[ G.R. No. L-2760. February 11, 1950 ] 85 Phil. 476
[ G.R. No. L-2760. February 11, 1950 ]
SIMPLICIO DURNA ET AL., PETITIONERS, VS. BIENVENIDO A. TAN, JUDGE OF THE COURT OF THE FIRST INSTANCE OF RIZAL, RIZAL CITY BRANCH, RESPONDENT. D E C I S I O N
MORAN, C.J.:
On August 26, 1948, an information for qualified theft was filed in the Court of First Instance of Rizal City charging the herein petitioners with having stolen an automobile belonging to Ned C. Cook which was parked in Port Area, City of Manila, on August 25, 1948, and which was later found in San Juan street, Rizal City. During the trial, after the prosecution had presented its evidence, the defense moved for the dismissal of the information on the ground that the trial court lacked jurisdiction to try the case. This motion and a subsequent motion for reconsideration were denied, and the defense was ordered to present its case. After presenting its evidence, the defense again moved for dismissal on the same ground and the lower court again denied the motion. Hence, this petition on the ground that the offense charged having been allegedly committed in Manila, the court of Rizal City has no jurisdiction to try the case.
Rule 106 of the Rules of Court provides in its Sections 5, 9 and 14 (a):
“Sec. 5. Sufficiency of complaint or information.—A complaint or information is sufficient if it states the name of the defendant; the designation of the offense by the statute; the acts or omissions complained of as constituting the offense; the name of the offended party; the approximate time of the commission of the offense, and the place wherein the offense was committed. “When an offense is committed by more than one person, all of them shall be included in the complaint or information.” “Sec. 9. Place of the commission of the offense.—The complaint or information is sufficient if it can be understood therefrom that the offense, was committed or some of the essential ingredients thereof occurred at some place within the jurisdiction of the court, unless the particular place wherein It was committed constitutes an essential element of the offense or is necessary for identifying the offense charged.” Sec. 14. Place where action is to be Instituted.—(a) In all criminal prosecutions the action shall be instituted and tried in the court of the municipality or province wherein the offense was committed or any one of the essential ingredients thereof took place.”
From the foregoing provisions and in accordance with settled jurisprudence, the commission of an offense is triable only in the courts of the place where the offense was allegedly committed. In the instant case, the offense charged was fully committed in the City of Manila where the automobile was allegedly stolen from its parking place in Port Area. The fact that said automobile was later found in Rizal City is not an essential ingredient of the crime but a mere circumstance which could add nothing to the nature of the offense or to its consummation. Hence, this circumstance cannot be made determinative of the jurisdiction of the trial court over the criminal action. In the case of People vs. Mercado (65 Phil., 665, 666) the defendant had stolen an animal in Gapan, Nueva Ecija, and had later taken it to Candaba, Pampanga, where it was found, and this Court held that the fact that the animal was taken to Pampanga did not give the court of that province concurrent jurisdiction to try the case because the consummation of the theft was completed when the animal was taken from the owner in Nueva Ecija, and its taking to Pampanga added nothing to the nature or consummation of the offense. The American rule that larceny is a continuing offense does not apply to theft because “carrying away” which is one of the characteristics of larceny is not an essential ingredient of theft, as stated by this Court in the Mercado case. If, as maintained by some members of the court, every moment’s continuance of the thief’s possession is a new taking and asportation, then criminal action would never prescribe against a thief in possession of the stolen thing. For all the foregoing, the Petition is hereby granted and respondent Judge is hereby ordered to dismiss the case for lack of jurisdiction. No costs.
Ozaeta, Paras, Pablo, and Torres, JJ., concur.
Bengzon, J., see dissenting opinion.
Padilla, Tuason, Montemayor, and Reyes, JJ., joins Justice Bengzon dissent.