[ G. R. No. L-3304. April 05, 1951 ] 88 Phil. 436
[ G. R. No. L-3304. April 05, 1951 ]
ANTONIO C. TORRES, PETITIONER AND APPELLANT VS. EDUARDO QUINTOS, RESPONDENT AND APPELLEE. D E C I S I O N
PARAS, C.J.:
The petitioner-appellant held the position of chief of police of the City of Manila from March 3, 1936, until the coming of the American liberation forces when Col. Marcus E. Jones, U. S. A., assumed the functions of the office on orders of Gen. Douglas MacArthur upon request of President Osmeiia. The petitioner served as assistant to Col. Jones until March 15, 1945, when he left the post at his own request. Col. Jones was relieved by Col. J. W. Holland, U. S. A., who remained as Manila chief of police until March 1, 1946, when Lt. Col. Angel Tuason, P. A., was appointed acting chief of police by the President of the Philippines. In the meantime, on March 18, 1945, the petitioner was taken into custody by C. I. C. and subsequently indicted for treason in the People’s Court which, however, acquitted him on January 16, 1948. During the pendency of the criminal case against the petitioner, Col. Lamberto T. Javalera was appointed chief of police of Manila in place of Col. Tuason; Col. Manuel de la Fuente replaced Col. Javalera; and the respondent-appellee, who was in turn appointed in place of Col. De la Fuente, qualified for the position on January 12, 1948, and has remained in said office. The appointments of Col. Javalera and the respondent were both confirmed by the Commission on Appointments. After his acquittal, or on February 6, 1948, the petitioner addressed a letter to the Mayor of Manila inquiring about his official status and impliedly asserting his right to be reinstated as chief of police, which claim was turned down. The petitioner, on July 7, 1948, sent a letter to the President of the Philippines reiterating his claim to the position. On January 17, 1949, the petitioner was advised by the Secretary of Justice to bring his case before the courts of justice. On January 26, 1949, the petitioner filed in the Supreme Court a petition for quo warranto against the respondent, but the same was dismissed on January 28, 1949, without prejudice to its filing in the Court of First Instance. The present quo warranto petition was instituted in the Court of First Instance of Manila on February 1, 1949. After hearing, judgment was rendered dismissing the petition on the ground that the same was not commenced within one year after the cause of the respondent’s ouster or the petitioner’s right to hold office arose, in accordance with section 16, Rule 68, of the Rules of Court. From this judgment the petitioner has appealed, pressing the contention made in the lower court that the reglementary period of one year was suspended during the pendency of petitioner’s request for reinstatement addressed, first, to the Mayor of Manila and, secondly, to the President of the Philippines. Reliance is-»placed on the decision in Agcaoili vs. Suguitan, (48 Phil., 676). There is every ground to hold that the petitioner’s right to hold the disputed office, if at all, arose in May, 1945, when he was replaced by Col. Jones and when he was arrested by the CIC and thereafter prosecuted for treason in the People’s Court. As a matter of fact, the petitioner admits, in his brief, that he had been deprived of said office “first by the arbitrary action of the Counter Intelligence Corps of the United States Army and, later On, during the pendency of the treason case in the People’s Court by his own sense of propriety.” And it is noteworthy that in Casin vs. Caluag (80 Phil., 758; 45 Off. Gaz., Supp. No. 9, p. 379), we have held that a special civil action for quo warranto may be tried and decided independently of a pending criminal case for treason. Hence, excessively more than one year had elapsed before the proper quo warranto petition was commenced. Assuming, however, that the petitioner’s cause of action arose only on January 12, 1948, when the respondent qualified for the position of the Manila chief of police, or on January 16, 1948, when the petitioner was acquitted by the People’s Court, the petition for quo warranto filed in the Supreme Court on January 28, 1949, is still beyond the one-year period prescribed in section 16 of Rule 68. In Abeto vs. Rodas, (82 Phil., 59; 46 Off. Gaz., 930), we applied section 16 of Rule 68 and held that the period fixed therein is a condition precedent to the existence of the cause of action, “with the result that, if a complaint is not filed within one year, it cannot prosper although the matter is not set up in the answer or motion to dismiss.” In said case, the petitioner (Abeto) filed a supplemental motion for reconsideration in which, invoking the case of Agcaoili vs. Suguitan, it was contended that the reglementary period of one year was suspended by the order of the President exonerating him from certain administrative charges, because the petitioner (Abeto) “was justified in waiting for the President of the Philippines to reappoint him as the logical and legal consequence of his exoneration,” and “only after considerable delay, when his hopes failed, did petitioner institute the present proceedings.” We denied said supplemental action in a minute resolution, the effect of which is of course to reject the theory that the pendency of an administrative remedy suspends the period within which a petition for quo warranto should be filed. The reason is obvious. While it may be desirable that administrative remedies be first resorted to, no one is compelled or bound to do so; and as said remedies neither are prerequisite to nor bar the institution of quo warranto proceedings, it follows that he who claims the right to hold a public office allegedly usurped by another and who desires to seek redress in the courts, should file the proper judicial action within the reglementary period. As emphasized in Bautista vs. Fajardo, (38 Phil., 62), and Tumulak vs. Egay (46 Off. Gaz., 3683) ,[*] public interest requires that the right of public office should be determined as speedily as practicable. This makes it unnecessary to take up the other contentions made as well by the petitioner as by the respondent. The appealed judgment is hereby affirmed with costs against the petitioner-appellant. So ordered. Pablo, Bengzon, Padilla, Montemayor and Jugo, JJ., concur.