[ G.R. No. L-4933. August 06, 1953 ] 93 Phil. 595
[ G.R. No. L-4933. August 06, 1953 ]
PLACIDO NACUA, PETITIONER-CLAIMANT, VS. INTESTATE OF ZACARIAS ALO, DECEASED. AMPARO ALO DE BELTRAN, RESPONDENT-ADMINISTRATIX. D E C I S I O N
MONTEMAYOR, J.:
Petitioner Placido Nacua is appealing from a decision of the Court of Appeals reversing an order of the Court of First Instance of Negros Oriental in Special Proceedings No. 533 of that Court for the settlement of the intestate estate of Zacarias Alo. The facts in this case are not disputed. On July 30, 1941, a decision was rendered in civil Case No. 1503 of the Court of First Instance of Cebu, sentencing defendant Zacarias Alo to pay to plaintiff Placido Nacua the sum of P810 with legal interest from October 22, 1940 and costs. Alo perfected an appeal to the Court of Appeals, docketed as C.A.-G.R. No. 9542, The Pacific War came and during said war Alo died. After liberation, special proceedings No. 533 already mentioned were instituted in the Court of First Instance of Negros Oriental for the settlement of the estate of Alo, and his daughter Amparo Alo de Beltran was appointed special administratrix. Upon inquiry by Nacua’s counsel as regards the status of the appeal made by Alo, the Court of Appeals replied that the records of that Court had been burned or lost during the war. It is a fact that none of the parties asked for the reconstitution of said records. Consequently, said parties nay be regarded as having waived their right to the reconstitution of the records destroyed. On April 28, 1947, Nacua’s counsel filed a claim in special proceedings No. 533 of the Court of First Instance of Negros Oriental, on the basis of the decision in Nacua’s favor in Civil Case No. 1503, for P810. On December 16, 1948, said counsel sent to the probate court a certified copy of the decision in Civil Case No. 1953, and on December 18, 1948, the probate Court issued an order allowing the claimant “two weeks to ascertain whether the decision in said case is already final and executory.” On May 12, 1949, acting upon a motion filed by Nacua in Civil Case No. 1503, the Court of First Instance of Cebu issued an order stating that said court was of the opinion that the decision rendered in said case was already final and for that reason ordered its execution. In pursuance thereof, a writ of execution dated May 17, 1949, was issued by the clerk of court, and was transmitted to the provincial sheriff of Negros Oriental. On July 13, 1949, the Court of First Instance of Cebu, acting upon a motion to vacate the writ of execution, set aside its previous order of May 12, 1949, on the ground that according to the Rules of Court, a judgment against a deceased person should be presented as a claim in the proceedings for the administration of his estate, and so gave Nacua permission to present a claim for the amount of said decision, in special proceedings No, 533 of Negros Oriental. In the same order the Cebu Court reiterated its belief and holding that said decision was final and executory. On July 14, 1949, Nacua filed an amended application for the approval of his claim in special proceedings No. 533. It was opposed by special Administratrix Amparo Alo de Beltran. Ruling upon said amended application and the opposition thereto, the probate court approved the claim of Nacua and ordered the administratrix to pay him the sum of P810 with legal interest from October 22, 1940. Failing to secure a reconsideration of said order, the special administratrix appealed to the Court of Appeals which, as already stated, reversed the decision or order appealed from, on the ground that the decision of the Cebu Court in favor of Nacua for P810 was pending appeal and therefore could not be sufficient basis for the probate court to grant the claim. The appellate court said that the failure of the administratrix of the estate of Alo to ask for reconstitution constituted waiver, and so “the other party was free to take his action anew.” The present appeal by certiorari is from that decision of the Court of Appeals. There is no question that inasmuch as the decision in civil case No. 1503 of the Cebu Court was properly appealed to the Court of Appeals, said decision did not become final and executory. Now, what was the effect of the failure of both parties, appellant and appellee, to ask for the reconstitution of the records of the Court of Appeals destroyed during the war? One theory is that it was the duty and to the interest of the appellant to have the records reconstituted in order to keep the appeal alive and prevent the appealed decision from becoming final. Another theory is that it was to the interest of the appellee to have the records reconstituted because the judgment was in his favor. However, inasmuch as this Court has already ruled on this question in several cases,[1] to the effect that it is the duty of both parties to ask for the reconstitution, we deem it unnecessary to elaborate