[ G.R. No. L-3899. May 21, 1952 ] 91 Phil. 313
[ G.R. No. L-3899. May 21, 1952 ]
RAYMUNDO TRANSPORTATION CO., INC., PETITIONER, VS. VICTORINO CERVO, RESPONDENT. D E C I S I O N
BAUTISTA ANGELO, J.:
Immediately after the liberation of the Philippines, Victorino Cervo secured an emergency certificate of public convenience to operate one auto-truck from Pililla to Manila from the Public Service Commission. This emergency certificate having expired on December 31, 1948, it was extended for an indefinite period in line with the policy of the Commission. In the meantime, he filed a petition for the conversion of his emergency certificate into a permanent one. The application was first heard on March 24, 1949, before chief attorney Antonio H. Aspillera who was authorized by the Commission to receive the evidence. Of the several operators affected on the line applied for by Cervo, only petitioner herein has filed its opposition to the application. Among the grounds stated by petitioner in its opposition, are: that in the line applied for by Victorino Cervo, now respondent, there is no need for any additional service or operator; that if there is need for additional service, petitioner is willing to put up such additional service; and that the proposed service will be but a duplicate of the service being rendered by petitioner and will only lead to a ruinous competition. After attorney Aspillera has submitted his report to the Public Service Commission, the latter rendered its decision granting the permanent certificate applied for by respondent. Its motion for reconsideration having been denied, petitioner filed the present petition for review. The first error assigned by petitioner-appellant refers to the delegation made by the Public Service Commission to chief attorney Antonio H. Aspillera of its authority to receive the evidence in connection with the application of respondent which, it is claimed, cannot be legally done because this is a contested case. This claim is well taken, as it is in line with a recent decision of this Court (G. R. No. L-2639). However, we find that petitioner is raising this question for the first time in this instance for it has sever made any objection to the designation of attorney Aspillera as a commissioner to receive the evidence in this case either before him or before the Public Service Commission. Instead it submitted itself to trial and presented Its evidence before him. As provided for in Rule 43, section 2 of the Rules of Court, an appellant can only raise in a petition for review questions that had been raised by him before the Public Service Commission, and as petitioner has never raised this question before the Commission, the same cannot now be raised in this petition for review. The other errors assigned by petitioner-appellant nay be boiled down as follows: (1) that appellee should not hare been allowed to invade the Pililla-Manila line because appellant has been operating on it even before the war; (2) to allow appellee to operate on the same line would result in a ruinous competition with appellant; (3) that public necessity does not require the service proposed by appellee; and if it so requires, appellant should have been given the preference to put up such additional service; and (4) it is unwise to grant a permanent certificate of public convenience to appellee after appellant had completed its pre-war equipment of 51 units pursuant to the requirements of the Commission. The first issue has no merit. The fact that appellant has been operating on the Pililla-Manila line for a long time does not preclude the Public Service Commission from granting an additional permit to operate on the same line if public necessity so demands. This is a matter for the Commission to determine. In it many factors are involved, and as long as they are met by the applicant the granting of a new permit is justified. Public necessity and convenience are of paramount importance. The claim that to allow the appellee to operate on same line would only result in a ruinous competition is a question which depends upon the requirements of the travelling public. When public necessity requires that a new operator be allowed to put up an additional service, that cannot be considered a ruinous competition, for it is to be presumed that the demand of the passengers in that line is such as to justify the requirements of all those tiio are in the service. Competition if wholesome and constructive should be allowed because it tends to promote satisfaction and efficiency in the management and operation of the public service. This is what the Public Service Commission did: to allow a wholesome competition. There is no showing that the competition is ruinous or prejudicial to the appellant. Whether public necessity and convenience warrant the putting up of additional service on the part of the appellee, is a question of fact which the Public Service Commission has found in the affirmative. This finding, being supported by sufficient evidence, should not be disturbed (Manila Yellow Taxicab Co. Inc. & Acro Taxicab Co. Inc. vs. Danon, 58 Phil. 75). The plea that if public necessity requires the putting up of additional service such privilege should be given to appellant which is old in the service is tenable, but there are cases where this cannot be done without causing injustice to emergency operators who were forced to enter the field due to the inability of old operators to rehabilitate and resume their former service in keeping with the demand of the travelling public. And one of these operators is the appellant which only recently acquired the needed equipment to put its service on a pre-war level. To deprive the appellee now of the privilege already enjoyed by him after investing money and effort for the sole purpose of giving preference to the appellant would be most unfair and unjust and cannot in equity be sanctioned by this Court. Such a ruling would lead to a monopoly and this should be avoided. In view of the foregoing, we find no error in the decision of the Public Service Commission. Wherefore, the decision appealed from is hereby affirmed, with costs against the appellant. Paras, C.J., Feria, Pablo, Bengzon, and Tuason, JJ., concur.