[ G. R. No. L-2582. February 27, 1951 ] 88 Phil. 228
[ G. R. No. L-2582. February 27, 1951 ]
TRINIDAD SEMIRA ET AL., PETITIONERS, VS. JUAN ENRIQUEZ, JUDGE, COURT OF FIRST INSTANCE OF BATANGAS ET AL., RESPONDENTS.
PARAS, J.:
In civil case No. 43 of the Court of First Instance of Batangas between Trinidad Semira and Isidoro G. Mercado, as plaintiffs, and Bienvenido Azores, Apolonia Azores, Manuel Azores, Juana Azores, Jose R. Azores, Sinforosa Azores, Antonio Azores and Norberta Azores, as defendants, judgment was rendered in favor of the latter on July 7, 1944, notice of which was received by counsel for plaintiffs on August 7, 1944. On August 30, 1944, counsel for plaintiffs filed a motion for reconsideration. On May 26, 1948, after the record had been reconstituted, the Court of First Instance of Batangas denied the motion for reconsideration, notice of which was received by counsel for plaintiffs on June 21, 1948. On June 5, 1948, that is, before receipt of the notice of denial, counsel for plaintiffs filed a motion for an extension of fifteen days within which to perfect an appeal in case the motion for reconsideration should be denied. In the resolution of May 26, 1948, the court made it appear that the defendants filed the motion for reconsideration and the plaintiffs filed an opposition thereto, when the fact was that the plaintiffs filed the motion and the defendants filed the opposition. In view of this mjgtake, the plaintiffs filed, on the same day he received the order of denial, a motion for correction which was set for hearing on July 3, 1948. Failing to receive notice of any action either on the motion for extension or on the motion for correction, counsel for plaintiffs sent a letter of inquiry to the clerk of court. Thus prompted, the court issued an order dated September 25, 1948,—received by plaintiffs on October 2, 1948,— holding that the judgment of July 7, 1944, had become final and executory for plaintiffs’ failure to perfect their appeal on time even if the motion for an extension of fifteen days was granted, the motion for correction filed by plaintiffs on June 21, 1948, not having suspended the time for appeal, A petition for mandamus was filed by the plaintiffs against the Judge of the Court of First Instance of Batangas as sole respondent, to compel judicial action on the motion for correction, to set aside the order of September 25, 1948, and to have the time for appeal declared suspended. In our resolution of March 23, 1950, we directed the petitioners to amend their petition by impleading as respondents the defendants in civil case No. 43; and the case is now before us upon the corresponding amended petition and the answer thereto. In our resolution of March 23, 1950,[1] penned by Mr. Justice Padilla, the following decisive pronouncement was made: “The petitioners, plaintiffs in the case in the court below, were entitled to expect action by the respondent court on their petitions for extension of time to perfect the appeal and for correction of the order of 26 May 1948. The respondent court was tn duty bound to decide and resolve the two petitions and it is unfair for it to declare the judgment rendered in the case final and executory without first complying with its duty to resolve and decide the petitions for extension of time to perfect the appeal and for correction of the aforesaid order of 26 May 1948.” When the petitioners filed on August 30, 1944, the motion for reconsideration, they had seven days out of the reglementary 30-day period for appeal. They also had the same seven days when their motion for an extension of fifteen days was filed on June 5, 1948. On June 21, 1948, when the petitioners received notice of the order of the respondent judge denying their motion for reconsideration and when they filed their motion for correction, they still had said seven days to perfect an appeal. Although the petitioners set their motion for correction for hearing on July 34 1948, the respondent judge could and should have acted thereon on shorter notice not only because he could dispose of it on his own motion (sec. 4, Rule 26) but because the motion might be heard ex parte, in view of the nature of the order sought and the short period left for perfecting the appeal (Moya vs. Barton, 43 Off. Gaz., 836). Although litigants are not justified in taking for granted that their motions would be granted (Bonoan and Yabut vs. Ventura, et al.. 43 Off. Gaz., 4602) [*], the courts are bound to act—in proper cases—on all motions with sufficient dispatch necessary to allow the parties to avail themselves of proper remedies. This is implied in the mandate that “justice shall be impartially administered without unnecessary delay.” (Section 1, Rule 124.) The inherent power of the court “to amend and control its process and orders so as to make them conformable to law and justice,” (Sec. 5, Rule 124), carries the concomitant duty to correct its orders on its own initiative or upon motion of the parties. This duty is not affected by the nature of the error sought to be corrected. In the case at bar, the petitioners timely called the attention of the respondent judge to the misstatement contained in his order of May 26, 1948, and, more timely still, filed the motion for an extension of fifteen days to perfect an appeal. The respondent judge, in his order of September 25, 1948, admitted that, for unknown reasons, he was not able to dispose of the two motions sooner, but ruled in the same breath that the judgment of July 7, 1944, had become final and executory because the error was merely clerical and the period to appeal had expired even if the petitioners were granted the 15-day extension. The unfairness and injustice of this ruling are obvious from the fact that, while the respondent judge in effect admitted the necessity of swift action on petitioners’ motions, the petitioners are made to suffer the consequences of his inaction. The petitioners might have resorted to too technical a move, but this circumstance did not dispense with the duty of the respondent judge to straighten out the record of the case for all purposes. The petitioners are expected to file a record on appeal containing pertinent pleadings, motions and orders which are correct; and it cannot rightly be contended that they are ready to do so before the order of the respondent judge of May 26, 1948/xs changed in the sense indicated in petitioners’ motion for correction. Wherefore, the respondent judge is hereby directed to correct the misstatement appearing in his order of May 26, 1948, as pointed out in this opinion. The petitioners have seven days from notice of the order effecting the necessary corrections within which to perfect, if it is so desired, an appeal from the judgment in civil case No. 43 dated July 7, 1944. So ordered with costs against the respondents other than the respondent judge. Moran, C. J., Feria, Pablo, Bengzon, Padilla, Tuason, Reyes, Jugo and Bautista Angelo, JJ., concur.