[ G. R. No. L-3362. March 01, 1951 ] 88 Phil. 260
[ G. R. No. L-3362. March 01, 1951 ]
TESTATE ESTATE OF CARLOS GIL, DECEASED. ISABEL HERREROS VDA. DE GIL, ADMINISTRATRIX AND APPELLEE, VS. PILAR GIL VDA. DE MURCTANO, OPPOSITOR AND APPELLANT. D E C I S I O N
JUGO, J.:
The Court of First Instance of Manila admitted to probate the alleged will and testament of the deceased Carlos Gil. The oppositor Pilar Gil Vda. de Murciano appealed to this Court, raising only questions of law. Her counsel assigns the two following alleged errors:
“Primer Error.—El Juzgado inferior erro al dejar de declarar que el alegado testamento de Carlos Gil no ha sido otorgado de acuerdo con la ley. “Segundo Error.—Erro finalmente al legalizar el referido testamento.”
The alleged will read as follows:
“Primera Pagina (1)
“EN EL NOMBRE DE DIOS, AMEN. “Yo, Carlos Gil, de 66 anos de edad, residente de Porac, Pampanga, I. F., hallandome sano y en pleno goce de mis facultades intelectuales, libre y expontaneamente, sin violencia, coaccion, dolo o influencia ilegal de persona extrana, otorgo y ordeno este mi testamento y ultima voluntad en castellano, idioma que poseo y entiendo, de la manera siguiente: “1. Declaro que durante mi matrimonio con mi esposa la hoy Isabel Herreros no tuvimos hijos; “2. Declaro que tengo propiedades situadas en Manila y en la Provincia de Pampanga; “3. Doy y adjudico a mi querida esposa Isabel Herreros todos mis bienes ya que muebles e inmuebles situados en Manila y en Pampanga, bajo la condicion de que cuando esta muera y si hayan bienes remanentes heredadas por ella de mi, que dichos bienes remanentes se adjudicaran a Don Carlos Worrel. “4. Nombro como albacea de mis bienes despues de mi fallecimiento al Dr. Galicano Coronel a quien tengo absoluta confianza, con relevacion de fianza; “En testimonio de todo lo cual, firmo este mi testamento y en el margen izquierdo de cada una de sus dos paginas utiles con la clausula de atestiguamiento en presencia de los testigos, quienes a su vez firmaron cada una de dichas paginas y la clausula de atestiguamiento en mi presencia cada uno de ellos con la de los demas, hoy en Porac, Pampanga, I. F., el dia 27 de Mayo de mil nove-cientos treinta y nueve.
“CARLOS GIL
“Testificacion:
“Segunda Pagina (2)
“Nosotros los que suscribimos, todos mayores de edad, certificamos: que el testamento que precede este escrito en la lengua castellana que conoce la testadora, compuesto de dos paginas utiles con la clausula de atestiguamiento paginadas correlativamente en Ietras y numeros en la parte superior de la casilla, asi como todas las hojas del mismo, en nuestra presencia y que cada uno de nosotros hemos atestiguado y firmado dicho documento y todas las hojas del mismo en presencia del testador y en la de cada uno de nosotros.
“(Fdo.) Alfredo T. Rivera “(Fdo.) Ramon Mendiola “(Fdo.) Mariano Omana”
Regarding the correctness and accuracy of the above-copied alleged will, the court below said:
“* * * The only copy available is a printed form contained in the record appeal in case G. R. No. L-254, entitled ‘Testate Estate of Carlos Gil; Isabel Herreros Vda. de Gil, petitioner and appellant vs. Roberto Toledo y Gil, oppositor and appellee.’ Both parties are agreed that this is a true and correct copy of the will.” (P. 10, Record on Appeal).
The appeal being only on questions of law the above finding of the court below cannot be disputed. The conclusions of law reached by said court are based on it. Moreover, the finding is correctly based on the evidence of record. The parties agreed that said copy is true and correct. If it were otherwise, they would not have so agreed, considering that the defect is of an essential character and is fatal to the validity of the attestation clause. It will be noted that the attestation clause above quoted does not state that the alleged testator signed the will. It declares only that it was signed by the witnesses. This is a fatal defect, for the precise purpose of the attestation clause is to certify that the testator signed the will, this being the most essential element of the clause. Without it there is no attestation at all. It is said that the court may correct a mere clerical error. This is too much of a clerical error for it affects the very essence of the clause. Alleged errors may be overlooked or corrected only in matters of form which do not affect the substance of the statement. It is claimed that the correction may be made by inference. If we cure a deficiency by means of inferences, when are we going to stop making inferences to supply fatal deficiencies in wills? Where are we to draw the line? Following that procedure we would be making interpolations by inferences, implications, and even by internal circumstantial evidence. This would be done in the face of the clear, unequivocal, language of the statute as to how the attestation clause should be made. It is to be supposed that the drafter of the alleged will read the clear words of the statute when he prepared it. For the court to supply alleged deficiencies would be against the evident policy of the law. Section 618 of Act No. 190, before it was amended, contained the following provision:
“* * * But the absence of such form of attestation shall not render the will invalid if it is proven that the will was in fact signed and attested as in this section provided.’
