[ G. R. No. L-5794. July 23, 1953 ] 93 Phil. 487
[ G. R. No. L-5794. July 23, 1953 ]
THE PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, PLAINTIFF AND APPELLEE, VS. MAMERTO DE LA CRUZ, DEFENDANT. BENIGNO ILAGAN, CHRISTOPHER VALENCIA AND TIMOTEO VALENCIA, SURETIES AND APPELLANTS. D E C I S I O N
TUASON, J.:
This appeal is from an order of the Court of First Instance of Quezon for the appellants, as sureties for an accused who had escaped, to show cause why the bail bond should not be forfeited, and another order denying their motion to be discharged as sureties. The bail has not actually been forfeited and much less have the appellants been required to pay the amount thereof, but it is assumed that they would be unless the orders on appeal were set aside. The facts are not in dispute. It will be well to sacrifice brevity in the recital of the facts the better to understand and appreciate the main issue and the discussion that will follow. The main issue is whether the actions of the sureties, of the court, and of the government, to be presently set forth, worked to cancel the bail or exonerate the appellants. Mamerto de la Cruz was charged with theft of large cattle in the court of justice of the peace of Tagkawayan, Province of Quezon, by reason of which on December 31, 1946, he put up a bond of P1,500 signed by the three appellants herein. Preliminary investigation of the complaint was conducted on January 2, 1947, after which, on the same date, the defendant was bound over to the Court of First Instance for trial. The Provincial Fiscal filed an information on January 9, and the case was set for arraignment of the accused for January 31. Meanwhile, i.e., on December 24, 1946, the Justice of the Peace of Paracale, Camarines Norte, had issued a warrant for the arrest of the same defendant, also for thefts of large cattle, which warrant a squad of constabulary soldiers headed by one Sergeant Andres Agustin from Camarines Norte came to Tagkawayan to execute. Appraised of that fact, the sureties surrendered De la Cruz to the Mayor of that municipality, and that official took him into custody and forthwith turned him over to the Justice of the Peace, who in turn delivered him over to the constabulary soldiers from the adjacent province. Then and there, in a writing dated January 14, 1947, Sgt. Agustin acknowledged receipt of the prisoner and further stated, among other matters: “Subject to action by superior authorities, I undertake to bring back the person of said Mamerto de la Cruz to Tagkawayan, Quezon, whatever may be the result of the investigation to be made by the Justice of the Peace of Paracale, Camarines Norte, so that said accused may be transmitted to Lucena, Quezon, to answer for the criminal case No. 656 of that court.” Let us return to developments in Lucena. Notice of the order setting the case for arraignment for January 31 was sent on January 16 by the Provincial Sheriff to the Chief of Police of Tagkawayan as ex-oficio Deputy Sheriff for service to the bondsmen. On January 18, the Chief of Police of Tagkawayan returned the notice to the Provincial Sheriff with the information that the bondsmen “refused to sign the subpoena because the accused Mamerto de la Cruz is held for trial at the Justice of the Peace Court of Paracale, Camarines Norte.” Thereupon, on January 20, the Clerk of Court of Quezon transmitted the notice direct to the Chief of Police of Paracale, Camarines Norte, but none to the bondsmen, who from this time on were bypassed. On January 25, the Chief of Police of Paracale returned the notice to the Court of First Instance of Quezon stating that Mamerto de la Cruz was being detained in the provincial jail at Daet, Camarines Norte, awaiting trial. The Paracale Chief of Police added that the cases with the accused had been elevated to the Court of First Instance at Daet on the 18th of January by the Justice of the Peace of Paracale. The Chief of Police attached to his communication a copy of the receipt of the prisoner signed by the Clerk of Court of Camarines Norte. On February 1, the Clerk of Court of Quezon wrote the Provincial Warden at Daet, Camarines Norte, for confirmation of the Paracale Chief of Police’s communication, with a request for an early reply, and on February 6, the Provincial Warden answered “that Mamerto de la Cruz was already confined in the provincial jail of Daet, Camarines Norte, since January 18, 12:30 p.m., 1947.” In view of the defendant’s arrest and detention in Camarines Norte, on February 11 Judge Antonio Cañizares of the Court of First Instance of Quezon reset the case in an order of the following tenor: “Apareciendo del informe del Alcaide Provincial de Daet, Camarines Norte, que el acusado Mamerto de la Cruz se halla detenido en la carcel provincial de dicha provincia, se señala la vista de esta causa para el dia 25 de Marzo de 1947, a las ocho y media de la mañana.” On the same date His Honor appointed an attorney de oficio to defend the defendant. On his part the Clerk of Court forwarded to the Provincial Sheriff of Camarines Norte at Daet, for service on Mamerto de la Cruz, notice in judicial form No. 65 informing the prisoner that his case was set for arraignment and hearing for March 25th. For reasons not disclosed by the record, on February 13, the arraignment and hearing was ordered postponed for March 31 and notice of the postponement was forwarded on February 14 by registered mail to the Provincial Sheriff of Camarines Norte for service on Mamerto de la Cruz. On February 17, the Provincial Sheriff through a deputy returned the notice to the Clerk of Court of Quezon with the information that it had been duly served. On February 26, Mamerto de la Cruz escaped from the provincial jail at Daet. Unaware, apparently, of that escape, the Provincial Fiscal of Quezon moved for postponement of the arraignment and hearing from March 31 to another date, alleging that he was “contemplating to conduct a reinvestigation of the case to secure additional