[ G. R. No. L-6512. June 19, 1953 ] 93 Phil. 363
[ G. R. No. L-6512. June 19, 1953 ]
JOSE D. VILLENA, PETITIONER VS. HON. MARCIANO ROQUE, ETC., ET AL., RESPONDENTS. [G. R. No. L-6540, June 19, 1953] THE MUNICIPAL COUNCIL OF MAKATI, RIZAL, ET AL., PETITIONERS, VS. HON. BIENVENIDO A. TAN, ETC., ET AL., RESPONDENTS. D E C I S I O N
JUGO, J.:
In view of the mutual relations of the two above entitled cases, they were submitted to this Court and considered together. In case G. R. No. L-6512, on December 16, 1952, the Provincial Fiscal of Rizal filed an information in the Court of First Instance of said province against Mayor Jose D. Villena charging him with falsification of a public document in criminal case No. 3874 of said court. On January 9, 1953, the court, after due trial, found him guilty and sentenced him to suffer imprisonment of from eight years, eight months and one day to nine years and eight months. On October 29, 1952, the complainant, Catalina Esteban, who considered herself an aggrieved party, filed with the Office of His Excellency, the President of the Philippines, administrative charges against said Mayor based on the falsification. On October 31, 1952, the Office of the President referred said charges to the Provincial Governor of Rizal for appropriate action. On December 17, 1952, the Office of the President addressed a communication to said Governor inviting his attention to the fact that an information had been filed in court against Mayor Villena, and on the same date the Governor suspended Mayor Villena. After the expiration of thirty days, that is, on January 16, 1953, the Governor reinstated him in accordance with section 2189 of the Revised Administrative Code. Inasmuch as the Provincial Board had not conducted any investigation of the charges, Catalina Esteban filed a petition with the Office of the President inviting his attention to that fact. On February 9, 1953, the Acting Executive Secretary, Marciano Roque, by authority of the President, addressed a communication to Mayor Villena, as follows:
“MANILA, February 9, 1953
“SIR: “Please be advised that His Excellency, the President, has decided, for the good of the public service, to take over and assume directly the investigation of the administrative charges against you, for falsification of public documents in connection with the lease of the Makati-Mandaluyong Ferry, engaging in the practice of law without previous permission, and extortion, which are now pending investigation before the Provincial Governor and the Provincial Board of that province, and to designate the Provincial Fiscal of Rizal as special investigator of this Office to conduct the investigation of the said charges. Copy of the designation of the said official as Special Investigator is enclosed, for your information. “In view of the serious nature of the aforementioned charges against you and in order to promote an orderly, fair, and impartial investigation thereof, you are hereby suspended from office effective immediately, your suspension to last until the termination of the administrative proceedings against you aforementioned. “The provincial Governor and the Special Investigator had been advised hereof.
“Respectfully,
“By authority of the President:
“MARCIANO ROQUE Acting Executive Secretary”
The Provincial Fiscal of Rizal was appointed by the Office of the President as investigator in the following communication:
“MANILA, February 9, 1953
“Sir: “Pursuant to the provisions of section 64 (c) of the Revised Administrative Code in relation to section 79 (c) of the same Code, you are hereby designated Special Investigator to conduct an investigation of the administrative charges against Mr. Jose D. Villena, Municipal Mayor of Makati, Rizal, for falsification of public documents in connection with the lease of the Makati-Mandaluyong Ferry, engaging in the practice of law without previous permission, and extortion. Copy of the original complaint for falsification of public documents is enclosed. You may request the Provincial Governor of Rizal or the Provincial Board to turn over to you all the papers regarding the said charges, attention being invited to the enclosed copy of our letter of even date to the Provincial Board. “In this connection, we wish to state that the respondent should be given sufficient notice in advance of the date and place of the investigation, and full opportunity to defend himself personally or by counsel. “Immediately after the investigation, please submit to this office the complete records of the aforesaid charges including the transcript of the stenographic notes and exhibits, together with your findings and recommendation.
