[ G.R. No. L-3972. October 13, 1950 ] 87 Phil. 492
[ G.R. No. L-3972. October 13, 1950 ]
FLOREÑA SALES, ON BEHALF OF HER STEPFATHER FIDEL ARISTÓN, PETITIONER, VS. THE DIRECTOR OP PRISONS, RESPONDENT.
OZAETA, J.:
This is an original petition for habeas corpus filed on behalf of prisoner Fidel Aristón, now confined in the New Bilibid Prison. It appears that on August 31, 1939, Fidel Aristón was convicted of frustrated murder by the Court of First Instance of Camarines Sur and sentenced to suffer from 1 year and 8 months of prisión correccional to 7 years of prisión mayor. After serving 2 years, 3 months, and 1 day of that sentence, he was released on January 6, 1942, by virtue of a conditional pardon granted him by the President of the Philippines, the condition being that he shall not again violate any of the penal laws of the Philippines and that, should this condition be violated, he shall be proceeded against in the manner prescribed by law. On February 1, 1950, said prisoner was recommitted to the custody of the Director:, of Prisons after having been convicted of estafa and sentenced by the Court of First Instance of Manila to suffer 3 months and 11 days of arresto mayor and to indemnify the offended party in the amount of P180, with subsidiary imprisonment in case of insolvency. On April 10, 1950, the Executive Secretary, by authority of the President and by virtue of the authority conferred upon the President by section 64 (I) of the Revised Administrative Code, ordered the Director of Prisons to recommit to prison the said prisoner Fidel Aristón to serve the remaining unexpired portion of the sentence for which he was originally committed to prison, in view of the fact that he had violated the condition of his pardon in that he was subsequently convicted of estafa by the Court of First Instance of Manila. The present petition for habeas corpus is premised upon the contention that the President has no authority to order the prisoner’s recommitment to serve the unexpired portion of his original sentence, because violation of a conditional pardon is an offense penalized by article 159 of the Revised Penal Code, and that, unless the prisoner is prosecuted for and convicted of that offense, he cannot be compelled to serve the unexpired portion of his original sentence. Said article 159 reads as follows:
“ART. 159. Other Cases of Evasion of Service of Sentence.—The penalty of prisión correccional in its minimum period shall be imposed upon the convict who, having been granted conditional pardon by the Chief Executive, shall violate any of the conditions of such pardon. However, if the penalty remitted by the granting of such pardon be higher than six years, the convict shall then suffer the unexpired portion of his original sentence.”
On the other hand, the President of the Philippines is authorized by section 64 (i) of the Revised Administrative Code:
“(i) To grant to convicted persons reprieves or pardons, either plenary or partial, conditional, or unconditional; to suspend sentences without pardon, remit fines, and order the discharge of any convicted person upon parole, subject to such conditions as he may impose; and to authorize the arrest and reincarceration of any such person who, in his judgment, shall fail to comply with the condition, or conditions, of his pardon, parole, or suspension of sentence.” (Italics ours.)
The only question to determine is whether the above-quoted provision of the Revised Administrative Code has been repealed by section 159 of the Revised Penal Code. The Revised Penal Code, which was approved on December 8, 1930, contains a repealing clause (article 367), which expressly repeals among other Acts sections 102, 2670, 2671, and 2672 of the Administrative Code. It does not repeal section 64 (i) above quoted. On the contrary, Act No. 4103, the Indeterminate Sentence Law, which is subsequent to the Revised Penal Code, in its section 9 expressly preserves the authority conferred upon the President by section 65 (i) of the Revised Administrative Code. The legislative intent is clear, therefore, to preserve the power of the President to authorize the arrest and reincarceration of any person who violates the condition or conditions of his pardon notwithstanding the enactment of article 159 of the Revised Penal Code. In this connection, we observe that section 64 (i) of the Administrative Code and article 159 of the Revised Penal Code aré but a reiteration of Acts Nos. 1524 and 1561, under which a violator of a conditional pardon was liable to suffer and to serve the unexpired portion of the original sentence. It is contended by the petitioner that the power vested in the President by section 64 (i) of the Revised Administrative Code to authorize the arrest and reincarceration of a violator of a conditional pardon is repugnant to the due process of law granted by the Constitution (sec. 1, Article III). A similar contention was advanced by the petitioner in the case of Fuller vs. State of Alabama (45 L. R. A., 502), and was rejected by the Supreme Court of that state, speaking thru Chief Justice McClellan, in the following language:
“But it is insisted that this statute, in so far as it undertakes to authorize the governor to determine that the condition of the parole has not been complied with, and the summary arrest of the convict thereupon by the direction of the governor, and his summary return or remandment to servitude or imprisonment under the sentence, is violative of organic guaranties of jury trial, that no warrant shall be issued to seize any person without probable cause, supported by oath or affirmation, etc. This position takes no account of the fact that the person being dealt with is a convict, that he has already been seized in a constitutional way,, been confronted by his accusers and the witnesses against him, been tried by the jury of his peers secured to him by the Constitution, and by them been convicted of crime, and been sentenced to punishment therefor. In respect of that crime and his attitude before the law after conviction of it, lie is not a citizen, nor entitled to invoke the organic safeguards which hedge about the citizen’s liberty, but he is a felon, at large by the mere grace of the executive, and not entitled to be at large after he has breached the conditions upon which that grace was extended to him. In the absence of this statute, a convict who had broken the conditions of a pardon would, if there were no question of his identity or the fact of breach of the conditions, be subject to summary arrest, and remandment, as matter of course, to imprisonment, under the original sentence by the court of his conviction, or any court of co-ordinate or superior jurisdiction,—a purely formal proceeding. If the person arrested denied his identity with the convict sought to be remanded, he might be entitled to a jury trial on that issue alone. If he denied only the alleged breach of the conditions of his enlargement, he would not be entitled to a jury on that issue, but it would be determinable in a summary way by the court before whom he is brought. But the statute supervenes to avoid the necessity for any action by the courts in the premises. The executive clemency under it is extended upon the conditions named in it, and he accepts it upon those conditions. One of these is that the governor may withdraw his grace in a certain contingency, and another is that the governor shall himself determine when that contingency has arisen. It is as if the convict, with full competency to bind himself in the premises, had expressly contracted and agreed that, whenever the governor should conclude that he had violated the conditions of his parole, an executive order for his arrest and remandment to prison should at once issue, and be conclusive upon him. Of course, if, in the execution of the order of arrest, the wrong man should be taken, he would be entitled to enlargement on habeas corpus; but there is no question of identity in the case before us. Upon such determination by the governor, evidenced by the executive order of arrest, the parole is avoided, and the person who has been at large upon it at once falls into the category of an escaped convict, so far as measures for his apprehension and remandment under the original sentence are concerned, and he is, no more than an escaped convict, entitled to freedom from arrest, except upon probable cause, supported by oath or affirmation, nor to a trial by jury, nor to his day in court for any purpose. Kennedy’s Case, 135 Mass., 48; Conlon’s Case, 148 Mass., 168; Arthur vs. Craig, 48 Iowa, 264; 30 Am. Rep., 395; State, O’Connor vs. Wolfer, 53 Minn., 135; 19 L. R. A., 783.”
A similar ruling was laid down in Kennedy’s Case (135 Mass., 48) ; and in People vs. Dudley (173 Mich., 389). We are of the opinion that article 159 of the Revised Penal Code, which penalizes violation of a conditional pardon as an offense, and the power vested-in the President by section 64 (i) of the Revised Administrative Code to authorize the recommitment to prison of a violator of a conditional pardon to serve the unexpired portion of his original sentence, can stand together and that the proceeding under one provision does not necessarily preclude action under the other. Take, for instance, the case of the present prisoner Fidel Aristón. Although under section 64 (i) of the Revised Administrative Code he has been recommitted to serve the remitted portion of his original sentence—4 years, 8 months, and 29 days—for having violated the condition of his pardon, he may still be prosecuted under article 159 of the Revised Penal Code and sentenced to suffer prisión correccional in its minimum period. In other words, one who violates the condition of his pardon may be prosecuted and sentenced to suffer prisión correccional in its minimum period without prejudice to the authority conferred upon the President by section 64 (i) of the Revised Administrative Code to recommit him to serve the unexpired portion of his original sentence, unless such unexpired portion exceeds 6 years, in which case the penalty of prisión correccional in its minimum period provided fey article 159 of the Revised Penal Code shall no longer be imposed. There is no dispute in this case as to the identity of the prisoner and as to the violation by him of his conditional pardon. Wherefore, the petition is denied, with costs de oficio, the petitioner having been authorized to litigate as a pauper. Moran, C.J., Pablo, Bengzon, Tuason, Montemayor, and Reyes, JJ., concur.