evidence,” and the court ordered that the case be included in the next April calendar. Nothing seems to have been done on the case until December of the same year (1947), when notice was sent by the Clerk of Court of Quezon by registered mail to the Provincial Sheriff of Camarines Norte for service on the prisoner through the Provincial Warden. On December 18, the Provincial Warden informed the Camarines Norte Provincial Sheriff that the prisoner had escaped in February (ten months ago), which information was transmitted to the Quezon Court of First Instance on the same date. Because of that information, so it seems, trial of the case in Lucena was set for February 23, 1948, and from that date postponed to March 17. On the latter date Judge Arguelles, then presiding, having “been informed by the fiscal that the accused had escaped,” had the case dropped from the calendar until further assignment, and ordered the arrest of the escaped prisoner. Still no order to produce the accused or notice of the hearing was given the sureties. In an order dated December 10, 1948, the case was put on the calendar for January 10, 1949, by Honorable Victoriano, now the presiding Judge. Before the latter date, the Fiscal filed a motion for an indefinite postponement of the trial because of the prisoner’s escape. Nevertheless, on the scheduled date, January 10, the case was called. It was then that the bondsmen were given by Judge Victoriano 30 days within which to show cause why the bail should not be forfeited. In the same order His Honor, Judge Victoriano, noted that the bondsmen had refused to sign the subpoena on the ground that they had already withdrawn as such. In United States vs. Bonoan, 22 Phil., 1, it was held that it was a good defense in an action on a bail bond for the sureties to allege that the indicted person was, when his production was ordered, in prison in another province for another offense. The facts of that case were substantially identical with those of the instant case. As summarized in the syllabus of the decision they were as follows: Mandac was allowed bail by the Court of First Instance of Ilocos Norte while his case was on appeal in the Supreme Court from a sentence for homicide. While at liberty, he committed the crime of bandolerismo in Nueva Vizcaya, for which he was arrested. His appeal having been declared deserted by the Supreme Court, the sentence was remanded for execution. At the precise time the lower court called upon his bondsmen for his appearance, their principal was under arrest in Nueva Vizcaya, whose authorities refused to surrender him to the said bondsmen. The Solicitor General would distinguish between that case and the case at bar because “the sureties in the Bonoan case could have produced the accused in court were it not for the refusal by the provincial authorities of Nueva Vizcaya to surrender him.” In other words, Bonoan and his fellow-sureties made an effort to bring Mandac from Nueva Vizcaya while the sureties here did nothing of the sort. It is not easy to see how the failure of the appellants herein to claim Mamerto de la Cruz from the authorities of Camarines Norte can influence the result of this appeal. In the first place, the unsuccessful attempt by Mandac’s sureties to get their principal was not the ratio decidendi of the judgment or the underlying reason for exonerating them. In the second place, law does not require the useless or the impossible. The Camarines Norte authorities could hardly be expected to let the bondsmen have the prisoner if they had demanded his custody for the purpose of presenting him to the Court of First Instance of Quezon Province. As a matter of fact, it was the court alone which could demand the transfer of the accused to Quezon; and the court far from doing something in that direction, appeared from all indications to be satisfied with holding the case before it until the Camarines Norte cases were finished. It is pointed out that the appellant did not surrender the accused to the court as provided by section 16 of Rule 110, according to which, “upon application filed with the court and after due notice to the fiscal, the bail shall be cancelled and the sureties discharged from liability (a) where the sureties so request upon surrender of the defendant to the court; * * *.” But this Rule has no bearing on the case, in our opinion. Manifestly it has in view a situation where the prisoner is at the disposal of his sureties and these wish to be released from their obligation on the bond before its terms are broken. The sureties’ rights, duties, and liabilities after the prisoner has absconded, or when for one reason or another he cannot be found, must be controlled by other statutory provisions or by the general principles of contract. Bail is nothing but a contract. (U. S. vs. Bonoan, supra) In consonance with these principles, “It is the settled law of this class of cases that the bail will be exonerated where the performance of the condition is rendered impossible by the act of God, the act of the obligee, or the act of law.” (Taylor vs. Taintor, 83 U. S., 366, cited in U. S. vs. Bonoan, supra). And so the Court reasoned on Bonoan’s appeal:
“The United States, the plaintiff in the homicide case against Mandac, was the obligee in the bond. The same plaintiff and obligee caused the arrest and confinement of Mandac in Nueva Vizcaya on a charge of bandolerismo and refused to surrender him to the appellants. It would be against all principle of equity and justice to allow the Government to recover against the sureties for not producing their principal when it had itself placed the principal beyond their reach and control. There was an implied covenant on the part of the Government when the bond was accepted that it would not in any way interfere with the due compliance of the conditions in the bond or take any proceeding against the principal which would affect the rights of the sureties. Reese vs. U. S., 13, citing Rathbone vs. Warren, 10 Jones 586; etc.
