[ G.R. No. L-4941. July 25, 1952 ] 91 Phil. 649
[ G.R. No. L-4941. July 25, 1952 ]
A. L. AMMEN TRANSPORTATION CO., INC., PETITIONER VS. BICOL TRANSPORTATION EMPLOYEES MUTUAL ASSOCIATION AND COURT OF INDUSTRIAL RELATIONS, RESPONDENTS. D E C I S I O N
TUASON, J.:
This is an application for certiorari to review and set aside a portion of the decision of the Court of Industrial Relations, ordering A. L. Ammen Transportation Co., Inc. “to continue its former practice of allowing check-off to petitioning union whose affiliates have already filed with the management of the respondent company their corresponding authority to make the necessary deductions from their monthly earnings.” The facts, not denied, which led to the questioned order are thus stated in respondents’ brief:
“On September 15, 1950, the Undersecretary of Labor certified to this Court that a labor dispute exists ‘Between the Alatco and its workers numbering 308 who are affiliated to the Bicol Transportation Employees Mutual Aid Association, a legitimate labor organization duly registered in this department under C. A. No. 213’. The aforesaid certification by the Department of Labor was due to its failure to settle amicably the ‘Alatco’ employees’ strike of September 14, 1950 which lasted until September 19, 1950 when the Honorable Presiding Judge of the respondent Court of Industrial Relations ordered the reopening of the business of the ‘Alatco’ and the return of the employees involved in the strike effective September 20, 1950, under the same terms and conditions of employment existing before the strike. In the meantime, the Honorable Presiding Judge of the respondent court ordered the ‘Bitemaa’ to submit a more detailed petition to embody all unsolved disputes not amicably settled in the conciliation proceedings effected on September 19, 1950; and In compliance therewith a petition dated November 3, 1950 was filed and received by the respondent court on November 9, 1950. After proper hearing and after considering the parties’ evidence on record, the respondent Court rendered its decision in Case No. 506-V dated April 26, 1951 embodying the disposition on Demand No. 4 now involved in the present proceedings and quoted in Annex ‘1’ of respondent court’s answer.”
The burden of the petitioner’s argument is that the Court of Industrial Relations acted in excess of jurisdiction and contrary to law, in that, it is alleged, “there is no law in the Philippines which authorizes the Court of Industrial Relations to compel an employee to practise check-off against his will.” The grounds of attack require a statement of the law creating the Court of Industrial Relations and of the rules of pleading and practice provided therefor. Section 4 of Commonwealth Act No. 103 provides that “The court shall take cognizance for purposes of prevention, arbitration, decision and settlement, of any industrial or agricultural dispute causing or likely to cause a strike or lockout, arising from differences as regards wages, shares or compensation, hours of labor or conditions of tenancy of employment, etc.” Section 13 provides that “In making an award, order or decision, under the provisions of Section four of this Act, the Court shall not be restricted to the specific relief claimed or demands made by the parties to the industrial or agricultural dispute, but may include in the award, order or decision any matter or determination which may be deemed necessary or expedient for the purpose of settling the dispute or of preventing further industrial or agricultural disputes.” And by Section 20 “the Court shall act according to justice and equity and substantial merits of the case, without regard to technicalities or legal forms and shall not be bound by any technical rules of legal evidence but may inform its mind in such manner as it may deem just and equitable.” It will be seen at once that these powers are comprehensive. While section 4 specifically speaks of wages, shares or compensation, and while these are the principal sources of industrial and agricultural conflicts, the Court’s authority is by no means confined to them. “Conditions of tenancy or employment” (Sec. 4) and contingencies too numerous to be conveniently detailed in a statute or thought of in advance had to be met and settled. To settle disputes and prevent crippling strikes and lock-outs, besides the improvement of labor standards, are the paramount objectives of the law, and such conditions and contingencies are the matters envisaged by the all-embracing provisions of the aforequoted sections. In consonnance with these principles, sick leave, maternity leave, hospitallzation, and other privileges having no direct relation to wages, shares or compensation, have been regarded without dissent as proper subjects of award. We perceive nothing so peculiar In checkoff that it can not be taken cognizance of by the Industrial Court. On the contrary, the practice of deducting dues from wages and payment of the amounts deducted over to the union appears to be more germane to wage fixing than are vacation leave or the defraying of hospitallzation expenses by the management. That check-off is a normal incident of employment is best illustrated by the fact that the same had been the subject of agreement between the parties herein and put into practice, the court’s order being no more than that it be continued. Since the order of which the petitioner complains was promulgated, Republic Act No. 602, otherwise known as Minimum Wage Law, has been approved. This enactment confirms in a more explicit fashion the idea that check-off is a legitimate dispute for arbitration. The law goes further in that it makes, we suppose, the practice compulsory on the part of the employer under certain conditions. Section 10 of Republic Act No. 602 provides that
(b) Wages, including wages which may be paid retroactively for whatever reason, shall be paid directly to the employee to whom they are due, except:
(3) In cases where the right of the employees or his (their) union to checkoff has been recognized by the employer or authorized in writing by the individual employees concerned.
