[ G.R. No. L-3352. June 12, 1950 ] 86 Phil. 554
[ G.R. No. L-3352. June 12, 1950 ]
ILEANA A. CELIS ET AL., PETITIONERS AND APPELLEES, VS. SOLEDAD CAFUIR ET AL., RESPONDENTS AND APPELLANTS. D E C I S I O N
MONTEMAYOR, J.:
This is an appeal taken by the respondents, Soledad Cafuir and Jose Simeon, supposedly her husband, from a decision of the Court of First Instance of Manila in a habeas corpus case granting the petition for a writ of Habeas Corpus and ordering the Sheriff of Manila who then had custody of the boy Joel Cafuir (John Cafuir) to deliver said child to its mother, petitioner Ileana A. Celis. The appeal involving as it does only questions of law, we accept the findings of fact made by the trial court. The facts are few and quite simple and may be stated briefly as follows.
On July 10, 1946, petitioner, Ileana A, Celis, single, gave birth at the North General Hospital to a boy subsequently named Joel (John) Cafuir. The father seems to be unknown, although from what may be gathered from the decision appealed from, he was an American soldier who formed part of the American Liberation Forces. Due to the anger and extreme displeasure of the father of Ileana because of the alleged disgrace that she brought on herself and the family for having maintained illicit relations with a man to whom she had not been married and because of her father’s objection to having her soft in the paternal home where Ileana was then living, nine days after delivery, Joel was given to the custody of the respondent Soledad Cafuir, who thereafter took him direct from the hospital to her house, ministered to his needs and comfort, and even employed a nurse to take care of him, Ileana herself spent several days in Soledad’s house while recuperating; later, she returned to her own home leaving her child to the care of respondent Soledad. Thereafter, Ileana visited her child every Saturday, taking to him condensed milk, food, and a little money.
On September 17, 1948, Ileana married her co-petitioner Agustin C. Rivera. The couple thereafter decided to get back Joel Cafuir. Because of the refusal of respondent Soledad to give him up, petitioners sued out the corresponding writ of habeas corpus.
The theory of the respondents-appellants is that Ileana had definitely renounced her custody of and patria potestas over her child and that now she may not get him back. In support of this claim, Exhibits 4 and 1 were presented in evidence. The first exhibit is dated July 10, 194 6, the same day that John Cafuir was born at the hospital, and reads as follows:
“July 10, 1946 “To whom it may concern: “I hereby entrusted to Mrs. Soledad Cafuir of 131 Limasana, Quiapo, Manila, my son name John Cafuir, for the reason that I don’t have the means to bring the child up. “Anybody who may claim my son for adoption in the future without the consent of the under-signed is hereby ignored. “(Sgd.) “Nenita Celis “Mother”
The second, Exhibit 1, is dated November 2, 1946, and reads as follows:
“November 2, 1946 “To whom it may concern: “I, Nenita Cells, of 1196 Singalong, Malate, Manila, hereby designate Mrs. Soledad Cafuir, residing at 131 Limasana, R. Hidalgo, Quiapo, Manila to be the real guardian of my son, name Johnny Cafuir. “No one has the right to claim for adoption except Mrs. Soledad Cafuir. (Sgd.) “Nenita Celis “Mother”
The trial court found and rule)/that under these two exhibits signed by petitioner Ileana Cells, there is no basis for finding that she had renounced the custody of her child in favor of respondent Soledad. We agree with the said finding and ruling of the trial court.
In the case of Soria Diaz vs. Servando Estrera, (G.R, No. L-1155, June 30, 1947; 44 Off.Gaz., 4354), [1] this court in dismissing the petition for habeas corpus involving the custody of a child held that paternal authority or patria potestas may be waived, and it denied the petition of the mother to recover the custody of her child from the respondent Estrera. The facts in that case are, however, a little different from the those in the present case. There, the mother in giving up the custody of her child signed a document reading as follows:
“A quien concierna:
“Hago constar que yo, Soria Bernardo Diaz, filipina, mayor de edad y vecina del pueblo de Badian, Cebu, doy a mi hija Dulcisima que nacio en la propia casa de los esposos Senor y Señora, de Servando Estrera, del pueblo de Mandaue, Cebu, debido a su amor grande a mi hija y como correspondencia a sus preocupaciones y gastos con motivo de mi parto he ofrecido a ellos sin ninguna vacilacion o deseo de tener la referida niña,
“Hago entender que cuando firme este documento ha cesado mi autoridad sobre mi hija y si en los dias futuros intentare intervenir, reclamando dicha niña y sacandola, yo podria ser acusada ante los tribunales del pueblo para que me castiguen por la infraccion, que yo cometiere de este contrato que he firmado.
“He firmado esto en este dia 20 de Febrero del año 1944 en preseneia de los testigos que firman abajo.
(Fda.) “Soria Bernardo Diaz “Madre de la niña”
From a reading of the above-quoted document it is not hard to see that the mother definitely gave up and renounced all right and claim to the custody of her child. She even imposed against herself a penal sanction should she in the future try to claim her child. Moreover, in that case, the man to whom the mother gave the custody of her child was the latter’s adulterine father and that circumstance seems to be one of the considerations which impelled this court to overrule the mother’s claim and leave the custody of the child in status quo, for the reason that the respondent being the father, tho illegitimate, of the child, he had obligations and duties towards said child such as support, care, and education, and that said duties and obligations could best be complied with by keeping the child in his own home.
