[ G.R. No. L-2451. February 24, 1949 ] 82 Phil. 828
EN BANC
[ G.R. No. L-2451. February 24, 1949 ]
JOSE M. TUMULAK, PETITIONER, VS. PROTOLICO EGAY, RESPONDENT. D E C I S I O N
BENGZON, J.:
Through this quo warranto proceeding filed in August, 1948, the petitioner seeks to wrest from respondent the position of justice of the peace of the municipalities of Gigaquit and Bacuag, province of Surigao. He alleges that in December, 1932, he became the duly appointed judge of said towns and acted accordingly until August, 1942, when the Japanese seized the province; that after the liberation, and in January, 1946, he received from President Sergio Osmeña an appointment ad interim for the same position; that in May, 1946, he duly qualified and assumed the office; that thereafter he went to Cebu to fetch his family, but upon returning he found the respondent Protolico Egay occupying the post beginning July, 1946; that he “had no other remedy” but to “accept the situation”; that in February, 1948, he was informed of the decision of this Court in Tavora vs. Gavina,[1] that thereafter and pursuant to said decision he asked the Department of Justice for reinstatement; and that, having failed to obtain relief, he instituted this litigation to vindicate his right to the office.
Required to answer, respondent submits a motion to dismiss the case, asserting that the action has lapsed because it was commenced more than one year after the cause of action had accrued.
The Rules provide that:
“SEC. 16. Limitations.—Nothing contained in this rule shall be construed * * * to authorize an action against an officer for his ouster from office unless the same be commenced within one year after the cause of such ouster, or the right of the plaintiff to hold office, arose; * * *” (Rule 68, Rules of Court, p. 139.)
There is no question that petitioner’s right of action, if any, accrued in July, 1946, when respondent allegedly usurped the office. From that day to August, 1948, more than one year has elapsed. This petition is, therefore, out of time and nay not be entertained. (Bautista vs. Fajardo, 38 Phil., 624; Abeto vs. Rodas, supra, p. 59 46 Off. Gaz., 930-938).
During our deliberations, some doubt was expressed as to the validity of this period of limitation when it refers to officers whose tenure is protected by the Constitution. Reduced to its simplest terms, the position seems to be that a statute may not limit the period within which a constitutional right should be asserted or enforced before judicial tribunals. The statement, however, would, in effect, contradict settled doctrines and practices. For instance, the right to recover real property admittedly prescribes after ten years; yet nobody will deny that such right is verily protected by the Constitution. Contracts are guaranteed by the Constitution; but none question the applicability of the statute of limitations to belated proceedings to enforce contractual obligations.
Furthermore, constitutional rights may certainly be waived,[2] and the inaction of the officer for one year could be validly considered as a waiver, i.e., a renunciation which no principle of justice may prevent, he being at liberty to resign his position anytime he pleases.
And there is good justification for the limitation period: it is not proper that the title to public office should be subjected to continued uncertainty, and the people’s interest requires that such right should be determined as speedily as practicable.
Remembering that the period fixed may not be procedural in nature, it is quite possible that some persons will question the validity of the “rule of court” on the point. However, it should be obvious that if we admit the inefficacy of the particular rule of court hereinbefore transcribed, the previous statute on the subject (Act 190, section 216)—equally providing for a one-year term—would automatically come into effect, and we return to where we started: one year has passed.
It is also suggested that according to Agcaoili vs. Suguitan,[3] the one-year period does not refer to public officers, but to corporations. In that litigation, it is true that the court, on this particular point, decided by a bare majority, the case for the petitioner on two grounds, namely, (a) the one-year period applies only to actions against corporations and not to actions against public officers and (b) even if it applied to officers the period had not lapsed in view of the particular circumstances. However, upon a reconsideration this Court “modified” the decision “heretofore announced”[4] by limiting it to the second ground.
And thereafter—this is conclusive—this Court, with the concurrence of justices who had signed the original Agcaoili decision, expressly applied the one-year period in a quo warranto contest between two justices of the peace.[5]
Wherefore, the petition is dismissed, with costs. So ordered.
Moran, C.J., Paras, Pablo, Tuason, and Montemayor, JJ., concur.