordered by a competent court” (Section 154, Revised Election Code).
The municipal board of canvassers shall meet immediately after the election, shall count the votes cast for each candidate and proclaim as elected those who have polled the largest number of votes. The board shall not recount the ballots nor examine any of them but shall proceed upon the statements presented to it. In case of contradictions or discrepancies between the copies of the same statements, the same may be corrected by the Court of First Instance of the province, upon motion of the board or of any candidate affected. (Section 168, in connection with Section 163, Revised Election Code.)
The above constitute the only pertinent provisions regarding the canvass and proclamation of municipal officials. They clearly postulate that any alteration or amendment in any of the statements of election, or any contradiction or discrepancy appearing therein, whether due to clerical" error or otherwise, cannot be made without the intervention of a competent court, once the announcement of the result of the election, or the proclamation of the winners, had been made. These provisions are all-inclusive in the sense that the power to authorize the correction can only be made by a competent court. They reject the idea, as now entertained by respondent, that such error can be ordered corrected by the Commission on Elections by virtue of its constitutional power to administer the laws relative to the conduct of elections.
That the above is the correct interpretation of the law seems to be implied from the cases decided by this Court (Galvez vs. Miranda, et al., 36 Phil., 316, 320; Cordero vs. Judge, 40 Phil., 246). Thus, it was held that “when it appears that the board of canvassers has failed or refused to perform a purely ministerial duty, then mandamus is the proper remedy. If the board of canvassers should, for example in its return, show that A had received a majority of the votes cast and, in the face of that fact, declare that B had been elected, certainly it should be required to make its certificate conform with the facts stated in its return. Under such circumstances, and in the face of such facts, A cannot be considered the person elected to the office in question. Mandamus is the most effective and expeditious remedy for such error.” (Municipal Council of Las Piñas vs. Judge of the Court of First Instance of Rizal, 40 Phil., 279, 282-284.)
But in order that the remedy of mandamus may be available, it is necessary that it be asserted within the two-week period within which an election may be contested. After that period has elapsed, the right of the candidate proclaimed to the office is deemed vested. The reason is obvious. This period is jurisdictional, as it has the effect of divesting a losing candidate of his remedy to contest the election. This is what this Court in effect said when in a recent case it made the following pronouncement:
“Before the proclamation of election, any candidate may petition the Court of First Instance to recount the votes cast in any precinct in case of discrepancies between copies of statements of election (Sections 163 and 168, Revised Election Code). After the proclamation, any candidate may file an election protest within two weeks (Section 174, idem.). These specific legal provisions logically compel any candidate, within short time limits, to seek in the Court of First Instance the corresponding relief against the regularity of a canvass of election, and to the same extent relieve the Commission on Elections from the duty of conducting similar investigations.’ (Ramos vs. Commission on Elections,[*] 45 Off. Gaz., Supp. No. 9, 345, 347.)
The theory entertained by the respondent tends to circumvent this mandatory provision which limits the period within which an election contest should be filed. This is the result which the action of the Commission on Elections has led into in the present case. It appears that Isidro de Leon, petitioner herein, was proclaimed councilor-elect by the municipal board of canvassers on November 18, 1951, but four months and twenty-four days thereafter, or on April 12, 1952, the defeated candidate, Fortunato Gutierrez, petitioned the Commission on Elections to order said board to make a recanvass of the votes alleging a clerical mistake, and this was done on May 31, 1952, thereby proclaiming Fortunato Gutierrez as the winner. The result was that Isidro de Leon filed an election protest within the legal period counted from the last proclamation disputing the legality of the election of Gutierrez. If we will hold that the Commission on Elections has acted properly, as entertained by the respondent, the inevitable result would be that the election contest was filed within the statutory period. This is a clear circumvention of the law which is destructive of the very essence and spirit which underlies the summary nature of an election proceeding while it sets a precedent which enlarges to a dangerous extreme the, administrative powers conferred upon the Commission on Elections by the Constitution. We cannot subscribe to such unwarranted interpretation.
Wherefore, the petition for certiorari is granted, with costs against respondent. The new proclamation made on May 31,1952 is hereby set aside and the original proclamation made on November 18, 1951 should stand.
Paras, C, J., Pablo, Bengzon and Labrador, JJ., concur.