[ G.R. No. L-5094. August 07, 1952 ] 91 Phil. 750
[ G.R. No. L-5094. August 07, 1952 ]
JUAN JABON, ALEJANDRO DIGAL, CANDIDO JABON, AND PAULINO JABON, PETITIONERS, VS. HIPOLITO ALO, JUDGE OF FIRST INSTANCE OF BOHOL AND SATURNINO ALIAS CATA LINO YTEM, RESPONDENTS. D E C I S I O N
BAUTISTA ANGELO, J.:
This is a petition for certiorari with preliminary injunction seeking to nullify an order of respondent Judge entered on August 11, 1951. Saturnino alias Catalino Ytem filed an action against Juan Jabon and three other persons praying that he be declared owner of a parcel of land containing approximately an area of four hectares. Defendants, in turn, prayed that Juan Jabon be declared owner of the property and that the claim of the plaintiff for damages be denied. On March 13, 1950, Judge Jose Querubin, then presiding the court, after trial, rendered judgment, the dispositive part of which reads:
“In view whereof, the Court declares the defendant Juan Jabon the owner of the portion of land described in his tax declaration No, 13439, having an extension of 2 hectares 07 areas and 36 centares and indicated in the report of the commissioner and his sketch, Exhibits X and X-1, as the portion covered by angles A, B, C, D, and back to A and the rest of the portions covered by tax declarations, Exhibits D, E, and F, belong exclusively to the plaintiff, without special pronouncement as to costs”.
This decision became final for lack of appeal, and so on May 8, 1950, a writ of execution was issued ordering the defendants to vacate the portion of the land adjudicated to the plaintiff. As defendants resisted the execution, plaintiff asked the court to declare them in contempt, but Judge Jose Veluz, then presiding the court, denied plaintiff’s motion, ruling that the writ of execution was not in accordance with the dispositive part of the decision. On August 6, 1951, or after the lapse of more than a year since the decision had become final, plaintiff moved that the dispositive part of the decision be amended by including therein an order directing the defendants to vacate the land adjudicated to the plaintiff, and notwithstanding the vigorous opposition of defendants, the respondent Judge, Hon. Hipolito Alo, entered an order on August 11, 1951, which practically amended the decision, for in said order he directs that defendants should vacate the land and should deliver its possession to the plaintiff. The case is now before this Court on a petition for certiorari, defendants contending that the respondent Judge acted in excess of his jurisdiction. As may be noted from the dispositive part of the decision which appears quoted in the early part of this decision, the court merely declares plaintiff owner of the portions of the land under litigation which are not covered by the area of 2 hectares, 07 areas and 36 centares adjudicated to defendant Juan Jabon. It does not give plaintiff any other relief, much less it orders plaintiff to be placed in possession of the land adjudicated to him. It later developed, however, that when plaintiff attempted to execute that part of the judgment rendered in his favor, a portion of the land was occupied by the defendants, and the latter had their houses built thereon. And because the decision contains no directive for their ejectment, they resisted the execution. The question now that arises for determination is whether that decision, which has become final and executory more than a year ago, can still be amended by adding thereto a relief not originally included, such as the delivery of the possession of the land and the ejectment therefrom of the defendants. Our answer is in the negative. Rule 39, section 45, provides that “that only is deemed to have been adjudged in a former judgment which appears upon its face to have been so adjudged, or which was actually and necessarily included therein or necessary thereto”. Here there has been only a declaration of ownership. No other relief is awarded to the plaintiff. In the absence of any other declaration, can we consider a mere declaration of ownership as necessarily including the possession of the property adjudicated? We do not believe so, for ownership is different from possession. A person may be declared owner, but he may not be entitled to possession. The possession may be in the hands of another either as a lessee or a tenant. A person may have improvements thereon of which he may not be deprived without due hearing. He may have other valid defenses to resist surrender of possession. We, therefore, hold that a judgment for ownership, does not necessarily include possession as a necessary incident. In a similar case, this Court held:
“It may be admitted that the judgment absolving defendant Talens was in effect a declaration that the sale to him was valid. It may also be admitted, though with some reluctance or reservation, that it was a declaration of ownership of the lot. But it is doubtful whether it also included a direction to surrender it to him. Although it is true that the owner is generally entitled to possession, it is equally true that there may be cases where the actual possessor has some rights which must be respected or denned. A lessee is not the owner; yet a declaration of ownership in another person does not necessarily mean his ouster. Touching the case at bar, if the possessor Garcia had made necessary improvements for which he is entitled to compensation, an order of possession would deprive him of such payment without having had an opportunity to claim for them and prove their value. His Honor, the trial judge, obviously foresaw this possibility among others, and refused to decree the restitution, taking ‘into consideration that said decision (of the Court of Appeals) seems not to close all the doors for the parties to protect their respective interests, if they still have any.’ “Consequently, we hold that the judgment of the Court of Appeals in G. R. No. 3221-R absolving Talens from the complaint did not include an order for delivery of possession of the land. The petition is denied, with costs”. (Talens vs. Garcia et. al. 47 Off. Gaz. [Supp. to No. 12], pp. 358, 360-361.)
Consequently, we hold that the order of respondent Judge dated August 11, 1951, is null and void, it having been issued in excess of his jurisdiction. Petition is hereby granted, with costs. The preliminary injunction issued is declared final. Paras, C. J., Bengzon, Montemayor, and Labrador, JJ., concur.