However, Act No. 2645 of the Philippine Legislature, passed on July 1, 1916, besides increasing the contents of the attestation clause, entirely suppressed the above-quoted provision. This would show that the purpose of the amending act was to surround the execution of a will with greater guarantees and solemnities. Could we, in view of this, hold that the court can cure alleged deficiencies by inferences, implications, and internal circumstantial evidence? Even in ordinary cases the law requires certain requisites for the conclusiveness of circumstantial evidence. It is contended that the deficiency in the attestation clause is cured by the last paragraph of the body of the alleged will, which we have quoted above. At first glance, it is queer that the alleged testator should have made an attestation clause, which is the function of the witnesses. But the important point is that he attests or certifies his own signature, or, to be more accurate, his signature certifies itself. It is evident that one cannot certify his own signature, for it does not increase the evidence of its authenticity. It would be like lifting one’s self by his own bootstraps. Consequently, the last paragraph of the will cannot cure in any way the fatal defect of the attestation clause of the witnesses. Adding a zero to an insufficient amount does not make it sufficient. It is said that the rules of statutory construction are applicable to documents and wills. This is true, but said rules apply to the body of the will, containing the testamentary provisions, but not to the attestation clause, which must be so clear that it should not require any construction. The parties have cited pro and con several decisions of the Supreme Court, some of which are said to be rather strict and others liberal, in the interpretation of section 618 of Act No. 190, as amended by Act No. 2645. In the case of Gumban vs. Gorecho (50 Phil., 30, 31), the court had the following to say:
“1. WILLS; ALLOWANCE OR DISALLOWANCE; SECTIONS 618 and 634 of the Code op Civil Procedure Construed.—The right to dispose of property by will is governed entirely by statute. The law is here found in section 618 of the Code of Civil Procedure, as amended by Act No. 2645, and in section 634 of the same Code, as unamended. The law not alone carefully makes use of the imperative, but cautiously goes further and makes use of the negative, to enforce legislative intention. “2. ID.; ID.; ID.; ATTESTATION.—The Philippine authorities relating to the attestation clause to wills reviewed. The cases of Safio vs. Quintana ([1925], 48 Phil., 506), and Nayve vs. Mojal and Aguilar ([1924], 47 Phil., 152), particularly compared. The decision in In re Will of Quintana, supra, adopted and reaffirmed. The decision in Nayve vs. Mojal and Aguilar, supra, modified. “3. ID.; ID.; ID.; ID.—The portion of section 618 of the Code of Civil Procedure, as amended, which provides that “The attestation clause shall state the number of sheets or pages used, upon which the will is written, and the fact that the testator signed the will and every page thereof, or caused some other person to write his name, under his express direction, in the presence of three witnesses, and the latter witnessed and signed the will and all pages thereof in the presence of the testator and of each other” applied and enforced. “4.ID.; ID.; ID.; ID.—An attestation clause which does not recite that the witnesses signed the will and each and every page thereof on the left margin in the presence of the testator is defective, and such a defect annuls the will. (Safio vs. Quintana,supra.)”
In the subsequent case of Quinto vs. Morata (54 Phil., 481, 482), Judge Manuel V. Moran, now Chief Justice of the Supreme Court, in his decision made the following pronouncement:
“* * * En la clausula de atestiguamiento del testamento en cuesti6n, se hace constar que los testadores firmaron el testamento en presencia de los tres testigos instrumental y que estos firmaron el testamento los unos en presencia de los otros, pero no se hace constar que dichos testigos firmaron el testamento en presencia de los testadores, ni que estos y aquellos firmaron todas y cada una de las paginas del testamento los primeros en presencia de los se-gundos y vice-versa. “En su virtud, se deniega la solicitud en la que se pide la legalizacion del alegado testamento Exhibit A de Gregorio Pueblo y Carmen Quinto, y se declara que Gregorio Pueblo murio intestado.”