“Respectfully,
“By authority of the President,
“MARCIANO ROQUE Acting Executive Secretary”
“The Provincial Fiscal Pasig, Rizal “Copy furnished:
“The Honorable The Secretary of Justice MANILA”
It will be noticed that the Fiscal was instructed in the above communication “that the respondent should be given sufficient notice in advance of the date and place of the investigation, and full opportunity to defend himself personally or by counsel.” Mayor Villena now comes to this Court praying that the Provincial Fiscal of Rizal be ordered to desist from proceeding with the investigation and that his (Villena’s) suspension be declared null and void. One of the points raised by the petitioner is that sections 2188 and 2190 of the Revised Administrative Code vest the power to investigate a municipal official in the provincial board. This power is not exclusive. As held in the case of Jose D. Villena vs. The Secretary of the Interior (67 Phil., 451, 452, 459, 460), (April 21, 1939) “the fact, however, that the power of suspension is expressly granted by section 2188 of the Administrative Code to the provincial governor does not mean that the grant is necessarily exclusive and precludes the Secretary of the Interior from exercising a similar power.”
“1. SECRETARY OF THE INTERIOR; EXECUTIVE SUPERVISION OVER THE ADMINISTRATION OF PROVINCES, MUNICIPALITIES, CHARTERED CITIES AND OTHEER LOCAL POLITICAL SUBDIVISIONS.—Section 79 (c) of the Administrative Code speaks of direct control, direction, and supervision over bureaus and offices under the jurisdiction of the Secretary of the Interior, but this section should br interpreted in relation to section 86 of the same Code which grants to the Department of the Interior “exclusive supervision over the administration of provinces, municipalities, chartered cities and other local political subdivisions.” “2. ID.; ID.; INVESTIGATION OF CHARGES; MEANING OF THE WORD “SUPERVISION”.—In the case of Planas vs. Gil (37 Off. Gaz., 1228) this court observed that “Supervision is not a meaningless thing. It is an active power. It is certainly not without limitation, but it at least implies authority to inquire into facts and conditions in order to render the power real and effective. If supervision is to be conscientious and rational and not automatic and brutal, it must be founded upon a knowledge of actual facts and conditions disclosed after careful study and investigation. The principle there enunciated is applicable with equal force to the present case. The Secretary of the Interior is invested with authority to order the investigation of the charges against the petitioner and to appoint a special investigator for that purpose. “3. ID.; ID.; ID.; SUPERVISION BY THE SECRETARY.—As regards the challenged power of the Secretary of the Interior to decree the suspension of the herein petitioner pending an administrative investigation of the charges against him, the question, it may be admitted, is not free from difficulties. There is no clear and express grant of power to the Secretary to suspend a Mayor of a municipality who is under investigation. On the contrary, the power appears lodged in the Provincial Governor by section 21SS of the Administrative Code which provides that “The provincial governor shall receive and investigate complaints made under oath against municipal officers for neglect of duty, oppression, corruption or other form of maladministration of office, and conviction by final judgment of any crime involving moral turpitude.” “4. ID.; ID.; ID.; POWERS OF THE PRESIDENT OF THE PHILIPPINES.— The fact, however, that the power of suspension is expressly granted by section 2188 of the Administrative Code to the Provincial Governor does not mean that the grant is necessarily exclusive and precludes the Secretary of the Interior from exercising a similar’ power. For instance, counsel for the petitioner admitted in the oral argument that the President of the Philippines may himself suspend the petitioner from office in view of his greater power of removal (sec. 2191, as amended, Administrative Code) to be exercised conformably to law.”
