G.R. No. L-4683

OLIMPIO NEÑARIA, HIPOLITO MACAMAY, MOISES MACAMAY, EPIFANIO NOGUERA, AND SANTOS GATASI, PETITIONERS, VS. HON. JOSE P. VELUZ, JUDGE OF THE COURT OF FIRST INSTANCE OF MISAMIS ORIENTAL, RESPONDENT. D E C I S I O N

[ G.R. No. L-4683. May 29, 1952 ] 91 Phil. 473

[ G.R. No. L-4683. May 29, 1952 ]

OLIMPIO NEÑARIA, HIPOLITO MACAMAY, MOISES MACAMAY, EPIFANIO NOGUERA, AND SANTOS GATASI, PETITIONERS, VS. HON. JOSE P. VELUZ, JUDGE OF THE COURT OF FIRST INSTANCE OF MISAMIS ORIENTAL, RESPONDENT. D E C I S I O N

JUGO, J.:

This is a petition for certiorari against the Judge of the Court of First Instance of Misamis Oriental, praying that the order of the respondent Judge denying the petitioners’ motion for dismissal be annulled and that said court be declared without jurisdiction. On November 12, 1948, an information for serious physical injuries was filed in the Justice of the Peace court of Mambajao, Misamis Oriental (Criminal Case No. 7103), against Ariston Talan, Andres Ganas, and the herein petitioners, Olimpio Neñaria, Hipolito Macamay, Epifanio Noguera, and Santos Gatasi. On April 7, 1949, when the case was set for preliminary investigation, the accused moved that the Justice of the Peace court try the case on the merits, but said motion was denied. After conducting the preliminary investigation, the Justice of the Peace, in its order of April 27, 1949, dismissed the case against Ariston Talan and Andres Baganas, and forwarded the case to the Court of First Instance of Misamis Oriental, with respect to the other accused, the herein petitioners. The information for the same offense was filed in the Ceurt of First Instance of Misamis Oriental on June 14, 1949, and the case was set for trial thereafter. After the prosecution and the defense had introduced their evidence, the herein petitioners, on March 9, 1951, filed a motion to introduce additional evidence which the court granted on March 15, 1951. However, instead of presenting such evidence, the petitioners filed a motion to dismiss alleging that the Court of First Instance of Misamis Oriental had no jurisdiction to try the case. As the motion to dismiss was denied, the petitioners instituted the present proceedings. In the present case, the Justice of the Peace court had concurrent jurisdiction with the Court of First Instance to try the case on the merits and render decision thereon. An accused has a right to a preliminary investigation. To follow the contention of the petitioners, it would result that if a case over which a Justice of the Peace court and a Court of First Instance have concurrent jurisdiction on the merits is set for preliminary investigation before the Justice of the Peace, then the latter must necessarily try the case on the merits. As preliminary investigations are generally held by Justices of the Peace, the result would be that the Courts of First Instance would have no occasion to try this kind of cases on the merits, notwithstanding their concurrent jurisdiction. It is said that when several courts have concurrent jurisdiction, the first court which acquires jurisdiction retains it to the exclusion of the others. This is a true principle, but in the present case the justice of the peace court acquired jurisdiction for the purposes of the preliminary investigation and not for trial on the merits, for if by holding a preliminary investigation the Justice of the Peace necessarily acquires exclusive jurisdiction to try the case on the merits, the Court of First Instance would in fact and in effect be deprived of its concurrent jurisdiction on the merits in practically all cases of this kind. The cases of People vs. Pegarum (58 Phil. 715), People vs. Blanco[1] (47 Off. Gaz., No. 7, p. 3425), People vs. Palmon[2] (47 Off. Gaz., Supp. No. 12, p. 29), and Natividad et al. vs. Robles, etc. (87 Phil., 834), are not applicable, for in the present instance, the case was forwarded by the Justice of the Peace after the preliminary investigation, to the Court of First Instance, and the latter proceeded with the trial of the case on the merits, receiving the evidence of the prosecution and the defense and then the petitioners filed a motion for the presentation of additional evidence which was granted, but instead of doing so, the accused moved for the dismissal of the case on the ground that the Court of First Instance had no jurisdiction, whereas in the case of People vs. Pegarum, supra, the court declared that if the information was filed in the Court of First Instance for the crime the penalty for which was within the jurisdiction of said court at the time the crime was committed, even if the penalty was afterward lowered so as to bring it within the jurisdiction of the Justice of the Peace court, still the Court of First Instance may proceed with the trial on the merits, which is not the question raised in the present case. In the case of People vs. Blanco, supra, the Court of First Instance erroneously declared itself with jurisdiction in the case of theft of an article valued at P28.00, for the reason that habitual delinquency was alleged in the information which raised the penalty to beyond six months imprisonment and/or P200 fine. It is clear that the doctrine of said case has no bearing here. In the case of People vs. Palmon, supra, the Court of First Instance dismissed the case without even sending it to the Justice of the Peace court, believing that it had no jurisdiction over the crime charged, when as a matter of fact it had concurrent jurisdiction. This Court ordered in said case the Court of First Instance to proceed with the trial of the case without requiring that it be returned to the Justice of the Peace court, which must have held previously the preliminary investigation. That case is essentially different from the present one, for the reason that in the case at bar the court correctly took jurisdiction and retained it almost up to the end of the trial, in accordance with the Palmon case. In the case of Natividad et al vs. Robles, supra, the Court of First Instance returned the case to the Justice of the Peace court, which had concurrent jurisdiction over the case. There was nothing erroneous in this act of the Court of First Instance, because as a matter of fact the Justice of the Peace court had concurrent jurisdiction. This is different from the present case, where the Court of First Instance having concurrent jurisdiction and having almost terminated the trial of the case and having denied its dismissal, still the petitioners ask this Court to order the court below to return the case to the Justice of the Peace court. In other words, in the Natividad vs. Robles case, the Court of First Instance returned the case to the Justice of the Peace, who, by virtue of his concurrent jurisdiction, could try the case on the merits, but in the present case the Court of First Instance retained the case over which it had concurrent jurisdiction and could proceed with it. To send back the present case to the Justice of the Peace court will cause unnecessary delay and repetition of the evidence of both parties already presented to the Court of First Instance. In view of the foregoing, the petition is denied, with costs against the petitioners. It is so ordered. Pablo, Padilla, Tuason, and Reyes, JJ., concur.