[ G.R. No. L-2351. May 31, 1949 ] 83 Phil. 929
[ G.R. No. L-2351. May 31, 1949 ]
FRANCISCO ARGOS, PETITIONER, VS. DOMINADOR VELOSO, THE SECRETARY OF JUSTICE AND THE JUDGE OF COURT OF FIRST INSTANCE OF CEBU, RESPONDENTS. D E C I S I O N
PARAS, J.:
The petitioner was the pre-war justice of the peace of the municipality of Opon, Province of Cebu. After the liberation, or on April 10, 1945, he resumed his position under a verbal temporary appointment made by the commanding officer of PCAU 15. The petitioner was thereafter replaced, first, by Gregorio S. Gochoco on June 18, 1945; secondly, by Bonifacio Yuson on September 1, 1946; and lastly by the respondent Dominador Veloso on October 15, 1946. In the present action for quo warranto, instituted originally in this Court only on July 12, 1948, the petitioner seeks to obtain his reinstatement to his former judicial position, with the consequent ouster there from of respondent Dominador Veloso. The respondents have set up the defenses of prescription and abandonment, which are valid. In Abeto vs. Rodas (82 Phil., 59), we have already given effect to Rule of Court 68, section 16, which provides that “Nothing contained in this rule shall be construed to authorize an action * * * against an officer for his ouster from office unless the same be commenced within one year after the cause of such ouster, or the right of the plaintiff to hold office arose; * * * . The petitioner’s contention that the one-year period does not apply to public officers, but to corporations, and cannot affect, at any rate, officers whose tenure is protected by the Constitution, has been overruled in the case of Tumulak vs. Egay (82 Phil., 828). Petitioner’s action cannot prosper, not only because he failed to institute it within one year from the date he was allegedly dispossessed of his lawful position, (even assuming October 15, 1946, to be such date, and not June 18, 1945, when he was first replaced by Gregorio S. Gochoco), but because his subsequent acts showed abandonment of the office, it appearing that from October 29, 1946, to January 24, 1948, he worked in the Surplus Property Commission as skilled laborer and clerk-typist, and that on February 12, 1947, he surrendered Ms policies to the Government Service Insurance System and received their cash value. It is not pretended that the petitioner could perform the duties of the justice of the peace of Opon while he was in the employ of the Surplus Property Commission. Our decisions in Floresca vs. Quetulio (82 Phil., 128), and Potot vs. Bagano (82 Phil., 679), are in point. The fact that “petitioner was forced to seek or accept these jobs in order to live would not alter the case even if we assume, for the sake of argument, that economic necessity was a valid plea.” The petition is therefore dismissed, with costs. So ordered. Moran, C. J., Pablo, Bengzon, Tuason, Montemayor, and Reyes, JJ., concur.