The case of Lacson vs. Hon. Marciano Roque, etc., et al., 92 Phil. 456 (49 Off. Gaz., [1] 93) is different from the present one, for the following reasons: (1) Lacson had only been indicted but not yet convicted; (2) Lacson was accused of libel which was not a misconduct in office; whereas in the present case, the petitioner was accused of falsification of a public document essentially in relation to the performance of his duties as mayor; and (3) Lacson was not subjected to an administrative investigation; whereas in the order appointing the Provincial Fiscal of Rizal to conduct the administrative investigation, the fiscal was enjoined to give the petitioner “sufficient notice of the date and place of the investigation, and full opportunity to defend himself personally or by counsel.” Section 2078 of the Revised Administrative Code clearly provides that the Governor-General (the President of the Philippines) has the power to suspend, and, if found guilty of disloyalty, dishonesty, oppression, or misconduct in office, after investigation, to remove any provincial officer including an elective governor (section 2082). If he can do this with regard to provincial officers, it stands to reason that he has also the same power with regard to municipal officers.
* * * * * * *
In case G. R. No. L-6540, when Mayor Villena was suspended by order of the President, Bernardo Umali was the Vice-Mayor. He should, automatically, have assumed the office of Mayor, but he could not do so, because on November 16, 1952, the Municipal Council had suspended Bernardo1 Umali and Councilor Abundio Suck, under section 2223 of the Revised Administrative Code, for alleged “disorderly conduct” which consisted in that Umali and Suck objected to and protested against the minutes of the Municipal Council in which it was made to appear that the council had ratified and validated the contract entered into in behalf of the Municipality of Makati by Mayor Jose D. Villena, by means of the falsified public document above mentioned. The Provincial Governor of Rizal appointed Ignacio Babasa the Councilor who had received the highest number of votes, as acting Mayor. It is evident that the objection and protest made by Umali and Suck did not constitute, in any way, “disorderly conduct.” The Office of the President ordered the reinstatement, of Umali as vice-mayor and Suck as councilor, but this order was ignored. Bernardo Umali and Abundio Suck filed a petition with the Court of First Instance of Rizal, in which, in addition to the principal remedy for their reinstatement, they prayed for a preliminary mandatory injunction to restore them to their offices. After the filing of the proper bond the judge issued said order. The petitioners herein filed a motion with the Court of First Instance asking for the dissolution of the preliminary injunction. The court denied the motion for dissolution and ordered the arrest of Ignacio Babasa for contempt for not complying with the injunction, but he was allowed to appeal to this court with the filing of a bond. The petitioners now ask this court for the annulment of the order of preliminary mandatory injunction and the order of contempt. They contend that the lower court had no jurisdiction to issue said injunction. There are cases where a mandatory injunction may be issued in order to restore the parties to the status quo. In the case of the Manila Electric Railroad and Light Company vs. Del Rosario, et al., (22 Phil., 433, 434), Doroteo Jose was suspected by the company of misappropriating electric current. He was accused of theft but was acquitted. Notwithstanding this acquittal, the company tried to collect the value pf the alleged misappropriated current from him and upon his refusal, it cut-off the service. This court issued a preliminary mandatory injunction to compel the company to continue furnishing current until the question of the misappropriation should have been finally determined. In the present case, the petitioners by arbitrarily and illegally charging Umali and Suck with “disorderly conduct”, suspended Umali from his position of vice-mayor to prevent him from assuming the office of acting mayor upon the suspension of Mayor Villena. In the case of Laxamana vs. Baltazar, 92 Phil. 32, it was decided that the vice-mayor, by operation of law, assumes the office of acting municipal mayor during the suspension of the mayor, and the Provincial Governor has no power to designate anyone else to such position. The mandatory injunction was properly issued by the court below in order to place vice-mayor Umali in the position of acting mayor from which he was ousted without cause, pending the final determination of the question as to who is entitled to discharge the duties of Mayor. This is even a stronger case than that of the Manila Electric Railroad and Light Company vs. Del Rosario, et al., just cited. In view of the foregoing, the petition in each of the two cases above mentioned-G. R. Nos. L-6512 and L-6540 is denied with costs against the petitioners. So ordered. Paras, C. J., Pablo, Bengzon, Padilla, Montemayor, Reyes, Bautista Angelo and Labrador, JJ., concur.