[ G.R. No. L-2617. December 29, 1949 ] G.R. No. L-2617
[ G.R. No. L-2617. December 29, 1949 ]
PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, PETITIONER, VS. HON. EULOGIO F. DE GUZMAN, AS JUDGE OF THE II BRANCH OF THE COURT OF FIRST INSTANCE OF PANGASINAN, AND ROMEO GERMENIANO, RESPONDENTS. D E C I S I O N
OZAETA, J.:
The respondent Romeo Germeniano was charged in the People’s Court by the Office of Special Prosecutors with the crime of treason under a single count, to wit: that on or about December 12, 1944, in the municipality of Aguilar, Pangasinan, said accused took part in the apprehension and arrest of one Victor Pastorin; a person suspected of being a guerilla, and in his subsequent confinement. The accused is at liberty on bail and has not yet been arraigned. After the abolition of the People’s Court the case was transferred to the Court of First Instance of Pangasinan in accordance with section 2 of Republic Act No. 311. Subsequently and on September 21, 1948, a Special Attorney of the Office of the Solicitor General filed an amendment to the information consisting of two new counts which refer to two overt acts distinct from that alleged in the original information. The respondent judge admitted the amended information and ordered the justice of the peace of the capital to conduct a prelimary investigation with respect to the new counts in accordance with the Rules. The present petition for certiorari has been presented in behalf of the People to annul the order of the respondent judge insofar as it requires a preliminary investigation of the new counts alleged in the amended information. Petitioner relies on the decision of this court in Guinto vs. Veluz, G.R. No. L-980. In that case the Office of Special Prosecutors filed in the People’s Court after the expiration of the six-month period provided in Commonwealth Act No. 6£2 an amended information adding new counts or alleged overt acts, and the question there presented was whether the information could be so amended in the People’s Court subsequent to the expiration of the deadline for the filing of an original information therein. This court held that the amended information was properly admitted because it did not constitute a new information since it did not charge another crime different from that charged in the original one, and because to hold otherwise would necessitate the filing of another information in the proper Court of First Instance, thereby splitting the single crime of treason committed by the accused into two and putting him in jeopardy of being convicted twice for the same offense. That case does not control the present. The question here presented is whether the respondent judge acted in excess of his jurisdiction or with grave abuse of discretion in requiring a preliminary investigation of the new counts alleged for the first time before him in the amended information. There is no question that if the amendments had been presented in the People’s Court, there would have been no need of a previous preliminary investigation in virtue of the proviso contained in section 22 of Commonwealth Act No. 682 “that, in cases triable before the People’s Court, a preliminary examination and/or investigation shall not be required.” But, although Commonwealth Act No. 682 has not been expressly repealed by Republic Act No. 311 abolishing the People’s Court and the Office of Special Prosecutors, we are of the opinion that the proviso contained in section 22 of Commonwealth Act No. 682 is no longer in force and may not be invoked with regard to new cases or new counts filed in the Court of First Instance. The People’s Court having been abolished, there are no more cases triable before it. Although the new counts may be added to the one alleged in the original information, they constitute distinct overt acts of treason which may not be tried before the Court of First Instance without a preliminary investigation. In the event the prosecution be unable to prove the overt act alleged in the original information, the accused would be entitled to an acquittal; and if the overt acts alleged in the amendment to the information be not established prima facie at the preliminary investigation, the accused would be entitled to dismissal without having to go to trial thereon. A preliminary investigation is a right of the accused which cannot be denied in the absence of a law specifically dispensing with it. The petition is denied, without costs. Moran, C.J., Paras, Bengzon, Padilla, Tuason, Reyes, and Torres, JJ., concur.