* * * * * * *”
“The Government had a perfect right to arrest and hold Mandac in the Province of Nueva Vizcaya on the charge of bandolerismo. It also had the right to decline to surrender him to these appellants. But it cannot by these acts prevent the fulfillment of the conditions in the bond by the sureties, and at the same time force the sureties to pay the amount of the bond.”
What material differences there are between the Bonoan case and the case at hand will be found to improve the herein appellants’ position. As already noted, soon after Mamerto de la Cruz was arrested in Tagkawayan and conducted to Camarines Norte—to be exact, on January 18 (the escape took place on February 26)—the sureties refused to accept service of notice of hearing and informed the court through the Provincial Sheriff that their principal was being held for trial in other cases in Camarines Norte, and gave the court to understand that, for that reason, they could not effect his appearance and were not obligated to do so. And from that time on the court dealt directly and exclusively with Camarines Norte officials, not bothering any more in any manner with the sureties. The court did not tell the sureties to produce the defendant until 1949, more than two years after his escape and after it had notice of the escape. When the accused was still in jail the court did not insinuate to the sureties that they should go and fetch him. If it had, it is to be presumed that the sureties would have followed the indication, much as they realized the futility and senselessness of the step. As it was, the court by its action led the sureties into believing, and these had every reason to believe all that time, that what they had done was enough and that their connection with the case had been terminated. From this standpoint, incidentally, the Government may rightly be considered estopped by laches. If this appeal must be decided within the confines of section 16 of Rule 110, as the appellee would have it, the preceding circumstances and discussion could supply the argument that the appellants did substantially comply with the terms of their undertaking. It has been seen that if the sureties did not bring the person of the accused to court, which they were powerless to do due to causes brought about by the Government itself, they did the next best thing by informing the court of the prisoner’s arrest and confinement in another province and impliedly asking that they be discharged. On its part, the court, by keeping quiet and, indeed, issuing notices of the hearings direct to the prisoner through the Sheriff of Camarines Norte and ignoring the sureties, impliedly acquiesced in the latter’s request and appeared to have regarded the accused surrendered. All signs combined to give the impression that the court in reality had that precise notion and intent. As to the Provincial Fiscal, no notice of the sureties’ desire to be discharged was furnished him. But there is every reason to believe that he learned of all that happened. Having control of the case, he must have known of its various continuances and the reasons therefor. What is more, notice to the Provincial Fiscal of the sureties’ request for discharge would have been a useless formality. There is no suggestion that office would have opposed or could have done anything to change the bondsmen’s status and responsibility or otherwise protect the interest of the Government if he had been given formal notice. And again, the Government can not very well complain that the prosecuting officer was not informed in writing of De la Cruz’s detention in Camarines Norte and the bondsmen’s desire to be relieved of all obligation, when it itself, through other agencies, effected the detention. Lastly, the Fiscal appears to have been satisfied with the manner in which the sureties proceeded in the premises, as evidenced by his making no move whatever to have them brought to account. The order to the sureties to explain why their bail should not be forfeited was of the court’s own initiative, even in disregard of the Fiscal’s motion to continue the scheduled trial indefinitely. Unversed in the manners of court and law, the appellants may not have followed the prescribed procedure to the letter, but they tried with all the diligence at their command to live up to their commitment the best they knew how and the court and the Government’s representative acquiesced in what they had done and the form in which they had acted. One important point to be kept in mind in this discussion is that sureties are said to be favorites of the law. Assuming an obligation without any thought of material gain, except in some instances, all presumptions are indulged in their favor. This rule is especially to be adhered to with respect to bail, which is a right ensured by the Constitution as a matter of the highest public concern and policy. Accordingly it is the judgment of this Court that the appellants should be discharged as sureties for Mamerto de la Cruz, and it is so ordered, without costs. Paras, C. J., Pablo, Bengzon, Padilla, Reyes, Jugo, Bautista Angelo and Labrador, JJ., concur.