on this point. But the most important question to be determined is the effect of failure to reconstitute the records on appeal in the Court of Appeals, on the status of the case in its entirety. Where the records in the appellate court as well as in the Court of First Instance are destroyed and are not reconstituted, it is clear that there is no recourse left to the parties but to litigate anew, and a new action may be filed. But what about a case where the records in the appellate court were lost or destroyed and were not reconstituted, but the records in the court of first instance are intact and complete? In this connection, we should state that from the records now before us, we understand that the records in the Court of First Instance are intact, and to confirm our understanding we had our Clerk of Court write the Cebu Clerk of Court on this point. Clerk of Court Vicente E. Jota of the Court of First Instance of Cebu, in his answer dated July 4, 1953, informs us that the records of Civil Case No, 1503, “Placido Nacua vs. Zacarias Alo” are still intact. In the case of Ambat vs. Director of Lands, supra, a land registration case where the Director of Lands appealed to the Court of Appeals a decision of the Court of First Instance of Davao ordering the registration of a parcel of land in favor of the applicant, and where the records in the appellate court were destroyed and not reconstituted by the parties, this tribunal citing the case of Claridad vs. Novella, supra, held that pursuant to the provisions of section 29 of Act No. 3110, the parties due to their failure to have the appeal records reconstituted were understood to have waived their right to the reconstitution and they should file their respective actions anew. Section 29 of Act No. 3110 reads thus:
“SEC. 29. In case the parties interested in a destroyed record fail to petition for the reconstitution thereof within the six months next following the date on which they were given notice in accordance with section two hereof, they shall be understood to have waived the reconstitution and may file their respective actions anew without being entitled to claim the benefits of section thirty-one hereof.”
After further study of the question involved in the cases above mentioned, we are inclined to modify the ruling therein made in the sense that section 29 of Act No. 3110 should be applied only where the records in the Court of First Instance as well as in the appellate court were destroyed or lost and were not reconstituted, but not where the records of the Court of First Instance are intact and complete, and only the records in the appellate court were lost or destroyed, and were not reconstituted. One reason for this view is that section 29 of Act 3110 is found among the sections and provisions dealing with the reconstitution of records in the Court of First Instance in pending civil cases, special proceedings, cadastral cases and criminal cases. A study of Act 3110 and the marginal notes as published in Public Laws will show that there are separate procedures for the reconstitution of records in the Justice of the Peace Courts, from Sec. 48 to Sec. 53; for the reconstitution of records in the Supreme Court, now including the Court of Appeals, from Sec. 54 to Sec. 74; for the reconstitution of records in the Office of the Register of Deeds, from Sec. 75 to Sec. 90 and for the reconstitution of destroyed records in the Courts of First Instance, from Sec. 1 to Sec. 47, under which sections, Sec. 29 is obviously comprehended. The whole theory of reconstitution is to reproduce or replace records lost or destroyed so that said records may be complete land court proceedings may continue from the point or stage where said proceedings stopped due to the loss of the records. The law contemplates different stages for purposes of reconstitution. In the case of Obien de Almario vs. Fidel Ibañez, et al., 81 Phil. 592, 46 Off. Gaz., Supp. No. 1, p. 396, we said:
“It will be noted that Act No. 3110 provides separate procedures for the reconstitution of civil cases pending in the Courts of First Instance and for the reconstitution of those pending in the Supreme Court on appeal. (Cf. sections 6 and 7 and 64.) Different sections of the Act cover different stages in which the cases were found at the time the records were destroyed. Thus, section 4 covers the stage where a civil case was pending trial in the Court of First Instance at the time the record was destroyed or lost; section 6 evidently refers to the stage where the trial had been concluded but the case had not been decided at the time the stenographic notes were destroyed or lost; section 7 covers the stage where the case had been tried and decided but was still pending in the Court of First Instance at the time the record was destroyed or lost; and section 64 covers the stage where the case was pending in the Supreme Court (or Court of Appeals) at the time the record was destroyed or lost.”