The facts in the present case, however, are quite different. The respondents, particularly Soledad, are strangers to the child. She is not related to him in any degree by consanguinity or affinity. Furthermore, the document wherein the boy’s mother is supposed to have definitely renounced custody over the child cannot be reasonably interpreted as having contemplated such renunciation. In the first document she merely entrusted her son to Soledad because she did not have the means to bring him up. The word “entrusted” cannot convey the idea of definite and permanent renunciation of the mother’s custody of her child.
The second document, Exhibit 1, merely designated respondent Soledad as the “real guardian” of the child. The designation of one as the guardian of another cannot and does not mean that said guardian will always assume and discharge the duties of the office or position. Guardianship is always or almost invariably understood to be temporary. While one is a minor or is incompetent, a guardian is appointed; but when minority has passed or incapacity has ceased, guardianship also terminates. The same reasoning may be applied in the present case. While petitioner Ileana was still unable to care for and support her child and because she could not bring said child to live with her in the home of her father, she entrusted its custody and care to respondent. Now that she has been emancipated from the parental authority of her father and now that she has already been married and is now in a position to care for and support her own child, this with the consent and desire of her husband, who joins her in the petition, there can no longer be any reason for depriving her of the custody of her boy. In her legitimate efforts, and to have her realize her natural desire in this respect, the law and this Court should give her every help.
Furthermore, the very last paragraph of Exhibit 1 to the effect that “no one has the right to claim for adoption except Mrs. Soledad Cafuir”, envisages a future act; it means that no one else may adopt the boy except respondent Soledad. It does not mean, however, that she has already adopted him. She may or may not adopt him. It is something yet to be done in the future. This the respondent has not done.
Of course, we realize and understand the position and attitude of respondent Soledad. She must have come to love the boy whom she raised from baby-hood and on whom she may have lavished her affections and spent money for rearing him up» To separate the boy from her now will mean a loss and mental suffering. But to assuage such suffering she has her own children, four of them,
Now, let us look at the other side of the picture. It shows to us the case of the real and natural mother legitimately, anxiously, and desperately trying to get back her child in order to fill the void in her heart and existence. She wants to make up for what she has failed to do for her boy during the period when she was financially unable to help him and when she could not have him in her house because of the objection of her father. Now that she has her own home and is in a better financial condition, she wants her child back, and we repeat that she has not and has never given him up definitely or with any idea of permanence.
This court should avert the tragedy in the years to come of having deprived other and son of the beautiful associations and tender, imperishable memories engendered by the relationship of parent and child. We should not take away from a mother the opportunity of bringing up her own child even at the cost of extreme sacrifice due to poverty and lack of means; so that afterwards, she may be able to look back with pride and a sense of satisfaction at her sacrifices and her efforts, however humble, to make her dreams of her little boy come true. We should not forget that the relationship between a foster mother and a child is not natural but artificial. If the child turns out to be a failure or forgetful of what its foster parents had done for him, said parents might yet count and appraise all that they have done and spent for him and with regret consider all of it as a dead loss, and even rue the day they committed the blunder of taking the child into their hearts and their home. Not so with a real natural mother who never counts the cost and her sacrifices, ever treasuring memories of her associations with her child, however unpleasant and disappointing. Flesh and blood count. On this point we quote with approval a paragraph in the decision of the trial court presided over by Judge Tiburcio Tancinco:
“El Juzgado mira con simpatia los esfuerzos hechos por la recurrida Soledad Cafuir y su familia por el cuidado del niño Joel, a quien se le ha rodeado de todas las comodidades y cuyos menores caprichos han sido satisfechos, y preve el dolor que causaria a ella y a los demas miembros de su familla la separacion del nino Joel, en quien se han acostumbrado a ver a un verdadero hijo. Pero si este carino es digno de adrairacion y de fsspeto, existe otro amor mas grande y mas digno de respeto, que es el amor de madre, no solo porque esta recoaocido y amparado por las leyes y constltuye un derecho mejor, sino porque tiene su origen en la misma sangre.”
The decision of the trial court does not assess the financial means of the mother to support and educate the boy. But bearing in mind the fact that she is now married to a man who with her is ready and willing to assume the responsibility of support and education, we may presume that the couple is able to discharge and cope with said responsibility. It is possible that the means of the respondent in this respect are more adequate, and that Joel would be better off staying and remaining with her. But financial means is not everything. Whether a child should stay permanently with a kindly stranger or with his own mother, is not to be determined alone by considerations of affluence or poverty. Poor youths who had to work their way thru school and college, have, not infrequently, scaled the heights of success, as easily and swiftly as their more favored companions, and done so with more, inner satisfaction, and credit to themselves and their humble parents.
As to the petition of respondents that they be indemnified in the sum of P5,531.15, the amount spent for the care and support of the child, we agree with the trial court that said claim should be made and established in a separate suit.
Pending the present appeal, upon motion of respondent Soledad, she was, by resolution of this Court dated October 14, 1949, given temporary custody of the boy Joel Cafuir, and pursuant thereto, the Sheriff had been directed to deliver said boy to Soledad, The dispositive part of the decision appealed from should therefore direct not the Sheriff but respondent Soledad to deliver the boy to petitioners. With this modification, the decision appealed from is affirmed, with costs.
Ozaeta, Pablo, Bengzon, and Reyes, JJ., concur.