[ G. R. No. L-3497. May 18, 1951 ] 88 Phil. 730
[ G. R. No. L-3497. May 18, 1951 ]
IN THE MATTER OF THE PROBATE OF THE LAST WILL AND TESTAMENT OF JOSE VENZON. VALENTINA CUEVAS, PETITIONER AND APPELLEE, VS. PILAR ACHACOSO, OPPOSITOR AND APPELLANT. D E C I S I O N
BAUTISTA ANGELO, J.:
This is an appeal from an order of the Court of First Instance of Zambales admitting to probate the last will and testament of the late Jose Venzon. On January 19, 1946, Jose Venzon died in Iba, Zambales, leaving a will. In said will the deceased instituted as his heirs, Valentina Cuevas, his widow and Rosario Asera Venzon, his daugther. He named therein his widow as executrix of the will. On February 1, 1946, Valentina Cuevas filed a petition for the probate of said will. On May 10, 1946, one Pilar Achacoso filed an alternative petition for the probate of a previous will executed by the deceased praying therein that, if the will submitted by the widow be rejected, the other will be admitted to probate in lieu thereof. In the previous will there are other heirs instituted, among them petitioner Pilar Achacoso. Pilar Achacoso objected to the probate of the second will executed by the deceased on October 10, 1945. After due hearing, the court found that the latter will was executed in accordance with law and ordered that it be admitted to probate. Pilar Achacoso took the case to the Court of Appeals, but the latter certified it to this Court on the ground that it involves purely questions of law. “The main error assigned refers to the alleged lack of attestation clause in the will under consideration, or to the fact that, if there is such attestation clause, the same has not been signed by the instrumental witnesses, but by the testator himself, and it is claimed that this defect has the effect of invalidating the will. The will in question, after reciting in separate paragraphs, and under correlative numbers, the provisions of the will, winds up with the following clause:
“IN WITNESS WHEREOF, I sign this testament or last will in the municipality of Iba, Zambales, Philippines, this 10th day of October, 1945, in the presence of the three witnesses, namely Dr. Nestorio Trinidad, Don Baldomero Achacoso, and Mr. Proceso Cabal as instrumental witnesses to my signing; this testament is written in three (3) sheets marked by letter ‘A’, ‘B’ and ‘C consecutively on top of each sheet and upon my-request and in my presence and also in the presence of each of the aforesaid instrumental witnesses, they also signed this testament already referred to. I hereby manifest that every sheet of the aforesaid testament, on the left-hand margin as well as the testament itself have been signed by me as also each of the witnesses has also signed in my presence and in the presence of each other.
(Sgd.) JOSE VENZON Witnesses: (Sgd.) NESTORIO TRINIDAD (Sgd.) BALDOMERO L. ACHACOSO (Sgd.) PROCESO CABAL The clause above quoted is the attestation clause referred to in the law which, in our opinion, substantially complies with its requirements. The only apparent anomaly we find is that it appears to be an attestation made by the testator himself more than by the instrumental witnesses. This apparent anomaly, however, is not in our opinion serious nor substantial as to affect the validity of the will, it appearing that right under the signature of the testator, there appear the signatures of the three instrumental witnesses, “Instrumental witness, as denned by Escriche in his Diccionario Razonado de Legislacion y Jurisprudencia, Vol. 4, p. 1115, is one who takes part in the execution of an instrument or writing” (In re will of Tan Diuco, 45 Phil, 807, 809). An instrumental witness, therefore, does not merely attest to the signature of the testator but also to the proper execution of the will. The fact that the three instrumental witnesses have signed the will immediately under the signature of the testator, shows that they have in fact attested not only to the genuineness of his signature but also to the due execution of the will as embodied in the attestation clause. The attestation clause in question bears close similarity with the attestation clause in the will involved in Aldaba vs. Roque, (43 Phil., 378). In that case, the attestation clause formed part of the body of the will and its recital was made by the testatrix herself and was signed by her and by the three instrumental witnesses. In upholding the validity of the will, the court said:
“In reality, it appears that it is the testatrix who makes the declaration about the points in the last paragraph of the will; however, as the witnesses, together with the testatrix, have signed the said declaration, we are of the opinion and so hold that the words above quoted of the testament constitute a sufficient compliance with the requirements of Act No. 2645.”
As was said in one case, “the object of the solemnities surrounding the execution of the wills is to close the door against bad faith and fraud, to avoid substitution of wills and testaments and to guarantee their truth and authenticity. Therefore the laws on this subject should be interpreted in such a way as to attain these primordial ends. But on the other hand, also one must not lose sight of the fact that it is not the object of the law to restrain and curtail the exercise of the right to make a will. So when an interpretation already given assures such ends, any other interpretation whatsoever, that adds nothing but demands more requisites entirely unnecessary, useless and frustrative of the testator’s will, must be disregarded.’’ In re will of Tan Diuco, supra, p. 811.) (Italics supplied.) Expressive of this liberal view of interpretation, are also the following rules embodied in the new Civil Code. These provisions, although not directly applicable, are however, significant because they project the point of view of our legislature when it adopted them having in view the existing law and jurisprudence on the matter.
“ART. 788. If a testamentary disposition admits of different interpretations, in case of doubt, that interpretation by which the disposition is to be operative shall be preferred.” “ART. 791. The words of a will are to receive an interpretation which will give to every expression some effect, rather than one which will render any of the expressions inoperative; and of two modes of interpreting a will, that is to be preferred which will prevent intestacy.”
Wherefore, the order appealed from is hereby affirmed, with costs against the appellant. Paras, C. J., Feria and Tuason, JJ., concur. JUGO, J.: I concur in the result.