[ G.R. No. L-2990. December 17, 1951 ] 90 Phil. 524
[ G.R. No. L-2990. December 17, 1951 ]
OSCAR ESPUELAS Y MENDOZA, PETITIONER, VS. THE PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, RESPONDENT D E C I S I O N
BENGZON, J.:
Article 142 of the Revised Penal Code punishes those who shall write, publish or circulate scurrilous libels against the Government of the Philippines or any of the duly constituted authorities thereof or which suggest or incite rebellious conspiracies or riots or which tend to stir up the people against the lawful authorities or to disturb the peace of t he community.
The appellant Oscar Espuelas y Mendoza was, after trial, convicted in the court of first instance of Bohol of a violation of the above article. The conviction was affirmed by the Court of Appeals, because according to said court,
“About the time comprised between June 9 and June 24, 1947, both dates inclusive, in the town of Tagbiliran, Bohol, Oscar Espuelas y Mendoza had his picture taken, making it to appear as if he were hanging lifeless at the end of a piece of rope suspended from the limb of a tree, when in truth and in fact, he was merely standing on a barrel (Exhibits A, C-1). After securing copies of his photograph, Espuelas sent copies of same to several newspapers and weeklies of general circulation, (Exhibits C, F, G, H, I) not only in the province of Bohol but also throughout the Philippines and abroad, for their publication with a suicide note or letter, wherein he made to appear that it was written by a fictitious suicide, Alberto Reveniera and addressed to the latter’s supposed wife translation of which letter or note is hereunder reproduced:
“Dearest wife and children, bury me fire meters deep. Over my grave don’t plant a cross or put floral wreaths, for I don’t need them”
“Please don’t bury me in a lonely place. Bury me in the Catholic cemetery. Although I have committed suicide, I still have the right to be buried among Christians”
“But don’t pray for me. Don’t remember me, and don’t feel sorry. Wipe me out of your lives.
“My dear wife, if someone asks you why I committed suicide, tell them I did it because I was not pleased with the administration of Roxas. Tell the whole world about this.
“And if they ask why I did not like the administration of Roxas, point out to them the situation in Central Luzon, the Hukbalahaps. Tell them about Julio Guillen and the banditry of Leyte.
“Dear wife, write to President Truman and Churchill. Tell them that here in the Philippines our government is infested with many Hitlers and Mussolinis.
“Teach our children to burn pictures of Roxas if and when they come across one”
“I committed suicide because I am ashamed, of our government under Roxas. I cannot hold high my brows to the world with this dirty government.
“I committed suicide because I have no power to put under Juez de Cuchillo all the Roxas people now in power. So, I sacrificed my own self.”
The accused admitted the fact that he wrote the note or letter above quoted and caused its publication in the Free Press, the Evening News, the Bisaya, Lamdag and other local periodicals and that he had impersonated one Alberto Reveniera by signing said pseudonymous name in said note or letter and posed himself as Alberto Reveniera in a picture taken wherein he was shown hanging by the end of a rope tied to a limb of a tree.”
The letter is a scurrilous libel against the Government.[1] It calls our government one of crooks and dishonest persons (dirty) infested with Nazis and Fascists i.e. dictators.
And the communication reveals a tendency to produce dissatisfaction or a feeling incompatible with the disposition to remain loyal to the government.[2]
Writings which tend to overthrow or undermine the security of the government or to weaken the confidence of the people in the government are against the public peace, and are criminal not only because they tend to incite to a breach of the peace but because they are conducive to the destruction of the very government itself (See 19 Am, Law Rep. 1511). Regarded as seditious libels they were the subject of criminal proceedings since early times in England. (V. op. cit.)
As explained by Patarson,[3] “* * * the great factors of government, consisting of the Sovereign, the Parliament, the ministers of state, the courts of justice, must all be recognized as holding functions founded on sound principles and to be defended and treated with an established and well-nigh unalterable respect. Each of these great institutions has peculiar virtues and peculiar weaknesses, but whether at any one time the virtue or the weakness predominates, there must be a certain standard of decorum reserved for all. Each guarded remonstrance, each fiery invective, each burst of indignation must rest on some basis of respect and deference towards the depository, for the time being, of every great constitutional function. Hence another limit of free speech and writing is sedition. And yet within that limit there is ample room and verge enough for the freest use of the tongue and pen in passing strictures on the judgment and conduct of every constituted authority.”
Naturally, when the people’s share in the government was restricted, there was a disposition to punish even mild criticisms of the ruler or the departments of government. But as governments grew to be more representative, the laws of sedition became less drastic and freedom of expression grew apace. Yet malicious endeavors to stir up public strife continue to be prohibited.
The United States punished seditious utterances in the act of July 14, 1798 containing provisions parallel to our own article 142. Analogous prohibitions are found in the Espionage Act of June 1917 and the Seditious Libel Amendment thereto in May, 1918.
Of course such legislation despite its general merit is liable to become a weapon of Intolerance constraining the free expression of opinion, or mere agitation for reform. But so long as there is a sufficient safeguard by requiring intent on the part of the defendant to produce illegal action such legislation aimed at anarchy and radicalism presents largely a question of policy. Our Legislature has spoken in Article 142 and the law must be applied.