It may be noted that sub-paragraph (3) consists of two clauses. Our understanding of this provision, which is none too clear, is that the two clauses are independent of each other, each denoting a separate meaning. In other words, check-off may be enforced with the consent of the employer or by authority in writing by the employees. When the union and the employer agree, the attitude of the employees is immaterial. When the employees duly authorize the check-off, as provided by the last clause, the employees consent is unnecessary and its recognition of the right is obligatory. If this were not so, if in any ca se the employer’s conformity were essential, it would have to be concluded that the second clause is superfluous and meaningless, for the first clause already provides for such conformity as a condition precedent. At any rate, Republic Act No. 602 is a clear signal that check-off is one of the matters affecting labor-management relations which the Court of Industrial Relations may include in an award, order or decision. And since the order in question was to be prospective its operation, the court in banc did not, in our opinion, err in applying the said Act to the present case. On the economic and practical side, petitioner complains that the practice imposes an extra burden on the employer. This alone is no reason for opposing the arrangement. Wage increases, reduction of working hours, sick leave, hospitalization and other privileges granted to the employed entail diminution of profits and additional duties and obligations to an extent much greater than the inconvenience and additional expense involved in the adoption of the check-off system. In fact, the circumstances of this case make said adoption more compelling than in ordinary cases. The petitioner is operating in four provinces comprising nearly the whole Bicol region. The employees, the majority of whom are affiliates of the respondent labor union, are scattered in these provinces. It is not difficult to see how much easier and less expensive it is for the company to handle the collection of membership dues than it would be for individual members to make remittances to their union’s office, or for the union to send out collectors in so wide a territory. The extra work and expense incurred by the company in deducting from its employees’ salaries the amounts the employees owe their with union are small in comparison with the savings in time and money by the union and the employees, savings which can not fail, to effect increased efficiency and redound to the benefit of the employer itself in the long run. In the adjustment of industrial conflicts concessions have to be made and some rights have to be surrendered, or enforced if necessary in the interest of conciliation and peace. The system of check-off is avowedly primarily for the benefit of the union and only indirectly of the individual laborers. However, the welfare of the laborers depends directly upon the preservation and welfare of the union. It is the union which is the recognized instrumentality and mouthpiece of the laborers. Only through the union can the laborers exercise the right of collective bargaining and enjoy other privileges. Without the union laborers are impotent to protect themselves against “the reaction of conflicting economic changes” and maintain and improve their lot. To protect the interests of the union ought therefore to be the concern of arbitration as much as to help the individual laborers. The objection that the respondent labor union’s permit to operate as such under Commonwealth Act No. 213 had been cancelled has become moot by the fact that said union has been re-registered as an organization in good standing. The petition is denied with costs. Paras, C. J., Pablo, Bengzon, Bautista Angelo, and Labrador, JJ., concur.