[ G.R. No. L-4286. April 30, 1952 ] 91 Phil. 198
[ G.R. No. L-4286. April 30, 1952 ]
BERNARDINO MELENCIO, PETITIONER, VS. THE COURT OF INDUSTRIAL RELATIONS, ET AL., RESPONDENTS. D E C I S I O N
PARAS, C.J.:
In 1934 the petitioner, Bernardino Melencio, entered into an oral contract ot tenancy with the respondents, Belen Rivera, Eladio Rivera, Titay Lanuza, Juanita Rivera, Imelda Rivera, Caridad Rivera and Vicente Rivera, for the cultivation of a parcel of land belonging to the respondents, located in the barrio of Duhat, Municipality of Santa Cruz, Province of Laguna, and having an area of about thirteen hectares. Eleven hectares of the land is dedicated to the planting of rice, while the remainder is coconut land. On May 27, 1949, the respondents filed with the Tenancy Law Enforcement Division, Department of Justice, a complaint praying that they be authorized to eject the petitioner on the ground that he had not paid in full the agreed annual rental of 140 cavanes of palay to the respondents. In the course of the investigation, the respondents invoked another ground for the petitioner’s ejectment, namely, that the latter, without the respondents’ consent, converted one hectare of coconut land into palay land and kept for himself all the produce thereof. The Tenancy Division rendered a decision dated December 15, 1949, authorizing the respondents to eject the petitioner as tenant-lessee, after the close of the agricultural year, subject to the provisions of sections 21 and 22 of Act No. 4054, as amended. The contention of the respondents that the petitioner had defaulted in the payment of the stipulated rentals was overruled, and the decision was premised solely on the ground that the petitioner, since 1946, had dedicated one hectare of coconut land to the planting of palay and appropriated for himself the produce thereof. Upon appeal by the petitioner, the Court of Industrial Relations affirmed the decision of the Tenancy Division. The petitioner has filed the present petition to review on certiorari the decision of the Court of Industrial Relations. The allegation of the respondents referring to the unpaid rentals, is now out of the question, since the Tenancy Division and the Court of Industrial Relations had ruled out the same and the respondents have not appealed. Our inquiry is limited to the alleged unauthorized conversion by the petitioner of one hectare of coconut land into rice-land. The petitioner admits that, from the year 1946, he planted palay on the spaces between the coconut trees growing on about one hectare of the land under his tenancy, and that he did not give any share of the palay produced on said portion to the respondents, because the latter’s share in the coconut products was already excessive and because the petitioner considered the palay produced on said spaces merely as a side crop, the expenses of which the petitioner alone shouldered. The theory of the Tenancy Division and the Court of Industrial Relations is that by planting rice on one hectare of coconut land in the manner admitted by the petitioner, without the consent of the respondents, the petitioner committed fraud and breach of trust, as he had no right to change the nature of the land held by him under tenancy. If there was in fact a conversion of the coconut land into palay land, the theory may be correct; but, in our opinion, in view of the admission that the coconut trees on the coconut land have never been cut or removed and that the petitioner merely planted rice on the spaces between the trees, no conversion actually took place. The existence of the coconut trees on the land preserves its character as coconut land. While the petitioner failed to obtain the previous consent of the respondents to the planting of palay on the spaces, this may be attributed to an honest misconception of the law or to a misunderstanding of his tenancy relations that led him to believe in good faith that he could raise palay on said spaces as a side crop. In this case there is no evidence tending to show the amount of palay harvested by the petitioner from the coconut land in question, but it is fair to suppose that palay would not thrive thereon, in view of the existence of the coconut trees which naturally place the ground below mostly under shade. We would not in this case take so shortsighted and strict a view as to penalize in effect industry and zeal for more production on the part of the tenant. Rather, we would encourage him to utilize in full the land under his cultivation in a manner, of course, that is equally just to the owner. Hence we are constrained to hold that there is no sufficient ground for the ouster of the petitioner, although he should be prohibited from hereafter planting palay on the coconut land without first obtaining the consent of the respondents. The appealed decision is therefore reversed, and the complaint for the ejectment of the petitioner filed by the respondents before the Tenancy Law Enforcement Division, Department of Justice, is hereby dismissed, it being understood that the petitioner is prohibited henceforth from planting palay on the coconut land without the previous consent of the respondents. So ordered without costs. Feria, Pablo, Bengzon, Padilla, Tuason, and Jugo, JJ., concur.