[ G.R. No. L-4708. June 30, 1952 ] 91 Phil. 536
[ G.R. No. L-4708. June 30, 1952 ]
VALENTIN R. MALINAO, PETITIONER, VS. JUAN L. BOCAR, AS JUDGE OF FIRST INSTANCE OF CEBU, JOSE AVILA, DIEGO CAÑIZARES AND JESUS AVILA, RESPONDENTS. D E C I S I O N
BAUTISTA ANGELO, J.:
This is a petition for certiorari seeking the annulment of an order of respondent Judge dated February 9, 1951, admitting the third party complaint filed by Jose Avila and requiring the clerk of court to issue the corresponding summons to Valentin R. Malinao, Jesus Avila and Diego Cañizares who were made parties-defendants thefein and to require them to answer within the reglementary period. The court granted the writ of preliminary injunction prayed for in the petition upon petitioner filing a bond in the amount of P500. On June 15, 1950, Valentin R. Malinao filed an action against Jose Avila in the municipal court of Cebu to recover his commission of 5 per cent on the first payment received by the latter from the received by the latter from the Philippine War Damage Commission in accordance with an agreement entered into between them. On June 20, 1950, Jose Avila filed an answer with a counterclaim stating therein that the plaintiff is not entitled to recover the commission he is claiming as the whole work necessary for the approval of his claim with the Philippine War Damage Commission had been undertaken by his son Jesus Avila and his son-in-law Diego Cañizares, the intervention of the plaintiff having consisted merely in typing the claim and in submitting it to said office, praying as a consequence thereof that the amount of P1,242.87 he had advanced to the plaintiff be returned to him, with the corresponding legal interests. After trial on the merits, at which both parties have presented their evidence, the court rendered judgment for the plaintiff ordering the defendant to pay in full the amount prayed for in the complaint. After the case had been elevated on appeal to the Court of First Instance, Jose Avila reiterated the answer he had filed in the municipal court, which was later amended, and on December 12, 1950, he filed a motion asking for authority to file a third party complaint against the plaintiff and his two children, Jesus Avila and Diego Cañizares, alleging therein that it becomes necessary that his two aforesaid sons be made, parties-defendants for the reason that these two had claimed from him the payment of the same commission daimed by the plaintiff in his complaint and that, notwithstanding his willingness to pay the commission allowed by law, he cannot very well do so because of the conflicting claims of his two sons on one hand and the plaintiff on the other. The court having granted the motion despite the vigorous objection interposed thereto by the plaintiff, the latter recurs now to this Court contending that the respondent Judge has committed an abuse of discretion in granting the motion. It should be noted that when this case was decided on the merits by the municipal court of Cebu, defendant Jose Avila presented as witnesses his son Jesus Avila, and his son-in-law Diego Cañizares, who testified to substantiate the claim of Jose Avila that all the work relative to the preparation concerning his claim with the Philippine War Damage Commission had been prepared by his said two sons, and not by the plaintiff, and, therefore, plaintiff is not entitled to the commission of 5 per cent he is claiming in the complaint. But when the case was elevated to the Court of First Instance, defendant Jose Avila, not contended with reiterating his special defense relative to the alleged services rendered by his two sons, filed a third party complaint in which he prayed that his two sons be made parties-defendants for the reason that they had claimed from him the same commission subject-matter of the action and, therefore, there is need for them to intervene to determine the merits of their conflicting claims. In our opinion, this step is not necessary, being merely a dilatory move, because the conflicting claims, if any, existing between the two sons of the defendant on one hand and the plaintiff on the other, could be as well threshed out by presenting the oft-mentioned sons as witnesses at the trial as it was done by the defendant in the municipal court. If after the presentation of the evidence the court finds that the claim of the defendant is true and the commission authorized by law should be given to his two sons, the only alternative left to the court would be to dismiss the complaint and authorize the defendant to pay the commission to his two sons. There is no need of any third party complaint, nor of any action for interpleading, as defendant has done in the present case. Moreover, the circumstances obtaining in this caae.clearly point to the conclusion that this attempt made by the defendant to bring his two sons into this case is but an eleventh hour scheme to defeat the claim of the plaintiff. Thus, while this case was pending in the municipal court, the defendant did not allege in his answer that his two sons demanded from him the payment of the 5 per cent commission authorized by law because of the alleged services rendered by them in connection with his claim with the Philippine War Damage Commission. He merely contended that much of the work concerning the prosecution of said claim was done by them and not by the plaintiff for which reason he is strongly opposed to the payment of the commission claimed by him. It is only now that he avers for the first time that his sons had demanded payment of the commission claimed by the plaintiff and so he wants them to intervene as parties in this case. However, we are skeptic about this claim of the defendant and have reasons to doubt his sincerity in view of the fact that, according to the decision of the municipal court from which this case originated, the two sons of the defendant refused to receive any amount from him for the services they have rendered, which circumstance indicates that this alleged claim of the two sons has been conceived only in the last minute in an attempt to defeat the claim of the plaintiff. Another reason why in our opinion this petition for interpleading should not be entertained is the fact that such a move was taken by the defendant for the first time in the Court of First Instance. This petition for interpleading is tantamount to a new defense not set up in the court of origin because its purpose is to see that the commission subject of the complaint be paid not to the plaintiff but to the sons of the defendant. This is a defense which the defendant never raised in the municipal court. The same cannot now be raised for the first time In the Court of First Instance under the well known principle that in cases appealed from an inferior court to a Court of First Instance the parties can neither change the cause of action or defenses they have pleaded in the inferior court nor add new ones in their pleadings, even if the case is to be tried de novo.
“As above stated, with the exception of the complaint, the parties must file new pleadings in the Court of First Instance, and, of course, the plaintiff may also file an amended complaint, if he so desires, and the question arises as to whether the parties may, in such new pleadings, change or amend the causes of action or defenses that have been pleaded in the inferior court. The Supreme Court laid down the following rulings: (1) The parties cannot allege in their pleadings in the Court of First Instance causes of action or defenses of which the inferior court had no jurisdiction. (2) The parties cannot allege in their new pleadings causes of action or defences that have not been pleaded in the inferior court. For instance, plaintiff in the inferior court sought, in his complaint, the recovery of possession of a building and a lot. In his amended complaint in the Court of First Instance, he cannot claim, in addition thereto, damages for illegal possession by the defendant of the building and the lot. And, if the defendant in the inferior court pleaded no special defense, he cannot, in his answer in the Court of First Instance, plead a special defense founded on the improvements he had made on the property. (3) The parties in the Court of First Instance cannot, in their new pleadings, change the nature of the causes of action or defenses pleaded in the inferior court.” (Moran, Comments on the Rules of Court, Vol. 1, 3rd ed. p. 800).
For the foregoing reasons, we are of the opinion that the respondent Judge has abused his discretion in issuing the order subject of the present petition for certiorari. Wherefore, the court hereby sets aside the order of the respondent Judge dated February 9, 1951, admitting the third party complaint filed by respondent Jose Avila, with costs against said respondent. The writ of injunction issued is hereby declared final. Paras, C. J., Feria, Pablo, Bengzon, Tuason, and Montemayor, JJ., concur.