[ G.R. No. L-2248. April 28, 1950 ] G.R. No. L-2248
[ G.R. No. L-2248. April 28, 1950 ]
IN THE MATTER OF THE PETITION OF VICENTE ROSAL PARDO TO BE ADMITTED A CITIZEN OF THE PHILIPPINES. VICENTE ROSAL PARDO, PETITIONER-APPELLEE, VS. REPUBLIC OF THE PHILIPPINES, OPPOSITOR-APPELLANT. R E S O L U T I O N
TUASON, J.:
This case is again before the Court, this time on a motion for reconsideration.
In our decision we says “As the Spanish Civil Code has been and still is ’the basic code in force in the Philippines,’ Articles 17 et seq thereof may be regarded as matters known to judges of the Philippines by reason of their judicial functions and judicially recognized by them without the introduction of proof. (Section 5, Rule 123.)”
The court is supposed to know that the Civil Code is the code of Spain, and this judicial knowledge embraces all its provisions, including those which have ceased to be in operation in the Philippines. This court has said that it is not, by reason of an opinion expressed by an expert witness, precluded from advising itself as to the common law of England. (Bryan vs. Eastern and Western Asso. Co., 28 Phil. 310.) If the court may take cognizance of the common law of England, there is perhaps at least as much reason that it may do so of the Spanish citizenship law, which was our own citizenship law until Spain relinquished its sovereignty over the Philippines and which is a part of the code that is still the major branch of law of our country although the said part is no longer applicable here.
In the matter of the application of Rafael Roa Yrostorza for naturalization, G.R. No. L-1394 we said that “There was no proof that Spain had a law which grants Filipinos the right to become naturalized citizens of that country,” and returned the case to the court of origin with instruction to reopen the hearing and give the parties new opportunity to establish or disprove the existence of such law. We have to confess that the remand for further proceeding was unnecessary. Oversight is the explanation, made possible by the failure of either party to direct our attention to the articles of the Civil Code of which we have been, in the present case, apprised by the applicant.
In the decision sought to be reconsidered we also say that in a number of decisions, which we cite, mere authentication of the Chinese naturalization law by the Chinese consulate general in Manila has been taken as competent proof of that law. The Solicitor General takes exception to this passage, in the following observations
“With regard to the second question under consideration as to whether the certification of the supposed naturalization laws of Spain made by the Spanish Consul General constitutes competent proof of that law, this Court cites In support of its opinion the cases of: Jose Leelin vs. Republic of the Philippines, G.R. No. L-1761; Bienvenido Yap vs. The Solicitor General, G.R. No. L-1602; Yee Boo Mann vs. Republic of the Philippines, G.R. No. L-1606; and Jose Go @ Joseph Cotianuy vs. Anti-Chinese League of the Philippines and Felipe Fernandez, G.R. No. L-1563. We have carefully gone over these cases and we beg leave to point out that in, each of them this Court did not rule that the mere authentication, of the Chinese Naturalization. Law by the Chinese Consulate General of Manila constitute competent proof of that law, but that the question as to whether or not the copy of the Chinese Nationality Law presented in said cases were properly authenticated and admissible in evidence to prove reciprocity, as required in Sec. 4(h) of the Revised Naturalization Law, has become academic because of the admission made by counsel for the oppositor (Republic of the Philippines) to the effect that in another case, there has been presented a copy of the naturalization laws of China duly authenticated in accordance with the Rules of Court.”
The decisions referred to seen to have been misread. In Bienvenido Yap vs. Solicitor General, G.R. No. L-1602, the document admitted, Exhibit “E”, purported to be “a copy of the Chinese law of citizenship, where it appears that Filipinos can acquire Chinese citizenship by naturalization.” There was nothing in that decision which would show that the certificate or authentication was made by a Philippine diplomatic or consular representative in China. In Jose Leelin vs. Republic of the Philippines, G.R. No. L-1761, we said that “in previous cases, a translation of the Chinese Naturalization Law, made and certified to be correct by the Chinese Consulate General in Manila, was admitted and considered sufficient evidence to establish that the laws of China permit Filipinos to become citizens of that country.” In Yee Boo Mann vs. Republic of the Philippines, G.R. No. L-1606, the petitioner introduced in evidence a translation of the Chinese naturalization law, certified to be correct by the Chinese consul general in Manila. The Court held in that case that the objection to the evidence “is of no moment, since this Court has already accepted it as a fact in previous naturalization cases that the laws of China permit Filipinos to naturalize in that country.” And the Court disposed of Lock Beng Ping vs. Republic of the Philippin.es, G. R. No. L-1675, on the strength of the pronouncement} just ’ quoted, in the Yee Boo Mann decision.
If it be true, as the Solicitor General notes, that in the Yap case the ratio decidendi was that “there has been presented a copy of the naturalization laws of China duly authenticated in. accordance with the Rules of Court^ then the decision recognized as a fact the existence of a law of China under which Filipinos may be naturalized. Of this fact the Court properly assumed judicial knowledge in the cases that came up before it soon after[1]
We realize that a copy of a foreign law certified only by the local consul of the applicant’s country does not conform to the requirement concerning the certification and authentication of such law (Sec. 41, Rule 123.) But the case at bar and the cases cited therein as precedents are not governed by the Rules of Court,, Rule 132 entitled “Applicability of the Rules” provides that “These rules shall not apply to land registration, cadastral and election cases, naturalization and insolvency proceedings, and other cases not herein provided for except by analogy or in a suppletory character and whenever practicable and convenient.” By reason of this provision, literal adherence to the Rules of Court, which include rules of evidence, is not obligatory in a proceeding like that under consideration. While naturalization proceeding under the Philippine law is judicial in character, and strict compliance with the process prescribed by statute, if there were one, would be essential, yet when, as here, no specific procedure is indicated in the premises, it is only necessary that the merits of the petition be passed on and a decision reached on a fair consideration, of the evidence on satisfactory proof. Accordingly, evidence of the law of a foreign country on reciprocity regarding the acquisition of citizenship, although not meeting the prescribed rule of practice by Section hi of Rule 123, may be allowed and used as basis for a favorable action if, in the light of all the circumstances, the court is satisfied of the authenticity of the written proof offerred.
The motion for reconsideration is therefore denied.
Moran, C.J., Ozaeta, Pablo, Bengzon, Montemayor, and Reyes, JJ., concur.