[ G.R. No. L-2709. June 30, 1950 ] 86 Phil. 617
[ G.R. No. L-2709. June 30, 1950 ]
UY CHIN HUA, PETITIONER VS. RAFAEL DINGLASAN, JUDGE OF THE COURT OF FIRST INSTANCE OF MANILA, RESPONDENT. D E C I S I O N
OZAETA, J.:
The question raised in this case is, which court has original jurisdiction to try an offense penalized with destierro or banishment—the municipal court or the court of first instance?
The petitioner was charged in the Court of First Instance of Manila with attempted bribery by offering the sum of P6 to patrolmen A. Caudal and L. de los Santos in consideration of their refraining from arresting him for a violation of the Price Tag Law (Republic Act No. 71). which offer the said police officers rejected, and placed the offeror under arrest.
Upon denial of his motion to quash for lack of jurisdiction, the petitioner filed the present petition for certiorari (which we interpret to mean prohibition), praying that the respondent judge be ordered to refrain from further proceeding on the ground that he has no jurisdiction to take cognizance of the case.
The consummated crime of bribery or corruption of public officials is penalized by article 212, in relation to the third paragraph of article 210 of the Revised Penal Code, with arresto mayor in its medium and maximum periods. The penalty for the attempted crime is two degrees lower, which is destierro in its minimum and medium periods. That means that the culprit shall be banished from his present residence (not imprisoned) for a period of not less than 6 months and 1 day and not more than 4 years and 2 months.
We are unanimous in the conclusion that the court of first instance has no jurisdiction over the offense charged and that therefore the writ of prohibition lies. But we are not unanimous as the reasons. A minority hold that if the scale provided by article 71 of the Revised Penal Code is to be followed, the penalty of destierro would have to be imposed which, they claim, would produce an absurdity because the duration of said penalty is from 6 months and 1 day to 6 years—“co-extensive with prision correccional, a penalty higher than arresto mayor in the scale provided by article 71.” Therefore, the minority hold that the penalty of destierro should be applied only when it is specifically imposed and should be disregard in the scale provided in article 71. In other words, the minority think that the penalty imposable for the offense charged is arresto menor.
A majority of the court, including the writer of this opinion, find no justification for disregarding the scale of penalties provided in article 71 and for not applying the penalty of destierro to the offense charged, in accordance with article 51 in relation to the scale of penalties provided in said article 71 of the Revised Penal Code.
To disregard the scale of penalties provided in article 71 and to apply destierro only to crimes specifically punished with that penalty, such as those mentioned in articles 247 and 334, would be to amend or change the law, and the court is not empowered to do so. Our sworn duty is to apply the law and not to tamper with it.
Destierro is not higher penalty than arresto mayor. Arresto mayor means imprisonment or complete deprivation of liberty, whereas destierro means banishment or only a prohibition from residing within the radius of 25 kilometers from the actual residence of the accused for a specified length of time. The respective severities of arresto mayor and destierro must not be judged by the duration of each of these penalties, but by the degree of deprivation of liberty involved. Penologists have always considered destierro lighter than arresto mayor. Such criterion is reflected both in the old Spanish Penal Code and in our Revised Penal Code. In the graduated scale of article 71 the lawmaker has placed destierro below arresto mayor. There is, therefore, no basis in fact or in law for holding that destierro is a higher penalty that arresto mayor and that an offense penalized with destierro falls under the jurisdiction of the court of first instance.
The judiciary Act of 1948 (Republic Act No. 296) does not expressly confer original jurisdiction on the court of first instance over offenses penalized with destierro. Section 44 of said Act provides that Courts of First Instance shall have original jurisdiction “(f) in all criminal cases in which the penalty provided by law is imprisonment for more than six months, or a fine of more than two hundred pesos.” And.section 87 of the same Act provides that justices of the peace and judges of municipal courts of chartered cities shall have original jurisdiction over “(b) all offenses in which the penalty provided by law is imprisonment for not more than six months 3 or a fine of not more than two hundred pesos, or both such fine and imprisonment .”
Thus there exists a gap in the law as to which court shall have original jurisdiction over offenses penalized with destierro or banishment. Until the lawmaking body should fill that gap by expressly providing otherwise, the Court must do so by reasonable interpretation of the existing law. The reasonable and logical interpretation, in our opinion, is this: Since the legislature has placed offenses penalized with arresto mayor under the jurisdiction of justice of the peace and municipal courts, and since by article 71 of the Revised Penal Code, as amended by section 3 of Commonwealth Act No. 217, it has placed destierro below arresto mayor as a lower penalty than the latter, in the absence of any express provision of law to the contrary it is logical and reasonable to infer from said provisions that its intention was to place offenses penalized with destierro also under the jurisdiction of justice of the peace and municipal courts and not under that of Courts of First Instance.
The writ of prohibition will be issued, without any finding as to costs.
Pablo, Bengzon, and Tuazon, JJ., concur.
MORAN, C.J.:
I concur in the result.
MONTEMAYOR, J.:
I concur in the result.
REYES, J.:
I concur in the result.
MORAN, C.J.:
I hereby certify that Mr. Justice Padilla took part in the consideration of this case and concurred in the opinion of the majority.