[ G. R. No. L-4017. August 30, 1951 ] 89 Phil. 752
[ G. R. No. L-4017. August 30, 1951 ]
THE PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, ET AL., PETITIONERS AND APPELLANTS, VS. JOSE C. ZULUETA, RESPONDENT AND APPELLEE. D E C I S I O N
BENGZON, J.:
Review of a decision of the Court of Appeals that annulled the order of Hon. Juan R. Liwag, Judge, admitting the amended information filed in Criminal Case No. 11232 of Manila. There is no question about these facts: On October 15, 1949 an information was filed in said criminal case charging Jose C. Zulueta with the crime of malversation of public property. Copy of the information is appended hereto (App. A). The substance of the accusation is that the accused, as Acting Chairman of the Surplus Property Commission, wilfully or thru abandonment permitted Beatriz Poblete to take and convert 3,000 kegs of nails of the aforesaid Commission. It is alleged that he secured the approval of a sale to her of said nails at very low prices by “astutely” prevailing upon Commissioner Angel Llanes to approve it on the pretext of urgency to expedite the liquidation of surplus properties. As an alternative charge the information states that at least through abandonment the accused permitted Beatriz Poblete to carry the hardware away. Arraigned on November 24, 1949, the accused pleaded “not guilty.” On January 14, 1950, the prosecution submitted an amended information (App. B), which practically reproducing the original accusation, contained the additional assertion—among others—that in permitting the misappropriation the accused Jose C. Zulueta acted in conspiracy with Commissioner Llanes, who had subsequently been booked for malversation of the identical public property (nails) in Criminal Case No. 11727 of the same court. The accused objected to the admission of the amended information contending that it introduced allegations about acts and omissions constituting another offense, and that the amendments were substantial and prejudicial to his rights. The court admitted the amended information by its order dated February 28,1950. Having failed in a motion to reconsider, the accused started proceedings on certiorari in the Court of Appeals to annul the last mentioned order of admission. The appellate court upheld his contentions. Hence, the People presented this petition for review, which was given due course. The issue requires application of the principles that after the defendant has pleaded, the information may be amended as to all matters of form, in the discretion of the court, when the same can be done without prejudice to the rights of the defendant. (Sec. 13, Rule 106). At that stage, no substantial amendment may be permitted. The question for decision is: Was the amendment purely a matter of form? Or did it touch upon matters of substance? The amended pleading, with its deletions, transpositions and rephrasings, practically added a full page to the original seven-page information. Seeing the prosecution’s insistence in its admission, to the extent of appealing to this Court even at the risk of delaying the proceedings, one, would naturally suppose that its moves are dictated by the necessities—neither formal nor unsubstantial—of the case for che People. Indeed, contrasting the two informations one will perceive that whereas in the first the accused is charged with misappropriation of public property because: (1) he deceived Angel Llanes into approving the bargain sale of nails to Beatriz Poblete or (2) at least, by his abandonment he permitted that woman to obtain the articles at very cheap prices, in the amended information a third ground of responsibility is inserted, namely, that he connived and conspired with Angel Llanes to consummate the give-away transaction. Again it will be observed that the third ground of action in effect contradicts the original theory of the information: if the accused conspired with Llanes, he did not deceive the latter, and did not by mere negligence permit the sale. Now therefore, an amended information setting forth a different manner of committing the felony,—a totally new proposition—does it merely introduce a formal amendment? We do not think so. Even in civil cases—wherein the rules are more liberal as to amendments—it is not generally permissible to alter plaintiff’s theory of the case, alteration being substantial.[1] In this connection it must be recalled that under the rules of criminal procedure there is a further limitation to formal amendments, namely, that the amendment “can be done without prejudice to the rights of the defendant.” Surely the preparations made by herein accused to face the original charges will have to be radically modified to meet the new situation. For undoubtedly the allegation of conspiracy enables the prosecution to attribute and ascribe to the accused Zulueta all the acts, knowledge, admissions and even omissions [2] of his co-conspirator Angel Llanes in furtherance of the conspiracy. The amendment thereby widens the battlefront to allow the use by the prosecution of newly discovered weapons, to the evident discomfiture of the opposite camp. Thus it would seem inequitable to sanction the tactical movement at this stage of the controversy, bearing in mind that the accused is only guaranteed two-days’ preparation for trial. Needless to emphasize, as in criminal cases the liberty, even the life, of the accused is at stake, it is always wise and proper that he be fully apprised of the charges, to avoid any possible surprise that may lead to injustice. The prosecution has too many facilities to covet the added advantage of meeting unprepared adversaries. Some passages from “Regala contra El Juez del Juzgado de Primera Instancia de Bataan” [3] are quoted by petitioners. Therein the accused pleaded not guilty to an information for murder, and later the fiscal amended the indictment by including two other persons charged with the same offense and alleging conspiracy between the three. Five justices held that the amendment was not substantial. But that situation differs from the one at bar. The amendment there did not modify the basic theory of the prosecution that the accused had killed the deceased by a voluntary act and deed. Here there is an innovation, or the introduction of another alternative imputation, which, to make matters worse, is inconsistent with the original allegations. In view of the above, we believe it unnecessary to discuss the defendant’s proposition that the original information did not actually describe the crime of malversation (but only of theft), which the amended information sets forth. Neither is it necessary to pas? on the other minor amendments objected to. One other point remains to be threshed out. The petitioners insist that certiorari is improper, because the accused has an adequate remedy by appeal. Of course these special civil actions may not generally be entertained if the party has an adequate remedy by appeal. However there have been exceptions. (Cf. Moran 3rd Ed. Vol. II, p. 148). For instance, in Yu Cong Eng vs. Trinidad 47 Phil. 385 this Court took cognizance cf a petition for certiorari and prohibition notwithstanding the accused could have appealed in due time. The Court’s action was premised on the public welfare and the advancement of public policy, in view of the many merchants interested in the Chinese Bookkeeping Law. In Dimayuga vs. Fajardo (43 Phil., 304) this Court admitted a petition to enjoin the prosecution of certain chiropractors. Although these could have appealed if convicted, the petition was given due course for the orderly administration of justice to avoid possible oppression by the strong arm of the law. And Arevalo vs. Nepomuceno, (63 Phil. 627), was a petition for certiorari to challenge the trial judge’s action permitting an amended information. This Court passed on the petition, despite the availability of appeal at the proper time. Now, inasmuch as the surplus property cases have attracted nationwide attention, making it essential to proceed with dispatch in the consideration thereof, and inasmuch as the Court of Appeals delving into the legal question has reached a conclusion which we do not reckon to be erroneous, it would not be,in furtherance of justice presently to dismiss the whole proceedings on the technical ground that the accused has a remedy by appeal at the proper time. Wherefore the judgment under review will be affirmed. No costs. Paras, C. J., FeHa, Pablo, Padilla, Tuason and Reyes, JJ., concur.