[ G.R. No. L-2417. January 29, 1949 ] 82 Phil. 756
[ G.R. No. L-2417. January 29, 1949 ]
DALMACIO CELINO, DECEASED, SUBSTITUTED BY THE JUDICIAL ADMINISTRATRIX OF THE INTESTATE, PETITIONER, VS. ALEJANDRO BAUTISTA, RESPONDENT. R E S O L U T I O N
FERIA, J.:
The petition for certiorari by way of appeal from the judgment of the Court of Appeals to this Court on the ground that the former has decided a question not in accord with the decision of this Court has remanded this case to it for proper action.
The pertinent part of our decision reads as follows:
“The Court of Appeals clearly erred in not passing upon the liability of the respondent in connection with the checks (Exhibits G, H and I). In his complaint Dalmacio Celino seeks to recover the value of said checks which the respondent allegedly failed to deliver to the former. The respondent was thereby required to account for said value, and this is the reason why in his answer he denies any liability and claims that Dalmacio Celino had admitted having received the amount of the checks and, at the trial, he introdttced evidence tending to show that said amount wad applied to debts owing by Dalmacio Celino to the respondent. Therefore, the plain issue raised by the pleadings and on which the case was tried, is whether Dalmacio Celino has the right to recover the value of the checks. This is exactly the issue which the Court of First Instance of Laguna decided when it sentenced the respondent to pay P10,022.61, represented by the checks (Exhibits F, G, H and I). We accordingly hold that it was the duty of the Court of Appeals to determine as a question of fact, upon the evidence of both parties, whether the respondent, who admittedly cashed the checks (Exhibits G, H and I) on behalf of Dalmacio Celino, has satisfactorily proved that he had accounted for their value one way or another, in full or in part. In the affirmative case, the respondent should be absolved from corresponding liability; otherwise he should be sentenced to pay what he has failed to account for.
“It is futile to contemplate the necessity of any further accounting on the part of the respondent, since in this case he had already made allegations that the amount of the checks in question was received by, or applied to the payment of the debts of, Dalmacio Celino. What remains to be done, is only to verify whether said obligations are supported by the proof, and this task properly falls under the fact-finding power of the Court of Appeals.” (Italics ours.)
In accordance with the above quoted directive or decision, the only question or conclusion of fact for the Court of Appeals to find is, whether or not the preponderance of evidence shows that the plaintiff delivered the checks at bar to the defendant in payment of his obligation or debt to the latter or, in the language of the very decision of this Court, “what remains to be done, is only to verify whether said obligations are supported by the proof.” “In the affirmative case, the respondent should be absolved from corresponding liability; otherwise he should be sentenced to pay what he has failed to account for.”
From a mere cursory reading of the decision of the Court of Appeals it appears evident that said court has acted in accordance with the foregoing decision. The Court of Appeals, after analyzing and considering the declaration of the plaintiff, who denied the authenticity of his signature affixed in the cash vouchers exhibits 11, 12, and 31, which correspond to the checks in question, G, H,and I, respectively j the testimony of Jose Sison, accountant and cashier of Kellog and Sons, Inc., about the signing of said vouchers by the plaintiff and the delivery of the corresponding checks to the defendant by express order or instruction of the plaintiff; and the testimony of the defendant, who corroborated the said testimony of Jose Sison and admitted that he has received said checks from the plaintiff and cashed them in payment of the obligation due him from the plaintiff, made the following conclusions or findings of fact and decision:
“La negativa de Celino de haber tenido conocimiento de la expedicion de los cheques Exhibits G, H e I se compagina con los cash vouchers Exhibits 11, 12 y 31 no son suyas, en lo cual le ha sostenido el Juzgado a quo. Pero habiendo el Tribunal de Apelaciones llegado a la conclusion de que dichas firmas son autenticas, pronunciamento esto que es hoy firme, cae por su base la afirmacion de Celino de que no ha tenido conocimiento de la libranza de tales cheques, ni que los haya el entregado a Bautista. Desacreditado Celino en este particular, lo dicho por Sison de que era la practica en las transacciones de la casa Spencer Kellog & Sons que el cheque y el cash voucher que lo soporta se preparan a la vez, y el interesado a cuyo favor se expide el cheque tiene que firmar el cash voucher, para que ambos documentos a su vez se firmen y expidan por el manager o tesorero de la compania, es de creer; y, en el curso ordinario, es lo que ha sucedido en el presente asunto, en que Celino firmo los cash vouchers Exhibits 11, 12 y 31 y recibio consecuentemente los cheques Exhibits G, H e I, entregandolos despues a Bautista, quien los endozo y cobro sus respectivos importes. Bautista asevera que ha recibido los expresados cheques en pago de cantidades tomadas de el en prestamo por Celino. Como no es lo natural que se entreguen cheques, sobre todo de las cantidades que representan los Exhibits G, H e I, sin causa ni razon, y ninguna de Celino, fuerza es aceptar la alegacion de Bautista, de que se los dio en pago.
“Con la revocacion de la sentencia apelada, en cuanto condena a Alejandro Bautista a pagar a Dalmacio Celino el importe total de los cheques Exhibits G, H e I, se confirma en todo lo demas la sentencia apelada, sin costas en esta instancia.”
As it is seen, the Court of Appeals predicates its finding of fact that the preponderance of evidence shows that the contention of defendant Bautista that the plaintiff delivered the checks in question in payment of the plaintiff’s debt or obligation to the defendant, upon the latter’s testimony, corroborated by the presumption juris tantum “that a negotiable instrument was given or indorsed for a sufficient consideration” (section 69 (s), Rule 123) ; and upon the fact that plaintiff’s assertion, given credence by the Court of First Instance, that his signatures in the vouchers Exhibits 11, 12, and 31 were a forgery, in support of his contention that he did not deliver the checks to the defendant Bautista nor did he have any knowledge of their delivery to him, in order to avoid the application of said presumption, had been rejected by the Court of Appeals in its previous decision, already final, promulgated on June 16, 1942, in which it was held that they are genuine. While the mere denial of plaintiff Celino of the existence of such debt is not supported by any evidence or reason (”* * * sin causa ni razon, y ninguna de Celino”).
Whether or not said conclusion of fact of the Court of Appeals that declares the contention of the defendant proven or more worthy of credit than that of the plaintiff, and reverses the decision of the lower court without considering the convictions of the defendant of certain offenses as sufficient to affect his credibility, is erroneous or not supported by the evidence, is a question of fact which this Court can not pass upon in the present case.
Petition for certiorari is therefore denied.
Moran, C.J., Bengzon, Tuason, and Montemayor, JJ., concur.
Moran, C. J.:
There being no majority in this case, the petition is deemed denied, in accordance with section 2, Rule 56, of the Rules of Court.