[ G.R. No. L-2734. March 17, 1949 ] 83 Phil. 132
[ G.R. No. L-2734. March 17, 1949 ]
PHILIPPINE TRUST COMPANY, PETITIONER, VS. LUIS MA. ARANETA ET AL., RESPONDENTS. R E S O L U T I O N
FERIA, J.:
This is an appeal by certiorari filed by the petitioner Philippine Trust Co. a banking corporation from the decision of the Court of Appeals, which affirms the judgment of the Court of First Instance of Manila.
Before the occupation of Manila by the Japanese military forces, the respondent and appellee Luis Ma. Araneta was indebted to the petitioner and appellant in the sum of P4,000, and as a collateral therefor, said respondent pledged the certificates of stock listed in the decision of the Court of First Instance. The balance of P3,683.60 was, upon demand of the appellant, paid by the appellee on May 2, 1944, in Japanese military notes, but the certificates of stocks pledged could not then be released, because according to the appellant, at the outbreak of the war, they were turned over to the American authorities and sent to the United States for safekeeping. After liberation, appellee demanded from the petitioner the return of the certificates of stocks, out the petitioner refused to do so, on the ground that the payment in Japanese war notes was not valid.
A complaint was filed with the Court of First Instance of Manila by the appellee against the appellant to recover the certificates of stock in question, and the latter set up as defense that it accepted the payment of the appellee’s obligation under duress, and therefore the payment was not valid. The Court of First Instance rendered judgment in favor of the appellee on the ground that the payment was voluntarily made and accepted, and therefore it was valid and extinguished the appellee’s obligation to the appellant, and ordered the latter to return to the former the certificates of stock listed in the decision. On appeal from the decision of the lower court to the Court of Appeals the decision was affirmed.
The appellant admits that, as testified to by the then acting president of the petitioner during the Japanese occupation, “neither the appellee nor the Japanese military authorities exercised any duress on the appellee Bank to accept the payment.” But the appellant contends that there was a collective and general duress exercised by the Japanese military occupant, because the latter ordered that the war-notes may be used in making payments of all kinds, and any attempt to interfere with the circulation of said notes, such as rejection of payment with said notes will be considered as hostile and will be punished severely (Proclamation dated January 3, 1942), and also ordered the reopening of such banking institution (not enemy banks) as may be notified in the City of Manila, one of them the appellant (Proclamation of January 23, 1942).
The question whether or not said orders constituted a collective and general duress and invalidated the payment made by the appellee to the appellant is a question of law, and not of fact, and for that, reason the petitioner asks that the present appeal by certiorari be allowed, under Rule 46 of the Rules of Court which provides that questions of law may be raised in an appeal by certiorari from a judgment of the Court of Appeals.
But even though such a question be raised the Supreme Court has, according to said rule, discretion to dismiss the petition if the Court of Appeals has decided a question in accord, with law or the applicable decision of this Supreme Court. As the judgment of the Court of Appeals in so far as it affirms the decision of the Court of First Instance which upholds the validity of the payment under consideration is in accord with the decisions of this Court in the cases of Laurel vs. Misa (77 Phil., 856), and Haw Pia vs. China Banking Corporation, (80 Phil., 604), the appeal by certiorari must be dismissed.
In the case of A. Laurel vs. Misa, this Court held:
“Considering that, although the military occupant is enjoined to respect or continue in force, unless absolutely prevented by the circumstances, those laws that enforce public order and regulate the social and commercial life of the country, he has, nevertheless, all the powers of a de facto government and may, at his pleasure, either change the existing laws or make new ones when the exigencies of the military service demand such action, that is, when it is necessary for the occupier to do so for the control, of the country and the protection of his army, subject to the restrictions or limitations imposed by the Hague Regulations, the usages established by civilized nations, the laws of humanity and the requirements of public conscience (Peralta vs. Director of Prisons, supra; 1940 U. S. Rules of Land Warfare, 76, 77); and that, consequently, all acts of the military occupant dictated within these limitations are obligatory upon the inhabitants of the territory, who are bound to obey thorn, and the laws of the legitimate government which have not been adopted, as well and those which, though continued in force, are in conflict with such laws and orders of the occupier, shall be considered as suspended or not in force and binding upon said inhabitants;” (Laurel vs. Misa, G. R. No. L-409,[1] pp. 3-4, minute resolution.)
And in the case of Haw Pia vs. China Banking Corporation we held that, under the rules of Public International Law, the right of the military occupant, in the exercise of his governmental power, to order the liquidation of enemy banks and the reopening of others in the occupied enemy territory, as well as to issue military currency as legal tender, has never been seriously questioned.
In view of the foregoing, it is evident that the payment made by the respondent-appellee and accepted by the petitioner and appellant during the Japanese occupation in compliance with the said orders of the Japanese military occupant, can not be considered as made under a collective and general duress, because an act done pursuant to the laws or orders of competent authorities can never be regarded as executed involuntarily, or under duress or illegitimate constraint or compulsion that invalidates the act.
Wherefore, the petition for certiorari is denied and the appeal dismissed.
Moran, C.J., Paras, Pablo, Bengzon, Briones, and Reyes, JJ., concur.