[ G.R. No. L-4229. May 29, 1952 ] 91 Phil. 456
[ G.R. No. L-4229. May 29, 1952 ]
DALMACIO FALCASANTOS, PLAINTIFF AND APPELLEE, VS. HOW SUY CHING, ETC., DEFENDANT AND APPELLANT. D E C I S I O N
PARAS, C.J.:
This is an action for legal redemption instituted in the Court of First Instance of Zamboanga by Dalmacio Falcasantos against How Suy Ching, as administratrix of the estate of the deceased Tan Kiok. The parties, without adducing any evidence, submitted the case on the pleadings. The court rendered judgment in favor of the plaintiff, ordering the defendant to convey to the plaintiff all the rights of the deceased Tan Kiok in Lots Nos. 154 and 52 mentioned in the complaint upon payment of the sum of P420. From this judgment the defendant has appealed. The complaint alleges that Lots Nos. 154 and 52, with their improvements, located in the City of Zamboanga and described in Original Certificates of Title Nos. 7642 and 7291, respectively, of the Office of the Register of Deeds of Zamboanga, are the undivided property in equal shares of Leonarda Falcasantos, Dalmacio Falcasantos and Josefa Falcasantos; that on December 1, 1934, and for the sum of P420, Leonarda Falcasantos sold all her rights to Tan Kiok, although the sale has not as yet been registered; that the plaintiff has offered to redeem the property from the defendant by paying to the latter the sum of P420 which Tan Kiok paid to Leonarda Falcasantos; that the defendant has refused to re-sell the property. The defendant in her answer admits all the allegations of the complaint but sets up the defense that plaintiff’s right of legal redemption is now barred by article 1524 of the old Civil Code, because “the plaintiff has had knowledge of the sale since long before nine days prior to the filing of the complaint.” The lower court, in giving judgment for the plaintiff, relied on the fact that “the deed of sale stated above was never and is not as yet registered in the office of the Register of Deeds, and there is nothing in the record to show that the plaintiff had any knowledge of the sale since certain date.” Its conclusion is that “there is no doubt therefore that the period for the exercise of the right of legal redemption by the plaintiff has not as yet expired as it has already been stated the deed of sale was never nor has as been registered in the office of the Register of Deeds.” It is already a rule in this jurisdiction that one who prays for judgment on the pleadings without offering proof as to the truth of his own allegations, and without giving the opposing party an opportunity to introduce evidence, must be understood to admit the truth of all the material and relevant allegations of the opposing party, and to rest his motion for judgment on those allegations taken together with such of his own as are admitted in the pleadings. (Evangelista vs. De la Rosa,[1] 42 Off. Gaz., 2100; Aquino vs. Blanco,[2] 45 Off. Gaz., 2080; Bauermann vs. Casas, 10 Phil., 386.) As the parties had submitted the case at bar on the pleadings without introducing any evidence, the plaintiff must be considered as having admitted the material allegation in the answer that he had known of the sale in question long before nine days prior to the filing of the complaint. It may be argued that, under section 1 of Rule 11 of the Rules of Court, if the plaintiff fails to make a reply, as in the case at bar, all the new matters alleged in the answer are deemed controverted; but we are of the opinion that said provision is not applicable to cases submitted on the pleadings. The reason is obvious. Where the parties pursue the course of a regular trial, the plaintiff may disprove by competent evidence any new matter alleged in the answer, while the defendant may establish also by competent evidence his own allegation. In other words, the opportunity is mutual for each party to prove or disprove any new fact deemed to be controverted by the failure of the plaintiff to file a reply to an answer. Article 1524 of the old Civil Code provides that “the right of legal redemption may not be exercised except within nine days, counted from the inscription in the Registry, and, in the absence thereof, from the time the redemptioner shall have had knowledge of the sale.” In Villasor vs. Medel et al.,* 46 Off. Gaz., Supp. No. 1, pp. 344, 343, citing Sempio vs. Del Rosario, 44 Phil., 1, we already had occasion to observe that: “The provision of this article which fixes the period of nine days within which the right of legal redemption may be exercised has not been repealed or modified by the Code of Civil Procedure or the Rules of Court. The right of legal redemption and the right to commence actions are entirely of different nature. The first is a substantive right which, in the absence of the article, would never exist; the second restricts the period in which the cause of action may be asserted.” In the same case, we held that the starting point of the 9-day period is registration or, in the absence of registration, knowledge of the conveyance by the co-owners. It cannot be contended that the period starts from registration only in respect of real property, because the article does not make any distinction. Indeed, in commenting on the provision, Manresa states that absence of registration refers not only to the case where the purchaser fails to register the conveyance, but also to the case where registration is not possible because the thing sold is personal property.
“Por estas razones, el Codigo dice, refiriendose a la inscripcion, que, en su defecto, el plazo se contara desde que el retrayente hubiera tenido conocimiento de la venta. Las palabras ’en su defecto’ que hemos subrayado, entendemos que tienen la plenitud de su sentido; es decir, que igualmente aluden al caso de que la incripci6n no exista por no haberla solicitado el comprador, que a aquel otro en que la inscripci6n no es posible por la naturaleza mueble de la cosa vendida.” (Manresa, Codigo Civil, 4th Ed., Vol. 10, p. 337.)
In view of our conclusion that the plaintiff must be held to have had knowledge of the sale in question long before nine days prior to the filing of the complaint herein, his right of legal redemption has been lost. Even if it be assumed that a mere offer to redeem is sufficient under Article 1524, the complaint is fatally defective and should be dismissed, because it contains no allegation that,the offer to redeem was made within nine days from registration/or the date the plaintiff had knowledge of the sale in question. The insinuation of the plaintiff that Tan Kiok could not validly purchase because he was not a Filipino citizen—which involves a constitutional question not even raised in the trial,—deserves no serious consideration, because the sale took place before the enforcement of the limitation provided in the Constitution which does not have any retroactive effect. (El Banco Nacional Filipino contra Sing, 69 Phil., 611.) Wherefore, the decision appealed from is hereby reversed and the complaint dismissed, with costs against the plaintiff-appellee. So ordered. Pablo, Bengzon, Tuason, Bautista Angelo, and Labrador, JJ., concur.