[ G.R. No. L-4069. May 21, 1951 ] G.R. No. L-4069
[ G.R. No. L-4069. May 21, 1951 ]
RODOBALDO GANDICELA PETITIONER, VS. THE HONORABLE DEOGRACIAS LUTERO, JUDGE OF THE MUNICIPAL COURT ILOILO CITY, RESPONDENT. R E S O L U T I O N
FERIA, J.:
This is a motion for reconsideration of the decision of this Court denying the petition for certiorari of the movant.
One of the grounds on which the motion is based is that the statement of the respondent judge in his answer to the petition for certiorari, “that the dismissal of the case was ordered by the respondent in accordance with the petition of the petitioner’s counsel” is not true, since it is not stated in said order of dismissal of July 17, 1950. The mere omission to state expressly in said order whether the dismissal is ordered by the Court motu propio or upon the motion of one of the parties, does not necessarily mean that the petitioner’s counsel did not ask for the dismissal of the case. Therefore, the statement in the respondent’s answer, not denied by the petitioner in his reply, to the effect that the dismissal was ordered in accordance with the petition of the petitioner’s counsel is controlling; and the petitioner’s petition in this motion for reconsideration that he be allowed to amend his reply for the purpose of alleging a denial of said statement is denied.
Another ground of the motion for reconsideration is that “even if it is assumed that the case was dismissed upon the instance of the petitioner , the dismissal ought to be one which is definite and not without prejudice,” because this Court, in the case of Kalaw vs. Provincial Fiscal of Samar et al. G.R. No. 45391, October 15, 1937, held that “the accused who is deprived of his constitutional right to a speedy trial has the right to ask that he be released if he were detained, or that the case against him be definitely dismissed.”
In the resolution denying the appellant’s motion for reconsideration in the case of Fransisco vs. Borja G.R. No. L-1854 and in the decision in the present case, we held that courts have no discretion to determine or characterize the legal effects of their orders or decisions, unless expressly authorized by law to do so as provided for in Rule 30, Rules of Court. The addition of such words as “without prejudice”, “provisionally,” or “definitely” to their order or decision would be a mere surplasge if the legal effect thereof under the law is otherwise, because courts cannot amend the law. So it is not for the court to state in the order or decision that the case is dismissed either definitely or without prejudice. The legal effect of a dismissal depends upon the stage of the trial and the circumstances under which a criminal case is dismissed.
According to Section 9 of Rule 13, if a criminal case is dismissed otherwise than upon the merits at any stage before judgment, without the express consent of the defendant, by a court of competent jurisdiction, upon a valid complaint or information, and after the defendant has pleaded to the charge, the dismissal of the case shall be definite or a bar to another prosecution for the same offense; but if it is dismissed upon the petition or with the express consent of the defendant, the dismissal will be without prejudice or not a bar to another prosecution for the same offense, because, in the last case, the defendant’s action in having the case dismissed constitutes a waiver of his constitutional right not to be prosecuted again for the same offense.
If the defendant wants to exercise his constitutional right to a speedy trial, he should ask, not for the dismissal but for the trial of the case. If the prosecution asks for the postponement of the hearing and the court believes that the hearing cannot be postponed anymore without violating the right of the accused to a speedy trial, the court shall deny the postponement and proceed with the trial and require the fiscal to present the witnesses for the prosecution; and if the fiscal does not or cannot produce his evidence and consequently fails to prove the defendant’s guilt beyond reasonable doubt, the Court, upon the motion of the defendant, shall dismiss the case. Such dismissal is not in reality a mere dismissal although it is generally so called, but an acquittal of the defendant^ because of the prosecution’s failure to prove the guilt of the defendant, and it will be a bar to another prosecution for the same offense even though it was ordered* by the Court upon motion or with the express consent of the defendant in exactly the same way as a judgment of acquittal obtained upon the defendant’s motion (People vs. Salico G. R. No. L-1567).
Wherefore the motion for reconsideration is denied.
So ordered.
Pablo, Padilla, Tuason, Montemayor, Jugo, and Bautista Angelo, JJ., concur.
Paras, C.J., reserves his vote.
Bengzon, J., did not take part.