[ G. R. No. L-3587. December 21, 1951 ] 90 Phil. 564
[ G. R. No. L-3587. December 21, 1951 ]
TIONG KING PETITIONER VS. COURT OF INDUSTRUIAL RELATIONS AND THE NATIONAL TAILOR’S ASSOCIATION, RESPONDENTS. D E C I S I O N
PARAS, C.J.:
Gaw Pun So owned and operated a tailor shop known as the Army Shirt Factory, located in his own house at Nos. 231-245 Soler Street, Manila. In January, 1948, he had a labor dispute with his personnel and, pending the case in the Court of Industrial Relations, Gaw Pun So, irked and worried by the incidents of litigation, thought of dis solving the business and selling the sewing machines. Aware of the plan of Gaw Pun So, Tiong King offered to take over the business by leasing the place and the sewing machines. The transfer was put in writing. Tiong King continued the Army Shirt Factory from the month of February with the same employees had by Gaw Pun So. This transfer was known to the personnel, so much so that the latter, as petitioner in the pending dispute in the Court of Industrial Relations, Case No. 117-V, entitled national Tailors Association vs. Army Shirt Factory et al., prayed that Tiond King be included as a respondent. In due time, the National Tailors Association entered into an agreement with Tiong King alone, to the effect that all cases were terminated against the respondents. This agreement was duly approved by the Court of Industrial Relations.
Tiong King put up a capital of P7,000.00. On April 27, 1948, Tiong King filed a petition in the Court of Industrial Relations Case No. 117-V-3, alleging that since he operated his shop in February, 1948, he had continually suffered losses; that as there remained only very little of the capital originally invested, Tiong King thought it advisable to close the business fooaveid ftirther irreparable losses; and that he was definitely closing the shop on May 30, 19k8. Tiong King . accordingly prayed that he be allowed to close his tailor shop and business from six o’clock in the afternoon of May 29, 1948. On the same date, April 27, 19W, Tiong King gave out a notice of the projected closing of the Army Shirt Factory, with the announcement that his personnel would be paid their salaries and wages on May 29, 1948, at six o’clock in the afternoon. On May 29, 1948, Presiding Judge Arsenio C. Roldan of the Court of Industrial Relations issued an order enjoining Tiong King not to close his factory and not to dismiss, suspend or lay off any laborer or employee without previous authority of said court.
After hearing, Presiding Judge Roldan rendered a decision dated January 13, 1949, dismissing the petition of Tiong King.and ordering him to pay his personnel from the last week of May, 1948, up to the date of the decision, at the rates specified therein.
Upon petition for reconsideration filed by counsel for Tiong King, the Court of Industrial Relations promulgated a resolution dated May 27, 19J49, allowing Tiong King to close Ms business and shop, subject to the condition that, upon reopening the same, his former personnel would be taken “Stack. This resolution was concurred in by Judges Jose S. Bautista, Modesto Castillo and Juan L. Lantin. Presiding Judge Arsenio C. Roldan and Judge Vicente Jimenez Yanson dissented in a separate opinion dated June 30, 1949.
Upon motion for reconsideration filed by counsel for the National Tailors Association, the Court of Industrial Relations, thru Presiding Judge Roldan and Judges Castillo and Yanson, promulgated a resolution dated October 31, 1949, reaffirming their stand on the resolution of the Court of Industrial Relations under date of July 1, 1949. Judges Lantin and Bautista dissented in a separate opinion dated November 10, 1949.
The present appeal by certiorari was taken by Tiong King against the last resolution of the Court of Industrial Relations.
The principal ground invoked by Presiding Judge Roldan in his decision dated January 13, 1949, dismissing the petition of Tiong King and ordering hin to pay the salaries and wages of his personnel, is that Tiong King was not in fact the lessee, much less the true owner, of the Array Shirt Factory, and that the alleged transfer of the business to Tiong King was a mere device to ease out the workers of Gaw Pun So. As a matter of fact, in the dissenting opinion dated June 30, 1949, obviously referred to in the appealed resolution of the Court of Industrial Relations dated October 31, 1949, Presiding Judge Roldan and Judge Yanson stated as follows: “It is regretted that the majority opinion failed to note that the trial court never denied the right of any party to file a petition to close its business. What the Court has maintained was that, said petition should be made, following certain fundamental rules of procedure (Rule 3, sec. 2, Rules of Court), in the name of the real owner, who could be affected by whatever decision the court may render in the case at bar, and not by any person whose claim is a mere pretension that could cast doubt regarding the veracity of his fictitious rights.
The decisive question before us, therefore, is not whether Tiong King had no more capital with which to continue the Army Shirt Factory, but whether he was the owner or operator thereof and had the right to file the petition in the Court of Industrial Relations to close the same. Upon this point, it is only sufficient to recall that the National Tailors Association entered into a stipulation with Tiong King alone whereby they agreed that all cases against the former owners of the business were terminated. As correctly observed in the resolution of the Court of Industrial Relations dated May 27, 1949, granting the petition of Tiong King, “Este traspaso del negocio a favor de Tiong King no se hizo a escondidas. Lo sabia la misma peticionaria; de ahi que esta pidio prirnero al Tribunal que se la incluyera a aquel como uno de los recurridos en estas actuaciones.” That fiong King was conceded to be the owner,1 and operator of the Army Shirt Factory at the time his petition to close it was filed, is conclusively borne out by the fact that Presiding Judge Roldan in his decision of January 13, 1949, ordered Tiong King, and not Gaw Pun So, to pay the salaries and wages of the personnel.
It is contended, however, that “If at all the Court has approved of the agreement between the National Tailors1 Association and Mr. Tiong King it was because ’this arrangement is a very good solution to the present conflict as it is advantageous not only to the union but also the management, and, is in consonance with the contract entered into between the management and the new workers.’” This contention is followed with the remark that the approval of said agreement did not include a finding that Tiong King was either the owner or the lessee of the Army Shirt Factory. We are unable to agree. In entering into the agreement with the National Tailors Association, Tiong King acted in his own behalf, regardless of the former owners of the business. Indeed, it was covenanted that all the cases against the lat$er were deemed terminated. Considerations of fair play and justice demand that Tiong King be given the full legal effect of said agreement which bore the sanction of the Court of Industrial Relations.
On the surface it may be argued that we have reversed, in violation of section 2, Rule 44, of the Rules of Court, the Court of Industrial Relations on its finding of fact that Tiong King was neither the owner nor the lessee of the business in question. At bottom, however, the argument must fall because, regardless of said result, we have merely passed upon and determined the legal effect of the agreement entered into between the National Tailors Association and Tiong King, tp4the complete exclusion of the former owners, and duly approved by the Court of Industrial Relations. In other words, we have in essence only held that the Court of Industrial Relations erred in construing the legal implications of said agreement.
There being no question that Tiong King’s capital invested in the Army Shirt Factory was almost exhausted at the time of the filing of his petition to close it, said petition must necessarily be granted. It is admitted by all the Judges of the Court of Industrial Relations that an employee may close his business, provided the same is done in good faith and is due to causes beyond his control. To rule otherwise, would be oppressive and inhuman.
Wherefore, reversing the resolution of the Court of Industrial Relations dated October 31, 1949 we hereby affirm the resolution of said court dated Hay 27, So ordered without costs.
Bengzon, Montemayor, Jugo, and Bautista Angelo, JJ., concur.
Reyes, J., concurs in the result.