The Supreme Court fully affirmed the decision, laying down the following doctrine:
“1. WILLS; ATTESTATION CLAUSE; EVIDENCE TO SUPPLY DEFECTS OF.— The attestation clause must be made in strict conformity with the requirements of section 618 of Act No. 190, as amended. Where said clause fails to show on its face a full compliance with those requirements, the defect constitutes sufficient ground for the disallowance of the will. (Sano vs. Quintana, 48 Phil., 506; Gumban vs. Gorecho, 50 Phil., 30). Evidence aliunde should not be admitted to establish facts not appearing on the attestation clause, and where said evidence has been admitted it should not be given the effect intended. (Uy Coque vs. Navas L. Sioca, 43 Phil., 405, 409.) “2.ID.; ID.; INTERPRETATION, OF SECTION 618 OF ACT NO. 190, AS AMENDED.—Section 618 of Act No. 190, as amended, should be given a strict interpretation in order to give effect to the intention of the Legislature. Statutes prescribing formalities to be observed in the execution of wills are very strictly construed. Courts cannot supply the defective execution of will. (40 Cyc, p. 1079; Uy Coque vs. Navas L. Sioca, supra.)
It is true that in subsequent decisions, the court has somewhat relaxed the doctrine of the Gumban vs. Gorecho case, supra, but not to the extent of validating an attestation clause similar to that involved herein. In the case of Aldaba vs. Roque (43 Phil., 378), the testatrix signed the attestation clause which was complete, and it was also signed by the two attesting witnesses. For this reason, the court said:
“In reality, it appears that it is the testatrix who makes the declaration about the points contained in the above described paragraph; however, as the witnesses, together with the testatrix, have signed the said declaration, we are of the opinion and so hold that the words above quoted of the testament constitute a sufficient compliance with the requirements of section 1 of Act No. 2645 which provides that: * * *” (p. 381, supra.)
The attestation clause involved herein is very different. In the case of Dichoso de Ticson vs. De Gorostiza (57 Phil., 437), it was held that:
“An attestation clause to a will, copied from a form book and reading: ‘We, the undersigned attesting witnesses, whose residences are stated opposite our respective names, do hereby certify that the testatrix, whose name is signed hereinabove, has publish unto us the foregoing will consisting of two pages as her Last Will and Testament, and has signed the same in our presence, and in witness whereof we have each signed the same and each page thereof in the presence of said testatrix and in the presence of each other,’ held not to be fatally defective and to conform to the law.”
This is very different from the attestation clause in the case at bar. In the case of Grey vs. Fabie[*] (40 Off. Gaz., 1st Supplement, 196, No. 3, May 23, 1939), the will was objected to on the ground that, although the attestation clause stated that “each of the pages of which the said will is composed” was signed by the testatrix at the left margin and at the foot of the fifth page, it did not state that the signature was made in the presence of the witnesses. It was held, however, that said deficiency was cured by the phrase “as well as by each of us in the presence of the testatrix.” The words “as well as” indicate that the testatrix signed also in the presence of the witnesses, for the phrase “as well as” in this case is equivalent to “also.” The language is clear and, unlike the attestation clause in the present case, does not necessitate any correction. In the body of the will the testatrix stated that she signed in the presence of each and all of the three witnesses. This was considered as a corroboration, but it was unnecessary. In the case of Leynez vs. Leynez (40 Off. Gaz., 3rd Supplement, 51, 52, No. 7, October 18, 1939; 68 Phil., 745), the attestation clause reads as follows:
“Suscrito y declarado por el testador Valerio Leynez, como su ultima voluntad y testamento en presencia de todos y cada uno de nosotros, y a ruego de dicho testador, firmamos el presente cada uno en presencia de los otros, o de los demas y de la del mismo testador, Valerio Leynez. El testamento consta de dos (2) paginas sola-mente.”