If the records up to a certain point or stage are lost and they are not reconstituted, the parties and the court should go back to the next preceding stage where records are available, but not beyond that; otherwise to ignore and go beyond the stage next preceding would be voiding and unnecessarily ignoring proceedings which are duly recorded and documented, to the great prejudice not only of the parties and their witnesses, but also of the court which must again perforce admit pleadings, rule upon them and then try the case and decide it anew,—all of these, when the records up to said point or stage are intact and complete, and uncontroverted. But during our deliberations on this case, it was suggested that all the prejudice and trouble incident to the filing of a new action as ordered in the case of Ambat vs. Director of Lands and as desired to be done here by the minority are all due to the fault and the failure of the parties to ask for reconstitution as what happened in the present case. The idea conveyed seems to be that it is the penalty for said failure to reconstitute or to ask for reconstitution. This idea or theory is not without flaw. The law on reconstitution, Act No. 3110, was not promulgated to penalize people for failure to observe or invoke its provisions. It contains no penal sanction. It was enacted rather to aid and benefit litigants, so that when court records are destroyed at any stage of judicial proceedings, instead of instituting a new case and starting all over again, they may reconstitute the records lost and continue the case. If they fail to ask for reconstitution, the worst that can happen to them is that they lose the advantages provided by the reconstitution law. In this case, they lose the benefit of having the case at the stage of appeal. So they have to go back to the next stage where they started from in making the appeal, namely, the decision of the Court of First Instance and the complete records of said court. These records being intact, there is no occasion or necessity for reconstitution, so that even following the theory of penalizing parties, there being no need for reconstitution, there was no failure to penalize. And all the records in the Court of First Instance being complete, there is no reason why the parties may not start from there, and renew the appeal. On the other hand, to require the parties to file their action anew and incur the expenses and suffer the annoyance and vexation incident to the filing of pleadings and the conduct of hearings, aside from the possibility that some of the witnesses may have died or left the jurisdiction, and also to require the court to again rule on the pleadings and hear the witnesses and then decide the case when all along and all the time the record of the former pleadings of the trial and evidence and decision are there and are not disputed, all this would appear to be not exactly logical or reasonable, or fair and just to the parties, including the trial court which has not committed any negligence or fault at all. We believe that the rule laid down in the case of Lichauco et al. vs. Judge Lucero et al., 85 Phil., 466, 47 Off. Gaz., No. 7, p. 3544, is more applicable and is more just to the parties, besides being more in keeping with the spirit and intention of the law on reconstitution. In that case, where the records in the Court of Appeals were destroyed and were not reconstituted, but the records in the Court of First Instance were intact, we held that “rather than put the parties to the necessity of filing a new action and conducting a new trial, we would be serving the interests of justice if we let them continue the old case by allowing them to prosecute the appeal anew, giving them reasonable time for that purpose. In the course of our discussion of this case, the minority contended that to allow the estate of Alo to prosecute his former appeal anew would be authorizing reconstitution, after the period therefor has long expired. The contention is premised on a misunderstanding of the implication or consequence of a renewal of the appeal. It will by no means require or mean reconstitution of records, because the records in the Court of First Instance are complete and intact, and it is in that court where the appeal may be renewed. Reconstitution implies reproduction or replacement of records of the Cebu Court were not lost or destroyed; so there is nothing to reconstitute, and there is no occasion for reconstitution. It is also argued that to allow renewal of the appeal would be granting a remedy which the parties have not solicited and which was never in issue. We are not exactly granting a remedy. We are only stating and defining the rights of the parties, and the remedy to them available under the circumstances; and this we do, to correct the error committed by the Court of Appeals when it said that the remedy available was to bring a new actions an error which we believe, is based on an erroneous interpretation of the law on reconstitution and the spirit motivating it. In view of the foregoing, the decision of the Court of Appeals in so far as it reverses the decision appealed from, on the ground that the decision of the Cebu Court in favor of Nacua for P810 was pending appeal and so could not be sufficient basis for granting the claim filed before the Probate Court, is affirmed. It is reversed where it holds that Nacua has to file a new action. He does not have to. He already has a decision in his favor, though not yet final. The administratrix in Special Proceedings No. 533 of the Court of First Instance of Negros Oriental is given thirty days within which to file and perfect a new appeal from the decision of the Court of First Instance of Cebu in Civil Case No. 503, dated July 30, 1941. Upon failure to do so, the said decision will become final and executory and will be sufficient basis for the approval of Nacua’s claim against the estate of the deceased Zacarias Alo. No pronouncement as to costs. Bengzon, Padilla, Tuason, Reyes and Jugo, JJ., concur.