[ G.R. No. L-2216. January 31, 1950 ] 85 Phil. 431
[ G.R. No. L-2216. January 31, 1950 ]
DEE C. CHUAN & SONS, INC., PETITIONER, VS. THE COURT OF INDUSTRIAL RELATIONS, CONGRESS OF LABOR ORGANIZATIONS (CLO), KAISAHAN NG MGA MANGGAGAWA SA KAHOY SA PILIPINAS AND JULIAN LOMANOG AND HIS WORK-CONTRACT LABORERS, RESPONDENTS. D E C I S I O N
TUASON, J.:
Dee C. Chuan & Sons, Inc. assails the validity of an order of the Court of Industrial Relations. The order, made upon petitioner’s request for authority to hire “about twelve (12) more laborers from time to time and on a temporary basis,” contains the proviso that “the majority of the laborers to be employed should be native.” The petition was filed pending settlement by the court of a labor dispute between the petitioner and Kaisahan Ng Mga Manggagawa sa Kahoy sa Pilipinas.
At the outset, the appellant takes exception to the finding of the court below that Dee C. Chuan & Sons, Inc., is capitalized with foreign capital and managed by person of foreign descent. This question has little or no bearing on the case and may well be passed over except incidentally as a point of argument in relation to the material issues. It is next said that “The Court of Industrial Relations cannot intervene in questions of selection of employees and workers so as to impose unconstitutional restrictions,” and that “The restriction of the number of aliens that may be employed in any business, occupation, trade or profession of any kind, is a denial of the equal protection of the laws.” Although the brief does not name the persons who are supposed to be denied the equal protection of the laws, it is clearly to be inferred that aliens in general are in petitioner’s mind. Certainly, the order does not, directly or indirectly, immediately or remotely, discrimate against the petitioner on account of race or citizenship. The order could have been issued in a case in which the employer was a Filipino. As a matter of fact the petitioner insists that 75% of its shares of stock are held by Philippine citizens, a statement which is here assumed to be correct. But is petitioner entitled to challenge the constitutionality of a law or an order which does not adversely affect it, in behalf of aliens who are prejudiced thereby? The answer is not in doubts An alien,may question the constitutionality of a statute (or court order) only when and so far as it is being, or is about to be, applied to his disadvantage. (16 C. J. S. 157 et seq.) The prospective employees whom the petitioner may contemplate employing have not come forward to seek redress; their identity has not even been revealed. Clearly the petitioner has no case in so far as it strives to protect the rights of others, much less others who are unknown and undetermined,, U. S. vs. Wong Kum Ark, 169 U.S. 649, Truax vs. Raich, 239 U. S. 39, 60 L. ed. 131, and other American decisions cited do not support the petitioner for the very simple reason that in those cases it was the persons themselves whose rights and immunities under the constitution were being violated that invoked the protection of the courts. The petitioner is within its legitimate sphere of interest when it complains that the appealed order restrains it in its liberty to engage the men it pleases. This complaint merits a more detailed examination. That the employer’s right to hire labor is not absolute has to be admitted. “This privilege of hiring and firing ad libitum is, or course, being subjected to restraints today.” Statutes are cutting in on it. And so does Commonwealth Act No. 103. The regulations of the hours of labor of employees and of the employment of women and children are familiar examples of the limitation of the employer’s right in this regard. The petitioner’s request for permission to employ additional laborers is an implicit recognition of the correctness of the proposition. The power of the legislature to make regulations is subject only to the condition that they should be affected with public interest and reasonable under the circumstances o The power may be exercised directly by the law-making body or delegated by appropriate rules to the courts or administrative agencies. We are of the opinion that the order under consideration meets the test of reasonableness and public interest. The passage of Commonwealth Act No. 103 was “in conformity with the constitutional objective and * * * the historical fact that industrial and agricultural disputes have given rise to disquietude, bloodshed and revolution in our country.” (Antamok Goldfields Mining Co. vs. Court Industrial Relations, 40 Off. Gaz., 8th Supp., 173.)[1]“Commonwealth Act No. 103 has precisely vested the Court of Industrial Relations with authority to intervene in all disputes between employers and employees or strikes arising from differences as regards wages, compensation, and other labor condition which it may take cognizance of.” (Central Azucarera de Tarlac vs. Court Industrial Relations, 40 Off. Gaz., 3rd Supp., 319, 324.)[1] Thus it has jurisdiction to determine the number of men to be laid off during off-season. By the same token, the court may specify that a certain proportion of the additional laborers to be employed should be Filipinos, if such condition, in the court’s opinion, “is necessary or expedient for the purpose of settling disputes, preventing further disputes or doing justice to the parties.” The order in question has that specific end in view. In parallel vein the court observed: “Undoubtedly, without the admonition of the Court, nothing could prevent petitioner from hiring purely alien laborers, and there is no gainsaying the fact that further conflict or dispute would naturally ensue. To cope with this contingency, and acting within the powers granted by the organic law, the court, believing in the necessity and expediency of making parent its desire to avoid probable and possible further misunderstanding between the parties, issued the order.” We are not prepared to declare that the order is not conducive to the aim pursued. The question is a practical one depending on facts with which the court is best familiar. The fact already noted should not be lost sight of—that there is a pending strike and, besides, that the employment of temporary laborers was opposed by the striking employees and was the subject of a protracted hearing. We can not agree with the petitioner that the order constitutes an unlawful intrusion into the sphere of legislation, by attempting to lay down a public policy of the state or to settle a political question. In the first place, we believe, as we have already explained, that the court’s action falls within the legitimate scope of its jurisdiction. In the second place, the order does not formulate a policy and is not political in character. It is not a permanent, all-embracing regulation. It is a compromise and emergency measure applicable only in this case and calculated to bridge a temporary gap and to adjust conflicting interests in an existing and menacing controversy. The hiring of Chinese laborers by the petitioner was rightly considered by the court likely to lead the parties away from the reconciliation which it was the function of the court to effectuate. As far as the petitioner is concerned, the requirement that majority of the laborers to be employed should be Filipinos is certainly not arbitrary, unreasonable or unjust« The petitioner’s right to employ labor or to make contract with, respect thereto is not unreasonably curtailed and its interest is not jeopardized. We take it that the ’nationality of the additional laborers to be taken in is immaterial to the petitioner. In its application for permission to employ twelve temporary laborers it expressly says that these could be Filipinos or Chinese. On the face of this statement, assuming the same to be sincere, the petitioner’s objection to the condition imposed by the court would appear to be academic and a trifle. We should not close without adverting to the fact that the petitioner does not so much as pretend that the hiring of additional laborers is its prerogative as a matter of right. It seems to be conceded that during the pendency of the dispute the petitioner could employ temporary laborers only with the permission of the Court of Industrial Relations. The granting of the application thus lies within the sound judgment of the court, and if the court could turn it down entirely, as we think it could, its authority to qualify the permission should be undeniable, provided only that the qualification is not arbitrary, against law, morals, or established public policy, which it is not as an expidient and emergency step designed to relieve petitioner’s own difficulties. Also important to remember is that it is not compulsory on petitioner’s part to take advantage of the order. Being a permitee petitioner is the sole judge of whether it should take the order qs it is, or leave it if it does not suit its interest to hire, new laborers other than Chinese. The order appealed from is affirmed with costs to this .appeal,against the petitioner-appellant.
Moran, C. J., Pablo, Bengzon, Padilla, and Torres, JJ., concur. Ozaeta, J., see dissenting opinion. Paras, Montemayor and Reyes, JJ., joins the dissent of Justice Ozaeta.