The objection was that the attestation clause did not state that the testator and the witnesses signed each and every page of the will. This fact, however, appears in the will itself. It is clear, therefore, that in that case the will complied with all the requisites for its due execution. In the instant case, essential words were omitted. In the case of Alcala vs. De Villa [1] (40 Off. Gaz., 14th Supplement, 131, 134-135, No. 23, April 18, 1939), the attestation clause reads as follows:
“Hacemos constar que en la fecha y pueblo arriba mencionados otorgo el Sr. Emiliano Alcala su ultima voluntad o testamento com-puesto de cuatro paginas incluida ya esta clausula de atestigua-miento. Que estabamos presentes en el momento de leer y ratificar el que el testamento arriba mencionado es su ultima voluntad o testamento compuesto de cuatro paginas en papel de maquinilla. Que igualmente estabamos presentes cuando el firmo este documento al pie del mismo y en el margen izquierdo de cada pagina del testador tambien en presencia suya y de cada uno da nosotros en cada pagina y en el margen izquierdo de esta escritura o testamento. En su testimonio firmamos abajo en presencia del testador y de cada uno de nosotros.”
The above attestation clause is substantially perfect. The only clerical error is that it says “testador” instead of “testamento” in the phrase “cada pagina del testador.” The word “tambien” renders unnecessary the use of the verb “firmamos.” In the case of Mendoza vs. Pilapil [2] (40 Off. Gaz., 1855, No. 9, June 27, 1941), the attestation clause did not state the number of pages of the will. However, it was held that this deficiency was cured by the will itself, which stated that it consisted of three pages and in fact it had three pages. In the case of Rallos vs. Rallos (44 Off. Gaz., 4938, 4940, No. 12, October 23, 1947), decided by the Court of Appeals, the attestation clause (translated in Spanish) reads as follows:
“Nosotros, los testigos, certificamos que este que hemo3 firmado es el testamento y ultima voluntad, que se ha redactado en cuatro paginas, de Numeriano Eallos, quien despues de leer y de leerle el mencionado testamento, y despues de que ella dio su conformidad, firtno y marco con su dedo pulgar derecho en nuestra presencia y en presencia de cada uno de nosotros, que asimismo cada uno de nosotros, loa testigos, firmamos en presencia de la testadora y en presencia de cada uno de nosotros.”
It will be noticed that the only thing omitted is the statement as to the signing of the testatrix and the witnesses of each and every page of the will, but the omission is cured by the fact that, their signatures appear on every page. This attestation clause is different from that involved in the present case. There is no reason why wills should not be executed by complying substantially with the clear requisites of the law, leaving it to the courts to supply essential elements. The right to dispose of property by will is not natural but statutory, and statutory requirements should be satisfied.
“The right to make a testamentary disposition of one’s property is purely of statutory creation, and is available only upon a compliance with the requirements of the statute. The formalities which the Legislature has prescribed for the execution of a will are essential to its validity, and cannot be disregarded. The mode so prescribed is the measure for the exercise of the right, and the heir can be deprived of his inheritance only by a compliance with this mode. For the purpose of determining whether a will has been properly executed, the intention of the testator in executing it is entitled to no consideration. For that purpose only the intention of the Legislature, as expressed in the language of the statute, can be considered by the court, and whether the will as presented, shows a compliance with the statute.” Estate of Walker, 110 Cal., 387, 42 Pac, 815, 30 L.R.A., 460, 52 Am. St. Rep. 104. In re Seaman’s Estate, 80 Pac, 700, 701.) “In interpreting the legislature’s thought, courts have rigidly opposed any exception tending to weaken the basic principle underlying the law, the chief purpose of which is to see that the testator’s wishes are observed. It is possible, in some or many cases, a decedent may have thought he had made a will, but the statute says he had not. The question is not one of his intention, but of what he actually did, or * * * failed to do * * . It may happen * * that * * * wills * * * truly expressing the intentions of the testators are made without observations of the required forms; and whenever that happens, the genuine intention is frustrated. * * * The legislature * * * has thought of it best and has therefore determined, to run the risk of frustrating (that intention, * * * in preference to the risk of giving effect to or facilitating the formation of spurious wills, by the absence of forms. * * * The evil of defeating the intention * * * is less than the evil probably to arise by giving validity to wills made without any form, * * *’ or, in derogation of testator’s wishes, fraudulently imposing spurious wills on his estate. Churchill’s Estate, 260 Pac. 94, 101, 103 Atl. 533. “It has always been the policy of this court to sustain a will if it is legally possible to do so, but we cannot break down the legislative barriers protecting a man’s property after death, even if a situation may be presented apparently meritorious.” (In Re: Maginn, 30 A.L.R., pp. 419, 420.)
In view of the foregoing, the decision appealed from is reversed, denying the probate of the alleged will and declaring intestate the estate of the deceased Carlos Gil. With costs against the appellee. It is so ordered. Moran, C. J., Pablo, Bengzon, Padilla and Reyes, JJ., concur.