In disposing of this appeal, careful thought had to be given to the fundamental right to freedom of speech. Yet the freedom of speech secured by the Constitution “does not confer an absolute right to speak or publish without responsibility whatever one may choose.” It is not “unbridled license that gives immunity for every possible use of language and prevents the punishment of those who abuse this freedom.” [4] So statutes against sedition have always been considered not violative of such fundamental guaranty, although they should not be interpreted so as to unnecessarily curtail the citizen1s freedom of expression to agitate for institutional changes. [5]
Not to be restrained is the privilege of any citizen to criticise his government and government officials and to submit his criticism to the “free trade of ideas” and to plead for its acceptance in “the competition of the market.” However, let such criticism be specific and therefore constructive, reasoned or tempered, and not a contemptuous condemnation of the entire government setup. Such wholesale attack is nothing less than an invitation to disloyalty to the government. In the article now under examination one will find no particular objectionable actuation of the government. It is called dirty, it is called a dictatorship, it is called shameful, but no particular omissions or commissions are set forth. Instead the article drips with malevolence and hate towards the constituted authorities. It tries to arouse animosity towards all public servants headed by President Roxas whose pictures this appellant would burn and would teach the younger generation to destroy. Analysed for meaning and weighed in its consequences the article cannot fail to impress thinking persons that it seeks to sow the seeds of sedition and strife. The infuriating language is not a sincere effort to persuade, what with the writer’s simulated suicide and false claim to martyrdom and what with its failure to particularise. When the use of irritating language centers not on per/uading the readers but on creating disturbance, the rationale of free speech can not apply and the speaker or writer is removed from the protection of the constitutional guaranty.
If it be argued that the article does not discredit the entire governmental structure but only President Roxas and his men, the reply is that article 142 punishes not only all libels against the Government but also “libels against any of the duly constituted authorities thereof.” The"Roxas people” in the Government obviously refer at least to the President, his Cabinet and the majority of legislators to whom the adjectives “dirty”, Hitlers and Mussolinis were naturally directed. On this score alone the conviction could be upheld.[6]
As heretofore stated the publication suggests or incites rebellious conspiracies or riots and tends to stir up the people against the constituted authorities, or to provoke violence from opposition groups who may seek to silence the writer.[7] Which is the sum and substance of the offense under consideration.
The essence of seditious libel may be said to be its immediate tendency to stir up general discontent to the pitch of illegal courses; that is to say to induce people to resort to illegal methods other than those provided by the Constitution, in order to repress the evils which press upon their minds. [8]
“The idea of violence pervades the whole letter” says Justice Paredes of the Court of Appeals “The mere fact that a person was so disgusted with his “dirty government” to the point of taking his own life, is not merely assign of disillusionment; it is a clear act to arouse its readers a sense of dissatisfaction against its duly constituted authorities. The mention made in said letter of the situation in Central Luzon, the Hukbalahaps, Julio Guillen and the banditry in Leyte, which are instances of flagrant and armed attacks against the law and the duly constituted authorities, cannot but be interpreted by the reading public as an indirect justification of the open defiance by the Hukbalahaps against the constituted government, the attempt against the life of President Roxas and the ruthless depredations committed by the bandits of Leyte, thus insinuating that a state of lawlessness, rebellion and anarchy would be very much better than the maladministration of said President and his men.
To top it all, the appellant proclaimed to his readers that he committed suicide because he had “no power to put under juez de cuchillo all the Roxas people now in power” Knowing, that the expression Juez de Cuchillo means to the ordinary layman as the Law of the Knife, a “summary and arbitrary execution by the knife”, the idea intended by the appellant to be conveyed was no other than bloody, violent and unpeaceful methods to free the government from the administration of Roxas and his men.
The meaning, intent and effect of the article involves maybe a question of fact, making the findings of the court of appeals conclusive upon us.[9]
Anyway, it is clear that the letter suggested the decapitation or assassination of all Roxas officials (at least members of the Cabinet and a majority of Legislators including the Chief Executive himself). And such suggestion clinches the case against appellant.
In 1922 Isaac Perez of Sorsogon while discussing political matters with several persons in a public place uttered these words: “Filipinos must use bolos for cutting off Wood’s head—referring to the then Governor-General, Leonard Wood. Perez was found guilty of inciting to sedition in a judgment of this court published in Volume 45 of the Philippine Reports. That precedent is undeniably apposite. Note that the opinion was penned by Mr. Justice Malcolm probably the member who has been most outspoken on freedom of speech. Adopting his own words we could say, “Here the person maligned by the accused is the Chief Executive of the Philippine Islands. His official position, like the Presidency of the United States and other high offices, under a democratic form of government, instead of affording immunity from promiscuous comment, seems rather to invite abusive attacks. But in this instance, the attack on the President passes the furthest bounds of free speech and common decency. More than a figure of speech was intended. There is a seditious tendency in the words used, which could easily produce disaffection among the people and a state of feeling incompatible with a disposition to remain loyal to the Government and obedient to the laws.”
The accused must therefore be found guilty as charged. And there being no question as to the legality of the penalty imposed on him, the decision will be affirmed with costs.
Pablo, Padilla, Montemayor, and Reyes JJ., concur.